Heartburn and the Unseen

Last night before bed I had a wicked case of heartburn. For whatever reason, I get heartburn a lot. Thankfully, ranitidine doesn’t just make me feel better. It makes the simply heartburn go away. It cures it. I find this amaing, and I’m very grateful for it. (Regular antacid is simply not enough.) A few times recently, when I’ve been away from home and didn’t have my pills, heartburn has completely destroyed my sleep, leaving me fatigued and aching all the next day. Until recently, the drug required a prescription. But now a bottle of ranitidine can be had at WalMart for $4. There are 65 pills in a bottle, each one–worth about $.16–a small salvation from misery.

Perhaps my heartburn is a symptom of a stressful modern life. Or perhaps I’m approaching my middle years. Either way, the problem is as good as solved. But the hellish nights and dragging days I have not slogged through are not something I notice–not something that ordinarily enters into my estimation of how good I have it. But it is a part of how good I have it. A world of comfortable beds, shoes that fit, basic indoor climate control, and $4 bottles of ranitidine is a world of massively reduced low-grade suffering. We would do even better if we would spare a moment now and then to reflect on the wonder of this, to allow ourselves to feel gratitude for all those things that give us the comfort to be aggravated by distant injustice and overwhelmed by a superabundance of possibilities in life.

David Brooks' Jihad Against Individualism

On behalf of America, I am staging an intervention. Country first!

David Brooks is evidently infatuated with the idea that individualism is just downright unscientific. It is more than a bit queer that Brooks uses this alleged Fact of Science to argue that American conservatives ought to purge all remaining vestiges of individualism from its thought since, you know, American conservative ideology is engineered entirely along scientific lines. On one understanding of the words, the opposite of “individualism” is “socialism”. So I think it’s safe to say that David Brooks is on a quest to make the Republican Party safe for scientific socialism. And that’s just the sort of surprise that makes David Brooks such a consistently interesting thinker.

Nevertheless, I cannot say I understand what he is talking about. Brooks appears to believe that the discovery that human beings are hypersocial mammals is some kind of earthshattering gamechanger, but it’s hard to grasp why he thinks this. Brooks’ account of the science is fine, but the remainder of the column is a lavish non-sequitur, a richly embroidered but intellectually vulgar instance of the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed, the fact that he tries to get where he does with the science he cites is evidence that he doesn’t understand it so well. Now, Brooks is entirely correct when he writes that

…we are intensely social creatures, deeply interconnected with one another and the idea of the lone individual rationally and willfully steering his own life course is often an illusion.

And it is also true that we are intensely social creatures, deeply connected to one another, and the idea of the lone individual rationally and willfully steering his own life course is often not an illusion. It is least often an illusion when one inhabits a moral culture in which psychological individuation, autonomy, and independence are cultivated and prized. If we have managed to wring a relatively individualistic culture out of the raw materials of our tribal natures, that is a triumph of deanimalizing civilization. Individualism is indeed unnatural — much like other noted mockeries of the natural order, such as equality under the law, vaccination, and the wheel. Brooks might stop to note that improvements on nature are both possible and desirable. The existence of mirror neurons no more debunks individualism than the existence of retinas debunks telescopes.

Americans individualism is a manifestation of human sociality. In our culture, individualist norms are routinely transmitted from one generation to the next through the unique hypersocial-mammalian capacity for cultural transmission. Brooks apparently wants to interfere with further transmission of individualistic norms because they produce a politics he finds insufficiently authoritarian and illiberal. Which is, of course, precisely why we need to double down on a moral culture of individualism.

Do individualistic cultures cut across the grain of human nature? Sure  — in a good way! It is a well-confirmed finding of happiness research that individualistic cultures are happier than collectivistic ones. Indeed, this discovery grounds a number of hypotheses about why average wealth correlates with average levels of self-reported life satisfaction. For example, here is Aaron Ahuvia in the Journal of Happiness Studies:

Rather [than increasing happiness directly through increased consumption], economic development increases SWB [subjective well-being] by creating a cultural environment where individuals make choices to maximize their happiness rather than meet social obligations (Coleman, 1990; Galbraith, 1992; Triandis, 1989; Triandis et al., 1990; Veenhoven, 1999; Watkins and Liu, 1996). This cultural transformation away from obligation and toward the pursuit of happiness is part of a broader transition away from collectivism and toward individualist cultural values and forms of social organization.

Got that? Wealth, which produces all sorts of hugely desirable human goods, also weakens orientation toward pre-assigned roles and their obligations and strengthens the orientation toward individual fulfillment, resulting in more fulfillment. Collectivist moral cultures do serve an important function in the typical human condition. But we are lucky when that function has become unnecessary  –  when collectivist values become a vestigial organ of the body politic. Ahuvia puts it nicely:

Collectivism revolves around face, honor, and public reputation. Collectivism is associated with poor countries because it is a cultural survival mechanism born of the necessity for group solidarity. Indeed collectivism is a survival mechanism that is positively correlated with well-being if one looks only at a sub-sample of poor countries (Veenhoven, 1999). Survival mechanisms are serious business. It is not surprising, then, that collectivist societies often rely on social coercion via threats and rewards to one’s public reputation to ensure compliance with group norms, since the stakes for the group are so high.

Does Brooks really want to fight so hard for a morality of poverty? It is true that in straitened circumstances we are forced to close ranks and get with the program, but this is and ought to be repulsive to a free people.

Brooks mentions Edmund Burke and Adam Smith as “conservatives” (WTF?) who really understood social embeddeness. They sure did! So they’re not individualists? Well, in Friedrich Hayek’s brilliant essay, “Individualism: True and False,” he says this:

The true individualism which I shall try to defend began its modern development with John Locke, and particularly with Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, and achieved full stature for the first time in the work of Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith and in that of their great contemporary, Edmund Burke…

The difference between Brooks and Hayek on this score is that Hayek understands Western political thought, and, more generally, he grasps that sociality is an enabling condition, not the antithesis, of the ethos of individualism that created modern liberty and the wealth of the Western world.

America is reputed to be the world’s most individualistic culture, and has been for a long time. Our individualism is the foundation of the mind-blowing innovation and variety of the American scene. Our individualism is a main source of our world-historical prosperity and high levels of happiness. Yet Brooks, unembarrassed or unaware, wheels out a fallacious appeal to nature specifically to discredit this — the most distinctive and valuable feature of American culture.

It clearly tickles Brooks’ collectivist fancy “when John McCain talks at a forum about national service.” But that is precisely when McCain exposes his martial animosity to the character of his own country. Brooks may wish to join McCain in an effort to efface the separateness of lives, to degrade the dignity of self-creation and self-command by denying its possibility, to cultivate in Americans the docility of subjects ready to kill and die for the state. In Prussia this may have been a “conservative” project. But this is America. And defending American individualism is my one conservative impulse!

So, David Brooks, here’s a line. Paine, Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Garrison, Spooner, Tucker, Twain, Mencken, Hayek, Friedman, Rand, and America are over here on this side. And there’s you over there. You are most welcome to step across and attempt to wrest the individualism from our cold dead fingers. Bring McCain! In fairness, I should say that Emerson is a vicious Indian leg wrestler.

More on the CPI: The BLS Responds!

John Greenlees of the BLS was kind enough to reply by email to my recent post on the CPI, and has agreed to allow me to post his comments:

Thank you for the kind words on your The Fly Bottle blog about my article with Rob McClelland, “Addressing Misconceptions about the Consumer Price Index.”  You also say there that you would be interested in our response to the concern that the CPI is too conservative in accounting for gains to consumers.

In calculating the CPI, the BLS faces a set of well-known but difficult challenges, including dealing with consumer substitution behavior, accounting for product quality change, and handling the introduction of new products like Ipods and new distribution channels like the Internet.  With respect to each of these issues, we attempt to employ the most advanced methods available, subject to the requirement that those methods also be objective and reproducible.  There is no perfect way, however, to measure the welfare gains and losses that consumers experience when prices change and products appear and disappear.  Thus, we know that the CPI is not perfect, but we do not have an estimate of any statistical “bias” in the index; if there was an accurate and reliable method to estimate such a bias, we would use that method to improve the CPI by eliminating the bias.

The most recent summary of the BLS approach to CPI measurement problems is probably the article “Working to Improve the Consumer Price Index” by Commissioner Katharine Abraham and others in the Winter 1998 Journal of Economic Perspectives (at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2646935.pdf).  More recently, at an American Economics Association session in 2006, I reviewed the BLS considerations underlying changes it made during the years surrounding the 1996 Boskin Commission report on the CPI.  That review was subsequently published in the International Productivity Monitor, available at http://www.csls.ca/ipm/12/IPM-12-Greenlees-e.pdf.

I hope these citations are helpful, and thank you again for mentioning our article.

John S. Greenlees, Ph.D.
Research Economist
Division of Price and Index Number Research
US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Thanks, John (and Rob)!

Here’s a few thoughts… I don’t think it’s surprising that there is no statistical estimate of conservative bias, given current modes of measurement. As John says, if there was, they’d use it to correct the measure. But I wonder what kind of measure would be convincing in establishing an overall conservative bias. In particular, I wonder about the possibility of objectively measuring average subjective consumer welfare gains.

I don’t think we can do this with current life satisfaction survey methods. But suppose some future science of the measurement of affective quality could track changes in the levels of the various hormones and the activation of the various neural pathways underpinning the various positive and negative feelings. Then suppose we were able to use statistical analysis to isolate the portion of these changes attributable to changes in consumption. We should then be able to say something more precise about the real hedonic (in the psychological sense) value of quality changes, new products, new outlets, etc. Shouldn’t we?

Of course, subjective states aren’t the only things we care about and don’t exhaust well-being, on plausible accounts of well-being. Longevity, health, and various capabilities are plausible constituents of well-being, too. And it strikes me that we can measure some of these things quite directly. So why not estimate the effects of new products and quality changes on all these aspects of well-being?

Let’s say a “theory of well-being” is a list of plausible candidate constituents of well-being together, where each element is assigned a weight corresponding to its relative importance. We could poll people and do other experiments to reveal the most popular theories. Then we could calculate changes in well-being, relative to the most widely accepted theories of well-being, as typical consumption baskets change in composition and quality over time. Your real income might go up according to an index built on one theory of well-being and down on another. Then, instead of arguing over suspected biases in the CPI, pundits could argue directly about the constituents of welfare. That would be better. That’s what the argument is really about anyway. Could pluralistic indexing be the future?

One last thing that you should skip unless you care:  I find the Austrian subjectivist argument against economic measurement based in the heterogeneity of preferences uninteresting. It’s still useful to know the average effect of a change in the set of consumption options, and preference profiles don’t randomly differ. They cluster in rough types. So heterogeneity is no argument against discovering usefully general truths. Anti-”scientism” is often little more than obscurantism or methodological laziness.

Once again, thanks to the guys from the Division of Price and Index Number Research for so kindly responding!

McCloskey on Happiness and Flourishing

Speaking of McCloskey, I’m enjoying her response to critics [doc] of Bourgeois Virtues. I’m symapthetic to her position on happiness in this passage:

[Graafland and I] do more sharply disagree that “the goal of virtues is just this: to become happy.”  The Greek word that started the discussion, eudaimonia, is indeed sometime translated erroneously as “happiness,” which then slides over to the pot-of-pleasure definition favored by modern utilitarians.  A well-fed cat sitting on the window sill in the afternoon sun would report to a happiness-questionnaire scientist that she was happy, being at 9 on a scale of 10 (reserving 10 for sexual intercourse).  But we are not cats—though I would be the last to deny that a cat-like “happiness” from time to time is an element of a full life.  Baskin-Robbins. 

One would have thought that more economists, though, would be familiar with the Experience-Machine example that Robert Nozick devised in 1974 (I discuss it in The Bourgeois Virtues, pp. 124-125).  “Superduper neuropsychologists,” wrote Nozick, “would stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel” any life you want. Then you would die.  “Would you plug in?”  No, of course not.  You are you.  You have an identity (faith) and projects (hope) and loyalties (love).  Being Queen Elizabeth I would be great fun, the fun we get from a novel or a history about her reign, or a TV series starring Helen Mirren.  But in a novel or TV series we do not have to give up being ourselves, and won’t.  Nozick’s argument devastates any version of utilitarianism that does not have a serious theory of identity (faith, hope, love).  The experiment shows, as Nozick put it elsewhere, that “we are not empty containers or buckets to be stuffed with good things.”

The better translation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s eudaimonia is “fulfilled” or “flourishing” or close to literally (though having then anachronistic Judeo-Christian overtones) “blessed,” since the word literally means “having good spirits attending one.”  Doubtless, if she was lucky enough in 1800 to miss smallpox and starvation, Burns’ impoverished Scottish nut-brown maiden, “Her eye so mildly beaming/ Her look so frank and free,” equaled in “happiness” defined in the pot-of-pleasure sense the average person on the streets of Glasgow nowadays.  That is what recent research on so-called happiness claims, quite plausibly.  Nonetheless the modern Glaswegian has gigantically greater scope.  She can do 100 times more of some things, leading a fuller life-fuller in travel, education, ease of life, ease of listening to “The Nut-Brown Maiden” sung in English and Gaelic on the internet.  “Happiness” viewed as self-reported mood is not the point of a fully human life.  Therefore I think it obvious that modern economic growth has greatly improved modern life, and made people better as much as better off.  Some people don’t get it, true, and watch TV for six hours a day and eat Frittos by the bagful.  Therefore let us preach to them.

I don not believe that recent happiness research in fact implies that the nut-brown maiden would have reported a level of happiness no less than contemporary Glaswegians. But the broader point is bang on.

Nozick is right that we’re not utility pots. But I’m skeptical of superstrong notions of personal continuity, too, (“faith” is the right word for identity) and therefore I’m skeptical of certain kinds of strong conceptions of flourishing as living according to virtue — unless simply we define virtues as “those habits of mind and action that facilitate flourishing” — in which case, we need an independent account of flourishing. I’m not skeptical of the idea that neural deselection and myelination creates deeply persistent skills or excellences that one might want to identify with virtuea. But I doubt that (1) there is a pattern of such brain development that counts as virtue everywhere and always, completely independent of local social structure, and that (2) the internalization of local norms — the kind we tend to identify with virtues — generally goes this deep. Once acquired, it is difficult to lose a well-practiced backswing or the hard-won ability to see through to an argument’s implicit logical structure. But given the right shift in social context, many of our virtues can turn on a dime.

Happiness Inequality

Read Justin Wolfers first in a trilogy of posts on U.S. happiness inequality at Freakonomics.

Also check out Eduardo Porter’s account of Stevenson and Wolfer’s paper:

It seems odd that happiness would become more egalitarian over a period in which the share of the nation’s income sucked in by the richest 1 percent of Americans rose from 7 percent to 17 percent. In fact, the report does find a growing happiness gap between Americans with higher levels of education and those with less, which is roughly in line with the widening pay gap between the skilled and unskilled.

Happiness, Meaning, and Knowledge

The continued discussion about kids and happines brings into focus the questions about the priority of happiness over other values and the reliability of happiness measurement. One of the hazards of blogging is to imagine that your audience has been following you all along, and so knows your positions on central topics so that your thoughts in short blog posts are interpreted in the context of your larger body of thought. Of course, that’s not how it works.

So, for those of you who insist that happiness isn’t the only thing that matters and that there are deep methodological problems in measuring happiness, let me say that I agree with you. Also, if I may so say myself, I believe I have written what is still one of the clearest and most sophisticated statement of these points in the paper on happiness Cato published last spring. So if philosophical and methodological questions surrounding the attempt to measure happiness interests you, let me direct you to pages 5-17 in my paper, starting at the section “The Limits of Happiness Research.’

Some people find my position confusing, since I am so critical of the methodology of happiness research, yet I also strongly support it. I don’t think this should be that confusing. It can be made better as I science, and I want to help. And it can be useful in assessing policy, as long as you don’t make a bunch of easily-avoidable mistakes, and I want to help with that as well. Here’s what I said about this in the paper:

Despite the foregoing criticisms, happiness research as it stands is far from useless. We can make the best use of it if we don’t naively assume that happiness is really the primary subject of measurement and research, as if the elusive nature of happiness has been pinned down at long last. Happiness research does tell us something about how we feel, and it tells us a lot about the conditions under which different kinds of people are inclined to say that they are satisfied or unsatisfied with life. Good feelings are important, and so are culture-laden judgments that life is going well, even if happiness is more and less than that. It would be pretty incredible if the disposition to say that we are happy on a survey didn’t correlate well with certain good feelings and other good things. And the evidence is clear that it does.

I have done my best to expose the weaknesses of the dominant survey methods in order to provide a much-needed counterweight to the often complacent confidence in their reliability and lack of care in the interpretation of their results. When intellectuals and politicians use putatively scientific data for political purposes, it is important to apply careful scrutiny to their methods and to the way their results are interpreted and used. If, however, we are very careful when comparing happiness survey results across different cultures or across long periods of time; or when looking at studies that make no note of individual personality differences, that do not follow the same individuals over time, or that sample an exceptionally diverse population, it is possible to glean solid information about things almost all of us care about that ought to have real weight—if not all the weight—in our public deliberation about our political and economic institutions and policies. In that regard, it is heartening that recent studies deploy more sophisticated research designs, better econometric techniques, better theoretical constructs, larger data sets, and integration with more objective and rigorous biological measurement techniques.

So, about the stuff with kids, I assume the studies tell us something real both about how kids affect the balance of day-to-day feelings and overall judgments of life satisfaction. I in fact think happiness is more than that and that there are values in competitions with happiness. The brute, intense, often overwhelming attachment to one’s own children may be the basis for one of those values. We are getting better and better at individuating the strands of sentiment and judgment that go into the various considerations that we take to count for an against our choices. If you believe that children make life more meaningful, then let’s try to verify that by clarifying what it is psychologically that constitutes meaning and see if we can find ways of measuring it. I understand that many people resist the attempt to measure everything — meaning, religious devotion, love for a child, the sense of authenticity, a feeling of purpose. But these things are part of the intelligible world, and part of us, and I happen to prefer knowledge over ignorance. New knowledge doesn’t always surprise us, but often it does, calling into question the weight and authority of our reasons. History is sufficient to predict with a high level of confidence that we will resist reevaluating the considerations that we take to count in favor of our lives as we live them. Some people think they know in advance that further knowledge, that deeper inquiry into the character of what we take to be good reasons for living the way we do, will leave us disenchanted and feeling diminished. But they don’t actually know that, because they never bothered to do the work necessary to really find that out.

Bundles of Oy

Newsweek has an excellent feature by Lorraine Ali on kids and happiness.

The most recent comprehensive study on the emotional state of those with kids shows us that the term “bundle of joy” may not be the most accurate way to describe our offspring. “Parents experience lower levels of emotional well-being, less frequent positive emotions and more frequent negative emotions than their childless peers,” says Florida State University’s Robin Simon, a sociology professor who’s conducted several recent parenting studies, the most thorough of which came out in 2005 and looked at data gathered from 13,000 Americans by the National Survey of Families and Households. “In fact, no group of parents—married, single, step or even empty nest—reported significantly greater emotional well-being than people who never had children. It’s such a counterintuitive finding because we have these cultural beliefs that children are the key to happiness and a healthy life, and they’re not.”

This is in fact the best piece of seen on this issue so far, touching on our culture’s intense romantization of parenthood. This is an excellent and accurate observation:

“If you admit that kids and parenthood aren’t making you happy, it’s basically blasphemy,” says Jen Singer, a stay-at-home mother of two from New Jersey who runs the popular parenting blog MommaSaid.net. “From baby-lotion commercials that make motherhood look happy and well rested, to commercials for Disney World where you’re supposed to feel like a kid because you’re there with your kids, we’ve made parenthood out to be one blissful moment after another, and it’s disappointing when you find out it’s not.”

Ali finishes on a hopeful note.

For the childless, all this research must certainly feel redeeming. As for those of us with kids, well, the news isn’t all bad. Parents still report feeling a greater sense of purpose and meaning in their lives than those who’ve never had kids. And there are other rewarding aspects of parenting that are impossible to quantify. For example, I never thought it possible to love someone as deeply as I love my son.

I think here we have the key to the intense resistance to the empirical results. There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the reports of parents like Ali who find that they love their children more than they thought possible. It’s really remarkable how often first time parents, especially men, seem almost startled by the profound depth of their love for and attachment to their child. I’ve heard any number of new parents say that they had heard others talk about this amazing bond, but never really expected to feel it themselves. The almost embarrassed earnestness of this admission is truly moving. And, if they won’t stop talking about it, also pretty annoying. (We are all surprised by the all-consuming intensity of our first teenage crush. But the point is, we all are.)  Anyway, the profundity of the experience of loving a child I think blinds many people to the very real costs of raising them. To accept that we have been made less happy in a real sense by our children threatens our sense of the profundity and the value of that bond. So people get upset when they hear this. But that’s not counter-evidence. Not all values move in one direction and it is a mark of maturity to be able to admit that some of the things we value most comes at a sometimes steep cost. We yearn to love our choices, and our lives, with whole hearts. But to do so is to lie to ourselves about ourselves, to close our eyes and cover our ears like children to the profundity of what we have given up. We cannot have everything. It does not diminish the life one has to face the truth about it. It enlarges it to see it for what it is, to know what it has cost, and to love it anyway.

There Is Something Called "Behavioral Economics," Can't Tell You What It Is Just Now, but It May Be Important, Just So You Know

I can’t say what the point of this less than coherent video from Gallup was, other than to mention that Gallup is at the forefront of measuring things in interesting new ways, but I thought some of you might find it interesting anyway:

[Update... Oh, this one is a little better, sort of. They could use a copywriter who doesn't have to guess so much about what the point of all this is.]

You’ll be relieved to see that the guy from Singapore is interested in measuring life satisfaction in order to allow you (the ruling class of a country like, say, Singapore) to “harness the total capacity of your people.” The Australian is interested in “chomping down the policies so we can drive people the right way.” Huh?

Regrettable Prudence

Yes, you can be too tight-fisted. From  Anat Keinan and Ran Kivetz in the Harvard Business Review:

One of our studies—published in the Journal of Consumer Research—explored the regret felt by college students over their conduct on recent winter breaks and by alumni remembering winter breaks of 40 years ago. Regret about not having spent or traveled more during breaks increased with time, whereas regret about not having worked, studied, or saved money during breaks decreased with time. We saw a similar pattern in a study of how businesspeople perceived past choices between work and pleasure. Over time, those who had indulged felt less and less guilty about their choices, whereas those who had been dutiful experienced a growing sense of having missed out on the pleasures of life.

People who unduly resist self-indulgence suffer from an excessive farsightedness, or hyperopia—the reverse of typical self-control problems. Rather than yielding to temptation, they focus on acquiring necessities and acting responsibly and they see indulgence as wasteful, irresponsible, and even immoral. As a result, these consumers avoid precisely the products and experiences that they most enjoy. Their hyperopia can inhibit consumption in ways that are bad both for their own well-being and for marketers’ bottom lines. We don’t advocate trying to motivate consumers to make ill-considered purchases, of course, but marketers can help customers make appropriately indulgent choices that they’ll appreciate over the long term.

I love the little bit of pro-luxury “libertarian paternalism” in that last sentence. The very existence of hyperopia of course points to the problem in trying to design one-size-fits-all policy designed to save people from excess. Some people drink, gamble, and shop too little. It needs to be easier for them. And some people do too much. It needs to be harder for them. There is no way a planner can design a set of incentives that hits everybody’s sweet spot.

[Thanks to DWAnderson for the pointer in the comments.]

World Getting Happier

The new World Values Survey is out and these dismal United States comes in 16th in the world in the WVS happiness rankings, just between such Scandinavian hellholes as Sweden and Norway. You’ll see the usual Latin American bonus in the data, with Puerto Rico, Colombia, and El Salvador populating the upper reaches of the rankings. However, the U.S. has now pulled ahead Mexico. Maybe it’s because all the Mexicans who moved to the U.S. Denmark retains its happiness crown.

The real news is that happiness increased in so many places. Univesity of Michigan political scientist Ronald Ingelhart, director of the WVS, explains why. From the University of Michigan press release:

ANN ARBOR, Mich.—People in most countries around the world are happier these days, according to newly released data from the World Values Survey based at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research.

Data from representative national surveys conducted from 1981 to 2007 show the happiness index rose in an overwhelming majority of nations studied.

“It’s a surprising finding,” said U-M political scientist Ronald Inglehart, who directs the World Values Surveys and is the lead author of an article on the topic to be published in the July 2008 issue of the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science. “It’s widely believed that it’s almost impossible to raise an entire country’s happiness level.”

[...]

The new findings from the World Values Surveys not only show that during the past 25 years, happiness has in fact risen substantially in most countries. Fully as important as the fact that happiness rose is the reason why. In recent decades, low-income countries such as India and China have experienced unprecedented rates of economic growth, dozens of medium-income countries have democratized and there has been a sharp rise of gender equality and tolerance of ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians in developed societies.

Economic growth, democratization and rising social tolerance have all contributed to rising happiness, with democratization and rising tolerance having even more impact than economic growth. All of these changes have contributed to providing people with a wider range of choice in how to live their lives—which is a key factor in happiness.

The people of rich countries tend to be happier than those of poor countries, but even controlling for economic factors, certain types of societies are much happier than others.

“The results clearly show that the happiest societies are those that allow people the freedom to choose how to live their lives,” Inglehart said.

The world is getting better. Wealth and freedom makes it better.

Betsey Stevenson on Happiness on Nightline

Watch, listen, learn.

Link via Justin Wolfers, who asks a tangential question I would very much like to know the answer to:

(An aside: You will note that I referred to Betsey as my co-author, which she is, but that is only a partial description, as she is also my Wharton colleague, and also my longtime significant other. What is the right word for this? “Colleague plus?” I imagine that finding the right language for this is an increasingly common conundrum. Any suggestions?)

Stranger-Reported Economist Happiness

This paper from the May 2008 edition of Kyklos [ungated] just may be the best paper ever written. It investigates the happiness of economics Nobel Prize winners, non-Nobel superstar economists, and prominent happiness researchers by showing their website photographs to people on the street in Melbourne Brisbane, Australia. Thus it contains winning lines such as:

[T]he advice for young academics is: if you seek happiness, become a macro-economist and research happiness; a Nobel Prize does not make you happier; if you want to be popular with the ladies, take lessons from Edmund Phelps, Bruno Frey and Richard Easterlin; if you are looking for the ability to age like a red wine, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean Tirole have the trick, but not Richard Easterlin.

Who, according to the good people of Melbourne Brisbane, is the happiest economist? Well, who do you think? [Click for full size.]

Nobelists, Superstars, and Happiness Researchers

That’s right, Edmund Phelps. That man is clearly loving life.

Congratulations to the authors for this exemplary piece of social science!

Arthur Brooks on Religion and Happiness

In Arthur Brooks’ Gross National Happiness, he makes a great deal of the effect of religiosity on happiness. And there is no disputing the data: in the United States, religious participation is positively correlated with higher levels of self-reported happiness. But he makes rather too much of it, I think, largely because he has decided not to take into account international comparisons but rather stick exclusively with evidence from the U.S. I think this is a huge mistake.

In the AEI forum Thursday, Brooks responded to my criticism by correctly pointing out that cross-country comparisons can be muddied by various cultural differences. Sure. But if you are more or less thoroughly satisfied with the general validity of survey measures, as Brooks claims to be, then there is really no principled reason not to compare results between the United States and Western Europe, which aren’t all that different. Indeed, the differences that do show up in the data are very telling, and they cut strongly against both the substance and rhetoric of Brooks’ strongly pro-religion argument.

I think Brooks is rather too willing to slide from local individual-level correlations — for example, that other things equal, religious folks in the United States say they are happier — to macro-level generalizations — for example, that more religious cultures are generally happier ones. At one point, Brooks implies that the ACLU is hurting national happiness by fighting against public displays of religion.

What you do not learn in the chapter on religion in Gross National Happiness is that countries with some of the lowest levels of religious participation in the world, such as Denmark, Norway, or Finland show up again and again in international rankings as some of the world’s happiest places, usually ahead of the U.S. Moreover, many of the most religious places on Earth are deeply miserable.

You’d think this would be relevant. But Brooks just doesn’t bring it up. He seemed to me to encourage the idea that the relationship between religiosity and happiness is deep, perhaps universal. But it just isn’t. According to a 2007 paper by Lisbeth Snoep in the Journal of Happiness Studies, there is no significant individual-level correlation between religiosity and happiness in the countries she looked at: Denmark and the Netherlands — both among the happiest countries. In his concluding chapter, one of Brooks’ “Happiness Lessons for our Leaders” is “America must defend it’s tradition of religious faith.” But it’s really hard to see why.

Please compare these two charts (click for full size):

That’s from Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide.

And that’s from Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, “Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox“[pdf].

Secularization has been rapid in much of Europe over the last several decades. But according to Stevenson and Wolfers’ recent paper, happiness has been steadily increasing there all the while — unlike in the U.S., where the measured trend has been flat. It doesn’t take an econometric wizard to eyeball the relationship: religion down, happiness up. Doesn’t this fact simply devastate Brooks’ strong implication that secularization is antagonistic to national happiness? Yes it does.

Note that you don’t have to believe in cross-country happiness comparisons to take this seriously. All you have to note is that average happiness rose while rates of religious participation fell here, here, here, here, and here, etc. And then, given that fact, Brooks may owe us a special story about why he doesn’t think that relationship would hold in the United States, too.

So what are we left with? Brooks rightly points out that in the U.S. a great number of community organizations are anchored in religion. And sociality and community are key to happiness. So, sure, non-religiosity in the U.S. is likely to be a socially alienating and stigmatized kind of non-conformism. I’m trying to track down a paper I think is in the Diener and Suh collection, Culture and Subjective Well-Being, which I recall as saying something to the effect that a good individual fit with prevailing cultural values predicts self-reported happiness. So, for example, people with collectivist values are more likely to be happy in a collectivist society than are people with individualist values in collectivist cultures. But, overall, individualist societies tend to be happier. It seems to me that Brooks has simply found that America has a religious culture, and therefore it’s less trouble to be religious in the U.S., not that religiosity has some kind of deep connection to happiness.

But Brooks writes:

You may not go to church — you may be an atheist. But if you enjoy living in a happy country, you can thank — well, you can thank your lucky stars–that so many of your American compatriots are religious.

Looking at the data, this strikes me as conservative bluster. Almost all the countries that consistently score higher than the U.S. in happiness are much less religious. While conservatives and the religious are indeed more likely to say they are happy in the U.S., it would be a simple error to infer that “gross national happiness” would be damaged were the culture to become less conservative or religious. In fact, cross-national data seem strongly to suggest the opposite. Perhaps we should thank our lucky stars for the salutary influence of Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris!

It's Better To Earn It

From WSJ’s Wealth Report:

PNC Wealth Management recently polled about 1,500 Americans with $500,000 or more in investible assets and found that 69% of respondents made most of their fortune through work, business ownership or investments. Only 6% made their wealth by inheriting it, while 25% made it through a combination of inheritence and earnings.

What’s most interesting is that the survey found some major differences in the two groups’ attitudes about money — and their responses didn’t always break down along predictable lines:

[...]

LUCK — Fully 37% of earners agreed that “the money I have made so far has come from being at the right place at the right time.” Among heirs, the number was 25%. I guess the heirs don’t subscribe to Warren Buffett’s “lucky sperm” theory.

HAPPINESS– Fuly 76% of earners agree that “my financial success lets me feel less stress and worry,” compared to 50% of heirs. Half of all earners agree that “as I have accumulated more money in my life I have become happier,” compared to a third of heirs.

I especially like the luck result. It’s hard work getting born to the right parents.

[HT: Free Exchange]

Hunger Exists to Destroy Itself

Alex Singleton makes a nice point:

We moan about modern Britain in a way that does not seem to scientifically correlate to how good – or bad – it is, empirically. Indeed, complaining is something of a national pastime and, ironically, something that people seem to enjoy.

Far from being a major problem, there is something virtuous about being unhappy with our present circumstances. Ludwig von Mises, one of the 20th century’s leading free-market economists, said (pdf) that to be happy with one’s existing condition: “and to abstain apathetically from any attempts to improve one’s own material conditions, is not a virtue. Such an attitude is rather animal behaviour than conduct of reasonable human beings.”

It is not the level of wealth that makes us happy. Instead, it is the process of betterment – the pursuit of it – that makes us happy. Whether we are twice as rich today as in 1971 has little bearing on our happiness, because it is in the past. Whether people can see their lives improving in the future is what counts. That is why economic growth remains a key component in happiness, despite what the happiness researchers might tell us.

There really is something wonderful about a place that keeps getting better. Those are the places most likely to already have it good, as a consequence of a history of improvement. But people are not driven to make things better for themselves because they are fully satisfied, but because they aren’t. Of course, happiness researchers do tell us that the level of wealth, and the growth that caused it, matters to happiness. Shall we then conclude that dissatisfaction, when harnessed to the institutions of wealth creation, is the source of its own reduction? Yes.