Here’s a question and answer from AskPhilosophers that bears on the question of individual moral obligation in matters where only coordinated collective action can make any meaningful difference.
If I don’t fly from London to my sister’s wedding in New Zealand she will be upset, I will cause her pain and so that’s morally bad.If I do fly to my sister’s wedding in New Zealand I will put about four tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which will contribute to climate change, which, according to the World Health Organisation, already causes about 150,000 deaths every year. Clearly that’s also morally bad.Which is the morally correct thing to do?
December 4, 2007
Response from Thomas Pogge on December 7, 2007
In dilemmas of this kind, always start by thinking about whether they are really inescapable. One escape in this case it to speak with your sister. If she likes New Zealand, she is unlikely to be indifferent to the environmental degradation that is already so much in evidence elsewhere. Plus you can offer to donate the flight cost to a good cause of her choice, in honor of her wedding. In any case, it is much easier for her to understand and accept the decision if she was herself involved in making it or at least in thinking it through.
BTW, I checked your numbers because 4 tonnes seemed like a lot. But you are basically right. A Boeing 747-8 takes a bit over 200 tonnes of fuel (over half its take-off weight), roughly 137 gallons of fuel per passenger. Each gallon produces 20 lbs of carbon dioxide. So that’s about 1.3 tonnes per person. But then one tank does not get you there, plus you’ll have to fly back as well. So 4 tonnes is a very good estimate. Way too much, indeed.
Well, I sure wouldn’t have given Thomas Pogge’s answer, which I think is really quite silly. Even granting what I’d guess are the underlying extreme AGW assumptions, surely the correct answer is this:
Your choice is very unlikely to determine whether or not a airplane leaves London for New Zealand. So, chances are extremely high that the same amount of carbon will be emitted whether or not you choose to go. Staying or going will make no difference at all to the condition of the atmosphere. But even if your choice quite improbably keeps that plane in the hangar, the effect of that flight is infinitesimally small in the overall scheme of things. Your choice is also likely to do nothing whatsoever to improve the probability of enacting some kind of future global climate treaty or some kind of scheme for incorporating the cost of the environmental externality into the cost of plane tickets. So, if not being a horrible selfish brat of a brother matters to you at all, then you should go. In fact, you sound suspiciously like a shit trying to find a bogus, holier-than-thou excuse to wriggle out of ponying up for a flight to your sister’s wedding. If you’re broke or cheap you’ve got to tell her the truth about why you won’t go. You are emphatically not allowed to hide behind Al Gore.
Thomas Pogge is an eminent moral and political philosopher, and not a complete idiot, so what’s going on here?
No doubt when he commutes between his dual appointment in NY and Australia, he takes a row boat.
No doubt when he commutes between his dual appointment in NY and Australia, he takes a row boat.
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I question the opinion of anyone who thinks 2 x 1.3 = 4
I question the opinion of anyone who thinks 2 x 1.3 = 4
Will, I’m going to be cautious in voicing this opinion, since my knowledge of economics is quite minimal. However, I think you’re getting the probable effect wrong. You say that the brother’s decision is extremely unlikely to stop a plane from flying, thus not altering the amount of carbon produced. That’s true, but you have to multiply that small probability by the very large effect (relative to the 4 tonnes one passenger produces) of grounding an entire airplane. So I think it’s reasonable to take the expected carbon reduction of his decision to be a substantial fraction of that 4 tonnes (minus whatever the carbon footprint of his spending that $4000 elsewhere is).
In terms of supply and demand curves, the measure should move the demand curve for airfare to the left by one ticket at the relevant price. Depending on the steepness of the supply curve, that reduces the expected value of the quantity produced by perhaps between .5 and 1 tickets. Of course the actual effect will be either 0 tickets or 100 (which is an arbitrary number) since you can’t fly half of an airplane. But it’s the nature of the probabilities involved to cancel that out.
So I think Pogge should have said: “Well, you’ll save a few tonnes of carbon, but we burn carbon all the time. Figure out a way to save those few tons elsewhere and go to her wedding, you twerp. She’s your SISTER, for crying out loud.”
Will, I’m going to be cautious in voicing this opinion, since my knowledge of economics is quite minimal. However, I think you’re getting the probable effect wrong. You say that the brother’s decision is extremely unlikely to stop a plane from flying, thus not altering the amount of carbon produced. That’s true, but you have to multiply that small probability by the very large effect (relative to the 4 tonnes one passenger produces) of grounding an entire airplane. So I think it’s reasonable to take the expected carbon reduction of his decision to be a substantial fraction of that 4 tonnes (minus whatever the carbon footprint of his spending that $4000 elsewhere is).
In terms of supply and demand curves, the measure should move the demand curve for airfare to the left by one ticket at the relevant price. Depending on the steepness of the supply curve, that reduces the expected value of the quantity produced by perhaps between .5 and 1 tickets. Of course the actual effect will be either 0 tickets or 100 (which is an arbitrary number) since you can’t fly half of an airplane. But it’s the nature of the probabilities involved to cancel that out.
So I think Pogge should have said: “Well, you’ll save a few tonnes of carbon, but we burn carbon all the time. Figure out a way to save those few tons elsewhere and go to her wedding, you twerp. She’s your SISTER, for crying out loud.”
If you assume that the plane will fly with empty seats, you define away the problem. (Under those circumstances the potential traveller might also be able to get a cheap fare – so it will be harder for him to cry poor!)
If there are additonal emissions involved it is possible to escape the dilemma by buying carbon credits. That means the question boils down to whether the traveller is prepared to pay the price (ie fare plus cost of carbon credits).
In terms of the broader question of responsibility for CO2 emissions, having ceased to be a skeptic about the influence of CO2 emissions on climate change, I am finding it difficult to weasel my way out of accepting responsiblity for my own CO2 emissions.
I don’t think the fact that my own actions in reducing my emissions will have an insignificant effect on the global problem gets me off the hook. I tried that argument in an analogous situation when I was a child and it didn’t work. When I was throwing rubbish out of the car window I was told by a responsible adult that it was wrong to litter the roadside. In reply I made the correct observation: “But, my little bit of rubbish isn’t going to make much difference”. The response I was given was that if everyone thought that way the litter problem would be much worse. That still seems to me to be a powerful moral argument.
If you assume that the plane will fly with empty seats, you define away the problem. (Under those circumstances the potential traveller might also be able to get a cheap fare – so it will be harder for him to cry poor!)
If there are additonal emissions involved it is possible to escape the dilemma by buying carbon credits. That means the question boils down to whether the traveller is prepared to pay the price (ie fare plus cost of carbon credits).
In terms of the broader question of responsibility for CO2 emissions, having ceased to be a skeptic about the influence of CO2 emissions on climate change, I am finding it difficult to weasel my way out of accepting responsiblity for my own CO2 emissions.
I don’t think the fact that my own actions in reducing my emissions will have an insignificant effect on the global problem gets me off the hook. I tried that argument in an analogous situation when I was a child and it didn’t work. When I was throwing rubbish out of the car window I was told by a responsible adult that it was wrong to litter the roadside. In reply I made the correct observation: “But, my little bit of rubbish isn’t going to make much difference”. The response I was given was that if everyone thought that way the litter problem would be much worse. That still seems to me to be a powerful moral argument.
I agree with Justin’s take. Of course in some sense Will is right that the individual action is a drop in the bucket — this is true of flying planes, eating meat, buying conflict diamonds, donating to charity, voting, and many other things.
It is logically defensible but kind of antisocial to say “since my actions can’t make a difference, I will ignore the broader picture.” Game theory says this leads to various tragedies of the commons. It is perfectly appropriate to combat the tragedy of the commons by getting angry at people for acting selfishly. So, it is morally appropriate (or defensible, anyway) to get pissed at someone who uses the “you can’t make a difference so do whatever you want” rule.
As an aside, it doesn’t matter that a single individual’s decision can’t make the difference between the plane flying/not-flying. I agree with the rule of thumb that each individual should shoulder an equal share of the blame for a collective failure. If nobody gets any blame, nothing changes.
A decent rule of thumb might be: If we instituted a carbon tax, what would I pay to make this decision? OK, that’s how much “carbon blame” I take on by doing this. (Think of moral opprobrium as a way of “taxing” someone for doing something bad).
So I wouldn’t say “If you care AT ALL about not being a dick of a brother…” I’d rather say “If you care significantly about not being a dick of a brother…” But the final recommendation would be the same. Go to your freaking sister’s wedding, you nincompoop!
[One shortcoming here is that taxing every individual for their share of the collective failure doesn't solve a coordination problem, game-theoretically. Think of a two-person prisoner's dilemma. But it's not a bad start. If anything, it suggests that moral opprobrium should be VERY HIGH on the first person to break a rule in a coordination game.]
I agree with Justin’s take. Of course in some sense Will is right that the individual action is a drop in the bucket — this is true of flying planes, eating meat, buying conflict diamonds, donating to charity, voting, and many other things.
It is logically defensible but kind of antisocial to say “since my actions can’t make a difference, I will ignore the broader picture.” Game theory says this leads to various tragedies of the commons. It is perfectly appropriate to combat the tragedy of the commons by getting angry at people for acting selfishly. So, it is morally appropriate (or defensible, anyway) to get pissed at someone who uses the “you can’t make a difference so do whatever you want” rule.
As an aside, it doesn’t matter that a single individual’s decision can’t make the difference between the plane flying/not-flying. I agree with the rule of thumb that each individual should shoulder an equal share of the blame for a collective failure. If nobody gets any blame, nothing changes.
A decent rule of thumb might be: If we instituted a carbon tax, what would I pay to make this decision? OK, that’s how much “carbon blame” I take on by doing this. (Think of moral opprobrium as a way of “taxing” someone for doing something bad).
So I wouldn’t say “If you care AT ALL about not being a dick of a brother…” I’d rather say “If you care significantly about not being a dick of a brother…” But the final recommendation would be the same. Go to your freaking sister’s wedding, you nincompoop!
[One shortcoming here is that taxing every individual for their share of the collective failure doesn't solve a coordination problem, game-theoretically. Think of a two-person prisoner's dilemma. But it's not a bad start. If anything, it suggests that moral opprobrium should be VERY HIGH on the first person to break a rule in a coordination game.]
Will, you’re answer is very amusing, and maybe even spot on. One rhetorical feature of your answer, though, cuts both ways. You play on the convenience of Brother’s CO2 excuse, as a means of avoiding having to cough up plane fair. (“C’mon, pony up, cheapskate.”) But your collective action rationale is just as convenient an excuse for those who simply want to do whatever it is they want to do, no matter the externalities of the underlying activity. And besides which, as between environmental and economic rationales, I think it’s clear which more typically serves as a convenient justification for self-regarding behavior…)
Will, you’re answer is very amusing, and maybe even spot on. One rhetorical feature of your answer, though, cuts both ways. You play on the convenience of Brother’s CO2 excuse, as a means of avoiding having to cough up plane fair. (“C’mon, pony up, cheapskate.”) But your collective action rationale is just as convenient an excuse for those who simply want to do whatever it is they want to do, no matter the externalities of the underlying activity. And besides which, as between environmental and economic rationales, I think it’s clear which more typically serves as a convenient justification for self-regarding behavior…)
Much of your argument focuses on the utility of the decision, which may not always be the best way to think about a moral problem. Putting aside possible unconscious reasons for trying to get out of attending the wedding, a moral problem like this offers us an interesting way to think about moral decisions. Does our sense of integrity ever matter more than practical material consequences? When do we take the feelings of others into account and when does integrity require us to upset other people with our adherence to a materially inconsequential principle?
Suppose I live in a place where wild looting has broken out. I have the opportunity to grab a few pricey items for myself with zero risk of legal consequence. Even if I don’t participate in the looting, everything is going to be stolen anyway because the entire neighborhood is up for grabs. It’s only a matter of who will steal rather than what will be stolen. On a practical level, it matters not a whit whether or not I grab a color TV and a few other attractive items. If I don’t, someone else will. Do I steal?
Now, my girlfriend would really like a diamond engagement ring for her upcoming birthday. She really has her heart set on a ring and it just so happens that there is a gorgeous antique diamond ring for the taking in that smashed window I’m standing beside. People are grabbing everything fast so I have to act if I’m to give her the ring. My girlfriend will be extremely disappointed if I don’t give her a diamond engagement ring for her birthday, but I just can’t afford to buy one for her. I could give it to her and she’ll just assume I bought it somehow. The truth she doesn’t know is of no measurable consequence to her. So, do I have a morally acceptable backdrop for stealing the ring? It’s only going to get stolen anyway. You might say “yes, take the ring,” but I won’t assume I know that to be your answer.
Much of your argument focuses on the utility of the decision, which may not always be the best way to think about a moral problem. Putting aside possible unconscious reasons for trying to get out of attending the wedding, a moral problem like this offers us an interesting way to think about moral decisions. Does our sense of integrity ever matter more than practical material consequences? When do we take the feelings of others into account and when does integrity require us to upset other people with our adherence to a materially inconsequential principle?
Suppose I live in a place where wild looting has broken out. I have the opportunity to grab a few pricey items for myself with zero risk of legal consequence. Even if I don’t participate in the looting, everything is going to be stolen anyway because the entire neighborhood is up for grabs. It’s only a matter of who will steal rather than what will be stolen. On a practical level, it matters not a whit whether or not I grab a color TV and a few other attractive items. If I don’t, someone else will. Do I steal?
Now, my girlfriend would really like a diamond engagement ring for her upcoming birthday. She really has her heart set on a ring and it just so happens that there is a gorgeous antique diamond ring for the taking in that smashed window I’m standing beside. People are grabbing everything fast so I have to act if I’m to give her the ring. My girlfriend will be extremely disappointed if I don’t give her a diamond engagement ring for her birthday, but I just can’t afford to buy one for her. I could give it to her and she’ll just assume I bought it somehow. The truth she doesn’t know is of no measurable consequence to her. So, do I have a morally acceptable backdrop for stealing the ring? It’s only going to get stolen anyway. You might say “yes, take the ring,” but I won’t assume I know that to be your answer.
If I don’t exercise today, it won’t have any measurable health consequences.
But, if I make this argument to myself every day, and wind up never exercising, that will have a severe effect on my expected health and happiness.
So, I don’t think that I should make this argument (with a one day time horizon) to myself every day.
What I think I should do is to cultivate good habits that will have good aggregate effects (i.e. the aggregate benefits exceed the aggregate costs), but remain open to violating them on an exceptional basis when the opportunity cost is significant. Perhaps, I should make up for these exceptions by doing more exercise (or buying carbon offsets if you’re into that sort of thing, etc.). That might make it easier to adhere to the good policies.
I don’t buy the “What if everybody did what you’re doing?” moral argument, though. My actions don’t cause everybody to follow my lead; so, the question seems irrelevant.
If I should do (or not do) something, I think it should be because I have internalized a good estimate of the total costs and benefits of my marginal action towards things that I value, and choose based on which is higher.
And, that’s what everybody should do (after they’ve chosen good things to value, of course!).
If I don’t exercise today, it won’t have any measurable health consequences.
But, if I make this argument to myself every day, and wind up never exercising, that will have a severe effect on my expected health and happiness.
So, I don’t think that I should make this argument (with a one day time horizon) to myself every day.
What I think I should do is to cultivate good habits that will have good aggregate effects (i.e. the aggregate benefits exceed the aggregate costs), but remain open to violating them on an exceptional basis when the opportunity cost is significant. Perhaps, I should make up for these exceptions by doing more exercise (or buying carbon offsets if you’re into that sort of thing, etc.). That might make it easier to adhere to the good policies.
I don’t buy the “What if everybody did what you’re doing?” moral argument, though. My actions don’t cause everybody to follow my lead; so, the question seems irrelevant.
If I should do (or not do) something, I think it should be because I have internalized a good estimate of the total costs and benefits of my marginal action towards things that I value, and choose based on which is higher.
And, that’s what everybody should do (after they’ve chosen good things to value, of course!).
By Pogge’s guilt-by-existence reasoning, is not the morally appropriate thing to do simply to terminate ones own life? Think about how much carbon that would save!
By Pogge’s guilt-by-existence reasoning, is not the morally appropriate thing to do simply to terminate ones own life? Think about how much carbon that would save!
Al Gore, by consuming about eighteen times the electricity the average American uses, about forty times the amount my wife and I use, shows that he does not believe in the collective action obligation.
Sure he buys indulgencesXXX carbon offsets. That doesn’t scale, and he must know that it doesn’t.
-dk
Al Gore, by consuming about eighteen times the electricity the average American uses, about forty times the amount my wife and I use, shows that he does not believe in the collective action obligation.
Sure he buys indulgencesXXX carbon offsets. That doesn’t scale, and he must know that it doesn’t.
-dk
Its a garbage argument. The guy is going to New Zealand once. BFD. If the travel was something that the guy did habitually, then one could opine on changing his behavior. Once? Stupid. If the guy is that concerned about his carbon footprint, then he needs to kill himself right now.
Its a garbage argument. The guy is going to New Zealand once. BFD. If the travel was something that the guy did habitually, then one could opine on changing his behavior. Once? Stupid. If the guy is that concerned about his carbon footprint, then he needs to kill himself right now.
The way I see it if I reduce my consumption by X then I get “moral” credit for reducing it by X. It doesn’t matter what fraction that is of total consumption. Vice versa, if one million other people decide to reduce by X along with me then I don’t get moral credit for reducing consumption by X million, but only my X.
So total consumption really doesn’t matter in the equation. What matters is if the reduction is “moral” in the first place.
Now the idea of assuming that climate change already causes 150,000 deaths is where the problem lies. What they are really saying is that C02 emissions cause 150,000 deaths, but that’s only half the equation. Considering the carrying capacity of the earth without the C02 emmissions is on the order of millions not billions you need to add back in the billions.
So the net lives saved by climate change is in the billions.
The way I see it if I reduce my consumption by X then I get “moral” credit for reducing it by X. It doesn’t matter what fraction that is of total consumption. Vice versa, if one million other people decide to reduce by X along with me then I don’t get moral credit for reducing consumption by X million, but only my X.
So total consumption really doesn’t matter in the equation. What matters is if the reduction is “moral” in the first place.
Now the idea of assuming that climate change already causes 150,000 deaths is where the problem lies. What they are really saying is that C02 emissions cause 150,000 deaths, but that’s only half the equation. Considering the carrying capacity of the earth without the C02 emmissions is on the order of millions not billions you need to add back in the billions.
So the net lives saved by climate change is in the billions.
…is not the morally appropriate thing to do simply to terminate ones own life? Think about how much carbon that would save!
Of course, but skipping your sister’s wedding while patting yourself on the back for “Saving the Earth” does more to improve one’s self esteem and sense of moral superiority than does putting a gun to your head and pulling the trigger. Takes less effort too.
…is not the morally appropriate thing to do simply to terminate ones own life? Think about how much carbon that would save!
Of course, but skipping your sister’s wedding while patting yourself on the back for “Saving the Earth” does more to improve one’s self esteem and sense of moral superiority than does putting a gun to your head and pulling the trigger. Takes less effort too.
While I don’t know that I’d suggest abstaining from flying in this particular instance, I don’t think the logic here is especially compelling, Will. Instead of droning on, two words: Harmless Torturers.
While I don’t know that I’d suggest abstaining from flying in this particular instance, I don’t think the logic here is especially compelling, Will. Instead of droning on, two words: Harmless Torturers.
Julian, I thought about this. The chicken case isn’t a harmless torturers-type case. It’s binary: either your individual choice in isolation saves a chicken or it doesn’t. I claim it doesn’t, given the present extent of the market for chicken. The carbon case has more of a harmless torturers sorites-like structure. But this isn’t about *pain*. Parfit’s whole argument is based on a philosophical claim that pains can get imperceptibly better or imperceptibly worse, such that an action that cannot be noticed counts as having caused pain. But I can’t see how emitting a little carbon is much like having caused an imperceptible pain. [Added: And the instant case is in fact binary: either your choice affects the number of planes flying to New Zealand or it doesn't.]
Also, I’m largely having fun here. The contractarian compliance problem, which this is an instance of, is one of my fortes. As you know, I think the point of moral conventions is precisely to overcome the myopia of rational self-interest. If carbon emissions really are harmful, and new consumption norms that limit emissions would really make people better off, then I’m all for them. But my point, RE: Henry, is that the same reasoning then applies to paying tithes to the government — if you really happen to think a bigger government budget would improve society. If you think moral conventions are insufficient, you might want coercion as a backup, but it doesn’t make sense to discourage the development of the moral norm.
Julian, I thought about this. The chicken case isn’t a harmless torturers-type case. It’s binary: either your individual choice in isolation saves a chicken or it doesn’t. I claim it doesn’t, given the present extent of the market for chicken. The carbon case has more of a harmless torturers sorites-like structure. But this isn’t about *pain*. Parfit’s whole argument is based on a philosophical claim that pains can get imperceptibly better or imperceptibly worse, such that an action that cannot be noticed counts as having caused pain. But I can’t see how emitting a little carbon is much like having caused an imperceptible pain. [Added: And the instant case is in fact binary: either your choice affects the number of planes flying to New Zealand or it doesn't.]
Also, I’m largely having fun here. The contractarian compliance problem, which this is an instance of, is one of my fortes. As you know, I think the point of moral conventions is precisely to overcome the myopia of rational self-interest. If carbon emissions really are harmful, and new consumption norms that limit emissions would really make people better off, then I’m all for them. But my point, RE: Henry, is that the same reasoning then applies to paying tithes to the government — if you really happen to think a bigger government budget would improve society. If you think moral conventions are insufficient, you might want coercion as a backup, but it doesn’t make sense to discourage the development of the moral norm.
I was brought here via the relatively awful Instapundit’s sabbatical, meaning it’s too wordy to stay popular without his pithiness, period.
The quote the brought me here, translated with one word substitutions makes something of a point, namely turning ‘flying’ into ‘voting’ and ‘global warming’ into ‘fascism’ with some creative license:
“THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION Will Wilkinson asks whether it’s useful to refrain from voting in order to prevent fascism. Answer: no. Any one voter’s demand will not impact the level of punitive instead of productive taxation levels, just as no citizen who recycles will actually cause the amount of food shortages to fall; the random mismatch in the supply and demand in your local market for carbon credits will far exceed the number of chickens you might have eaten for any time frame you choose.
So why vote? To create a cultural norm about democracy, or fascism, says Will. I have a different intuition, which is that if you want everyone to give up limousines, you are morally bound to do it too, even though limousines are all full of tacky 1970s decore and empty bars unless you pre-pay for that sort of thing. I am rethinking that — but I have a sense that those sorts of illogical bourgeois committments to virtue are precisely what allow us to talk over the heads of normal Americans.”
- Nik
P.S. Typewrite alert to computer users: The use of ‘–’ is an old TYPEWRITER trick to make a DASH instead of two hyphens, but if you simply type alt-1050, oh, forget it, wow, I thought it was there, but I used to use the little Macintosh utility called ‘keyboard’ to copy and paste it: Option-Hyphen – vs. a normal dash -. See the difference?! I don’t, but if I make a bunch of them, you’ll see some difference –––—-–––—––—––– like Morse Code, but more subtle. But we all know, don’t we, why we all use (except for the *one* guy who is going to protest this comment) QWERTY keyboards? Because *early* typewriters were too mechanically prone to jamming that they figured out how to SLOW down the typist as best as possible. How? By putting common characters in very inconvenient locations. Which is the most obvious character? I’d say ‘p’ since I have to reach way up with my pinky to get it, but also, the DELIBERATE confusion between ‘c’, ‘v’, and ‘b’. So what letters so our eight (thumb is just the SPACE bar, only, even though HUMANS are defined by having a versatile “opposing thumb”?!) fingers placed upon? My right pinky is on the semicolon; what a travesty. My main finger, my Index Finger is on the lost letter ‘j’, as in JERK, JUGS or JESUS, which do not rhyme with COLONoscopy. And there’s no dash on the keyboard. At all. You must enter code to get one!!!
—
Ha ha!!! Look!!! I’ll add a few to my ‘–––—-–––—––—–––’:
————————————————–––—-–––—––—–––————————————————–––––––––––
You can’t see it at the very end, but if you look CLOSELY, the last 11 digits are almost half as long as the ones preceding it, an have no relation to the hyphens or “underscores” available to normal people.
In 1962, computers keyboards got something new, SINCE BEFORE THEN IT WAS ALL LIKE THIS. They got a shift key. Dashes_were-hyphens=were under_scores. But they left out the actual dash.
So…it you’d ever like to use a real dash instead of a hyphen, just go to Wikipedia and copy one for pasting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dash
I was brought here via the relatively awful Instapundit’s sabbatical, meaning it’s too wordy to stay popular without his pithiness, period.
The quote the brought me here, translated with one word substitutions makes something of a point, namely turning ‘flying’ into ‘voting’ and ‘global warming’ into ‘fascism’ with some creative license:
“THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION Will Wilkinson asks whether it’s useful to refrain from voting in order to prevent fascism. Answer: no. Any one voter’s demand will not impact the level of punitive instead of productive taxation levels, just as no citizen who recycles will actually cause the amount of food shortages to fall; the random mismatch in the supply and demand in your local market for carbon credits will far exceed the number of chickens you might have eaten for any time frame you choose.
So why vote? To create a cultural norm about democracy, or fascism, says Will. I have a different intuition, which is that if you want everyone to give up limousines, you are morally bound to do it too, even though limousines are all full of tacky 1970s decore and empty bars unless you pre-pay for that sort of thing. I am rethinking that — but I have a sense that those sorts of illogical bourgeois committments to virtue are precisely what allow us to talk over the heads of normal Americans.”
- Nik
P.S. Typewrite alert to computer users: The use of ‘–’ is an old TYPEWRITER trick to make a DASH instead of two hyphens, but if you simply type alt-1050, oh, forget it, wow, I thought it was there, but I used to use the little Macintosh utility called ‘keyboard’ to copy and paste it: Option-Hyphen – vs. a normal dash -. See the difference?! I don’t, but if I make a bunch of them, you’ll see some difference –––—-–––—––—––– like Morse Code, but more subtle. But we all know, don’t we, why we all use (except for the *one* guy who is going to protest this comment) QWERTY keyboards? Because *early* typewriters were too mechanically prone to jamming that they figured out how to SLOW down the typist as best as possible. How? By putting common characters in very inconvenient locations. Which is the most obvious character? I’d say ‘p’ since I have to reach way up with my pinky to get it, but also, the DELIBERATE confusion between ‘c’, ‘v’, and ‘b’. So what letters so our eight (thumb is just the SPACE bar, only, even though HUMANS are defined by having a versatile “opposing thumb”?!) fingers placed upon? My right pinky is on the semicolon; what a travesty. My main finger, my Index Finger is on the lost letter ‘j’, as in JERK, JUGS or JESUS, which do not rhyme with COLONoscopy. And there’s no dash on the keyboard. At all. You must enter code to get one!!!
—
Ha ha!!! Look!!! I’ll add a few to my ‘–––—-–––—––—–––’:
————————————————–––—-–––—––—–––————————————————–––––––––––
You can’t see it at the very end, but if you look CLOSELY, the last 11 digits are almost half as long as the ones preceding it, an have no relation to the hyphens or “underscores” available to normal people.
In 1962, computers keyboards got something new, SINCE BEFORE THEN IT WAS ALL LIKE THIS. They got a shift key. Dashes_were-hyphens=were under_scores. But they left out the actual dash.
So…it you’d ever like to use a real dash instead of a hyphen, just go to Wikipedia and copy one for pasting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dash
I just want to say that the preceding typography note, oddly, is beyond fascinating—it’s mesmerizing.
I just want to say that the preceding typography note, oddly, is beyond fascinating—it’s mesmerizing.
Also people who are interested in an extremely thorough treatment of the problem exemplified in Will’s post above can read Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory by Liam Murphy.
Also people who are interested in an extremely thorough treatment of the problem exemplified in Will’s post above can read Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory by Liam Murphy.
Will-
I think you’re off on two claims here. First, the chicken case is pretty parallel: My private abstention has no perceptible effect on the aggregate demand for chicken, but the abstention of many people concerned about animal suffering might.
Second, I think you’re reading Parfit sort of backwards here: He explicitly wants to argue that each “torturer” acts wrongly even if we think the notion of “imperceptible pain” is a sort of nonsense, and even stipulating that an individual torturer causes nobody any pain at all. Bottom of page 80, if you’re following along at home.
Will-
I think you’re off on two claims here. First, the chicken case is pretty parallel: My private abstention has no perceptible effect on the aggregate demand for chicken, but the abstention of many people concerned about animal suffering might.
Second, I think you’re reading Parfit sort of backwards here: He explicitly wants to argue that each “torturer” acts wrongly even if we think the notion of “imperceptible pain” is a sort of nonsense, and even stipulating that an individual torturer causes nobody any pain at all. Bottom of page 80, if you’re following along at home.
“I question the opinion of anyone who thinks 2 x 1.3 = 4″
Which would be no-one. You get to 4-ish assuming 1.5 tanks per leg (which would be conservative, cos it’s probably closer to 2). Next time try reading before mouthing off.
“I question the opinion of anyone who thinks 2 x 1.3 = 4″
Which would be no-one. You get to 4-ish assuming 1.5 tanks per leg (which would be conservative, cos it’s probably closer to 2). Next time try reading before mouthing off.
Will,
The factual premise, that if you don’t affect whether the plane flies then you don’t affect emissions, is wrong. Your mass and the mass of your luggage force the plane to expend more fuel to accelerate, decelerate, and to maintain cruising speed on a given route.
Will,
The factual premise, that if you don’t affect whether the plane flies then you don’t affect emissions, is wrong. Your mass and the mass of your luggage force the plane to expend more fuel to accelerate, decelerate, and to maintain cruising speed on a given route.
I thought that you, as a libertarian, would tend towards a Kantian “do as you believe everyone should do in your situation” in which case, the number of flights would certainly decrease.
I thought that you, as a libertarian, would tend towards a Kantian “do as you believe everyone should do in your situation” in which case, the number of flights would certainly decrease.
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Will, your answer is really interesting and amusing! Don't you find it tedious job to answer to those question which relates to some extent moral or ethics?
The first logic makes me laugh. A silly “alibi”, a shallow reason…very obvious that you were not really in the mood to attend. Why reason the toxic emission of the plane? LOL…Whether you attend or not, the plane will “fly” -still the toxic is release and you and all of us – will inhale the deadly fumes. Next time, bring with you fabulous food hampers as present. Nice isn't it?
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I really enjoyed the post and i like to share this info with info with my friends that it could be discussed further thanks for sharing the post.
Regards,
Doji – emergency dentistry