But it does all depend on whether you believe the “taboo” or not. There is popular prejudice against theft — but theft is also wrong.

Tolerant, fairly secular people have a lot of trouble with the notion of a consensual wrong: an act that doesn’t involve any coercion but is nonetheless an “abomination.” I’m genuinely uncertain as to whether such acts exist, and if so, why they are wrong. But I suspect that incest might be intrinsically wrong. Why? The potential for an abuse of authority can only explain part of it, since in sibling incest presumably both partners are roughly equal. The best reasoning I can think of is that relationships have a different character when they involve sex — and so a father and daughter who have sex have lost the possibility of a parent-child relationship. But I don’t know if this is reason enough for legal intervention; I also don’t know if it captures the reason most of us feel incest is wrong. What do folks think? Can there be such a thing as an abomination?

But it does all depend on whether you believe the “taboo” or not. There is popular prejudice against theft — but theft is also wrong.

Tolerant, fairly secular people have a lot of trouble with the notion of a consensual wrong: an act that doesn’t involve any coercion but is nonetheless an “abomination.” I’m genuinely uncertain as to whether such acts exist, and if so, why they are wrong. But I suspect that incest might be intrinsically wrong. Why? The potential for an abuse of authority can only explain part of it, since in sibling incest presumably both partners are roughly equal. The best reasoning I can think of is that relationships have a different character when they involve sex — and so a father and daughter who have sex have lost the possibility of a parent-child relationship. But I don’t know if this is reason enough for legal intervention; I also don’t know if it captures the reason most of us feel incest is wrong. What do folks think? Can there be such a thing as an abomination?

Now if you’re arguing that the state has no business enforcing a cultural taboo, it seems to me that it’s irresponsible not to step up and enforce it yourself by expressing disgust at these two sickos. Dain’s attitude — “what the hell business is it of ours?” — just seems reckless.

But this only follows if you agree with the cultural taboo. One can acknowledge the fact that a taboo exists without necessarily agreeing with it.

Now if you’re arguing that the state has no business enforcing a cultural taboo, it seems to me that it’s irresponsible not to step up and enforce it yourself by expressing disgust at these two sickos. Dain’s attitude — “what the hell business is it of ours?” — just seems reckless.

But this only follows if you agree with the cultural taboo. One can acknowledge the fact that a taboo exists without necessarily agreeing with it.

That doesn’t mean that society should never change, but it does mean that casting off tradition tends to have far-reaching and unpredictable consequences. If you want to tear down a tradition as well-established as the incest taboo, the burden is on you is to give a good reason. The desires of two Australian nutjobs don’t cut it.

This is precisely the argument non-bigoted conservatives give against gay marriage. (I say non-bigoted conservatives because bigoted conservatives don’t need a Hayekian argument to justify maintaining the status-quo; their hatred of homosexuality is justification enough.

I’m not so sure why you think the burden of proof is necessarily in favor of the status quo, as if the status quo is reason enough on its own, and the side proposing a change to the status quo is the only side that must give reasons. The burden of proof could just as easily go in the opposite direction, with a prima facie assumption of freedom, with the side proposing any moral or legal restriction on human action obligated to give sufficient reasons to override the prima facie assumption.

Now, I will agree that the status quo, all else being equal, with no other reasons given by either side, is reason enough to maintain itself, but this is almost never the case, for if there was no one to object to the status quo, this entire discussion is moot. As soon as a critic suggests that the status quo rule (whether a legal rule or simply a moral rule) should be changed in favor of liberty, that critic has given a reason – a reason to be weighed against the reason of the status quo.

Is the reason of liberty a stronger reason than the reason of maintaining the status quo? I’m not sure. But then, I’ve heard no good argument for why the burden of proof should favor the status quo and not favor liberty.

Jonathan Rauch addressed the Hayekian argument against gay marriage, concluding that Hayek himself was a moderate and not extreme Hayekian, and thus would probably have been in favor of extending the institution of marriage to gay couples. This particular excerpt, from Hayek’s “Law, Legislation, and Liberty, is telling:

“It may be due simply to the recognition that some past development was based on error or that it produced consequences later recognized as unjust….But the most frequent cause is probably that the development of the law has lain in the hands of members of a particular class whose traditional views made them regard as just what could not meet the more general requirements of justice….Such occasions when it is recognized that some hereto accepted rules are unjust in the light of more general principles of justice may well require the revision not only of single rules but of whole sections of the established system of case law.”

If the only justification we can give for maintaining the status quo is merely that it is the status quo, and if you don’t believe that the “desires of two Australian nutjobs” isn’t reason enough to change the status quo, then would be reason enough? How many nutjobs who want to enjoy their liberty to be nutjobs does it take before their unsatisfied desires become a good enough reason to ask the status quo to justify itself?

That doesn’t mean that society should never change, but it does mean that casting off tradition tends to have far-reaching and unpredictable consequences. If you want to tear down a tradition as well-established as the incest taboo, the burden is on you is to give a good reason. The desires of two Australian nutjobs don’t cut it.

This is precisely the argument non-bigoted conservatives give against gay marriage. (I say non-bigoted conservatives because bigoted conservatives don’t need a Hayekian argument to justify maintaining the status-quo; their hatred of homosexuality is justification enough.

I’m not so sure why you think the burden of proof is necessarily in favor of the status quo, as if the status quo is reason enough on its own, and the side proposing a change to the status quo is the only side that must give reasons. The burden of proof could just as easily go in the opposite direction, with a prima facie assumption of freedom, with the side proposing any moral or legal restriction on human action obligated to give sufficient reasons to override the prima facie assumption.

Now, I will agree that the status quo, all else being equal, with no other reasons given by either side, is reason enough to maintain itself, but this is almost never the case, for if there was no one to object to the status quo, this entire discussion is moot. As soon as a critic suggests that the status quo rule (whether a legal rule or simply a moral rule) should be changed in favor of liberty, that critic has given a reason – a reason to be weighed against the reason of the status quo.

Is the reason of liberty a stronger reason than the reason of maintaining the status quo? I’m not sure. But then, I’ve heard no good argument for why the burden of proof should favor the status quo and not favor liberty.

Jonathan Rauch addressed the Hayekian argument against gay marriage, concluding that Hayek himself was a moderate and not extreme Hayekian, and thus would probably have been in favor of extending the institution of marriage to gay couples. This particular excerpt, from Hayek’s “Law, Legislation, and Liberty, is telling:

“It may be due simply to the recognition that some past development was based on error or that it produced consequences later recognized as unjust….But the most frequent cause is probably that the development of the law has lain in the hands of members of a particular class whose traditional views made them regard as just what could not meet the more general requirements of justice….Such occasions when it is recognized that some hereto accepted rules are unjust in the light of more general principles of justice may well require the revision not only of single rules but of whole sections of the established system of case law.”

If the only justification we can give for maintaining the status quo is merely that it is the status quo, and if you don’t believe that the “desires of two Australian nutjobs” isn’t reason enough to change the status quo, then would be reason enough? How many nutjobs who want to enjoy their liberty to be nutjobs does it take before their unsatisfied desires become a good enough reason to ask the status quo to justify itself?

Even in cases of polygyny, with a single man married to multiple women, I still think the issues of power imbalance and potential for abuse are separable from the act of polygyny itself, in exactly the same way that issues of power imbalance and potential for abuse are separable from the act of incest itself.

Just as we can imagine (however unlikely in practice) a case of incest without a power imbalance or potential for abuse, so too we can imagine a case of polygyny without a power imbalance or potential for abuse.