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Furthermore, bounded rationality can explain why one animal might BELIEVE a signal, but not why the mutation to send out the signal spread. The benefits for signalling must have exceeded the costs.

Hanson's theory is that it is more costly for the inexperienced to signal confidence than the experienced. The experienced learn how to signal credibly. Because they actually are more experienced, it is rational for observers to consider it credible.

Have you read much evolutionary theory? Animals evolve to give signals. If the costs of those signals exceeded the benefits, the mutations responsible would be weeded out.

Yes, I have. Evolutionary models describe a form of bounded rationality, not full rational choice — for example, evolutionary processes can get stuck in local optima, whereas perfectly rational agents will not. That is, an evolutionary model is an explanation based on a deviation from rational choice.

If I DON'T signal overconfidence, that indicates that I probably have unusually low confidence. The experienced are more overconfident, so it is rational for observers to infer greater experience on the part of the more confident.

This is plausible, but actually establishing that this is a true explanation is very, very difficult. The problem is that this is not a stable solution concept — you're assuming that the observer is rational, but the counterparty is not acting strategically.

Now, what happens if the counterparty decides to project confidence strategically? And what happens if the observer decides to take into account the possibility that the counterparty is acting strategically, and so on? If you treat the degree of mutual information as a parameter to the model, then the model can predict either that the signal is meaningful or that it's not meaningful, depending on the degree of common knowledge — if you don't iterate, you get the solution you propose, and if you do, then you get the Nash equilibrium. In between, you get a transition depending on exactly how you've formulated the game.

This means that you need a method for measuring the degree of common knowledge before you can decide whether this is a true explanation or not. Without out, you have to remember that there's a word for models that can be tuned to predict anything, based on a hard-to-observe parameter with many plausible values: non-falsifiable.

Yes, but when you say “gosh, politicians are horrible!” and then fail to note that robber-barons and generals and popes, etc., are also horrible then you're left sounding libertarian-trite. I think it's safe to say that institutions that concentrate power are a permanent fixture in human societies. Reducing the power of “horrible politicians” just gives other horrible people in positions of power that much more freedom to operate and provides that much more incentive to power-mad assholes to move into alternative institutions and do their thing there.

Given the high barriers to entry into politics, the various advantages that incumbents enjoy, and the preponderance of assholes seeking entry, elections are far from ideal, but they do present a superior way to separate horrible people from power than exists in many other institutions that concentrate power such as religious organizations, corporations, the military, etc.

Many extremely smart people on Yglesias' side seem to pretend that policies will be executed precisely as they imagine them, with no abuse or scope creep.

Well, many extremely smart people on Wilkinson's side seem to pretend that “smaller government” won't lead to a game of whack-an-immoral-power-monger with a mallet even smaller than the one we currently have. “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty” is trite, too, but a utopian elimination of concentrations of power isn't one of its prerequisites. I also think you'll find that most of the smart people on Yglesias' side are on board with the eternal vigilance bit.

Costly signals are not incompatible with rational choice. Being costly does not means that costs exceed benefits (on an individual basis). If they did, nobody would engage in them!

This is the fallacy of assuming the consequent. The rationality of this behavior is precisely what is in question.

Signals are not credible unless their costs exceed their benefits. If the benefits of a behavior exceed its costs, you have an incentive to engage in this behavior regardless, and so your opponent cannot infer anything about your true intentions from it. That's why talk is cheap.

Signaling is precisely a way to escape the Nash equilibrium: if you give credible evidence that you are not rational, then the common knowledge assumption fails, and so the theorem that says you can't do better than a Nash equilibrium now no longer holds. Of course, to send such a signal requires…not being rational about costs!

This is why Schelling was not a particularly mathematical game theorist. His idea of strategy made heavy use of manipulations of perceptions of rationality — things which mathematical game theorists had to assume a fixed form for (common knowledge of rationality) in order to get viable solution concepts at all. This is also why many of Schelling's suggested strategies are not reflectively stable. For example, he suggests that a winning strategy in the Chicken game (drive two cars straight at each other, with the loser being the one who swerves first) is to remove your steering wheel, so that you have credibly committed to being unable to swerve away. If you do this, and your opponent is rational, then you win the game. However, if both sides do this, you get a crash, which is worse than the Nash equilibrium.

Seriously, read Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict. His prose is elegant and clear.

As an aside, this also gives a handy heuristic for judging policy debates: if someone starts talking about “credibility”, that's basically an admission that their policy's costs exceed benefits.