Comments on: Moral Duties in Contexts of Partial Compliance http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/ The Sweet Release of Reason Thu, 09 Feb 2012 18:11:50 +0000 hourly 1 By: Slocum http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12462 Slocum Tue, 04 Mar 2008 03:55:28 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12462 "Maybe if there was a special “tax patriot” armband you got to wear around for paying extra taxes that allowed people to signal, and take public credit for, an otherwise invisible act — a Prius of taxation — we’d see more of it." This already exists in several forms and people do contribute to government in this way. The best examples are the contributions people make to state universities -- for which people receive recognition of various kinds, including buildings and even entire schools named after them if the contributions are large enough: http://www.bus.umich.edu/RossB-SchoolGift/ “Maybe if there was a special “tax patriot” armband you got to wear around for paying extra taxes that allowed people to signal, and take public credit for, an otherwise invisible act — a Prius of taxation — we’d see more of it.”

This already exists in several forms and people do contribute to government in this way. The best examples are the contributions people make to state universities — for which people receive recognition of various kinds, including buildings and even entire schools named after them if the contributions are large enough:

http://www.bus.umich.edu/RossB-SchoolGift/

]]> By: Slocum http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12463 Slocum Tue, 04 Mar 2008 03:55:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12463 "Maybe if there was a special “tax patriot” armband you got to wear around for paying extra taxes that allowed people to signal, and take public credit for, an otherwise invisible act — a Prius of taxation — we’d see more of it." This already exists in several forms and people do contribute to government in this way. The best examples are the contributions people make to state universities -- for which people receive recognition of various kinds, including buildings and even entire schools named after them if the contributions are large enough: http://www.bus.umich.edu/RossB-SchoolGift/ “Maybe if there was a special “tax patriot” armband you got to wear around for paying extra taxes that allowed people to signal, and take public credit for, an otherwise invisible act — a Prius of taxation — we’d see more of it.”

This already exists in several forms and people do contribute to government in this way. The best examples are the contributions people make to state universities — for which people receive recognition of various kinds, including buildings and even entire schools named after them if the contributions are large enough:

http://www.bus.umich.edu/RossB-SchoolGift/

]]> By: R. Stanton Scott http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12461 R. Stanton Scott Thu, 28 Feb 2008 19:47:12 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12461 What if voluntary donors to government could designate a use for the funds? This would create an incentive for officials to lobby citizens for money to fund pet projects--local officials could create a "teacher's salary" fund, or the Feds could create a "body armor" fund. This would allow citizens to pocketbook-vote on what they want government to do--the arm bands would advertise the project a donor helped pay for--and might make voluntarily higher tax payments more likely. This brings another thought to mind. A relationship exists between "tax rage" and government policy--that is, some citizens become more reluctant to pay taxes because government redistributes it to poor people. Does this mean that campaign contributions in a way look like voluntary higher tax payments? What if voluntary donors to government could designate a use for the funds? This would create an incentive for officials to lobby citizens for money to fund pet projects–local officials could create a “teacher’s salary” fund, or the Feds could create a “body armor” fund. This would allow citizens to pocketbook-vote on what they want government to do–the arm bands would advertise the project a donor helped pay for–and might make voluntarily higher tax payments more likely.

This brings another thought to mind. A relationship exists between “tax rage” and government policy–that is, some citizens become more reluctant to pay taxes because government redistributes it to poor people. Does this mean that campaign contributions in a way look like voluntary higher tax payments?

]]> By: Anonymous http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12485 Anonymous Thu, 28 Feb 2008 19:47:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12485 What if voluntary donors to government could designate a use for the funds? This would create an incentive for officials to lobby citizens for money to fund pet projects--local officials could create a "teacher's salary" fund, or the Feds could create a "body armor" fund. This would allow citizens to pocketbook-vote on what they want government to do--the arm bands would advertise the project a donor helped pay for--and might make voluntarily higher tax payments more likely. This brings another thought to mind. A relationship exists between "tax rage" and government policy--that is, some citizens become more reluctant to pay taxes because government redistributes it to poor people. Does this mean that campaign contributions in a way look like voluntary higher tax payments? What if voluntary donors to government could designate a use for the funds? This would create an incentive for officials to lobby citizens for money to fund pet projects–local officials could create a “teacher’s salary” fund, or the Feds could create a “body armor” fund. This would allow citizens to pocketbook-vote on what they want government to do–the arm bands would advertise the project a donor helped pay for–and might make voluntarily higher tax payments more likely.

This brings another thought to mind. A relationship exists between “tax rage” and government policy–that is, some citizens become more reluctant to pay taxes because government redistributes it to poor people. Does this mean that campaign contributions in a way look like voluntary higher tax payments?

]]> By: Crooked Timber » » Double movements http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12460 Crooked Timber » » Double movements Thu, 28 Feb 2008 19:00:15 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12460 [...] so I’m going to declare intellectual bankruptcy, and just tell you to read Laura McKenna, Will Wilkinson and Russell Arben Fox. But I also wanted to point to some interesting stuff that’s been [...] [...] so I’m going to declare intellectual bankruptcy, and just tell you to read Laura McKenna, Will Wilkinson and Russell Arben Fox. But I also wanted to point to some interesting stuff that’s been [...]

]]> By: conchis http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12459 conchis Tue, 26 Feb 2008 21:46:44 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12459 Will, You're obviously right on (b) but I still don't buy (a), at least not at your supposed level of certainty. Of course there's noise, and of course its likely to be bigger than any change you induce. But that doesn't change the fact that you've still shifted the center around which the noise is distributed. Assuming (plausibly) that supply changes at all in response to demand, it seems to me that such responses could either be continuous or have discontinuities. In the continuous case the effect of your action is obvious: small but not nonexistent. On the other hand, if there are discontinuities in response, this does indeed mean that most of the time your action will have no effect, but it also means that in a small proportion of cases it can have an effect if it helps make it over the discontinuity threshold: that is, you've got a small probability of a somewhat larger effect. As I said before, neither a small effect nor a small probability of an effect is identical to no effect. Rather, no effect seems to me to be an asymptotic approximation that never applies in actual (finite) markets. By and large it may be a useful approximation, but I'm not convinced it is here, and I'm not sure you should be either. Will, You’re obviously right on (b) but I still don’t buy (a), at least not at your supposed level of certainty.

Of course there’s noise, and of course its likely to be bigger than any change you induce. But that doesn’t change the fact that you’ve still shifted the center around which the noise is distributed.

Assuming (plausibly) that supply changes at all in response to demand, it seems to me that such responses could either be continuous or have discontinuities. In the continuous case the effect of your action is obvious: small but not nonexistent. On the other hand, if there are discontinuities in response, this does indeed mean that most of the time your action will have no effect, but it also means that in a small proportion of cases it can have an effect if it helps make it over the discontinuity threshold: that is, you’ve got a small probability of a somewhat larger effect.

As I said before, neither a small effect nor a small probability of an effect is identical to no effect. Rather, no effect seems to me to be an asymptotic approximation that never applies in actual (finite) markets. By and large it may be a useful approximation, but I’m not convinced it is here, and I’m not sure you should be either.

]]> By: conchis http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12481 conchis Tue, 26 Feb 2008 21:46:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12481 Will, You're obviously right on (b) but I still don't buy (a), at least not at your supposed level of certainty. Of course there's noise, and of course its likely to be bigger than any change you induce. But that doesn't change the fact that you've still shifted the center around which the noise is distributed. Assuming (plausibly) that supply changes at all in response to demand, it seems to me that such responses could either be continuous or have discontinuities. In the continuous case the effect of your action is obvious: small but not nonexistent. On the other hand, if there are discontinuities in response, this does indeed mean that most of the time your action will have no effect, but it also means that in a small proportion of cases it can have an effect if it helps make it over the discontinuity threshold: that is, you've got a small probability of a somewhat larger effect. As I said before, neither a small effect nor a small probability of an effect is identical to no effect. Rather, no effect seems to me to be an asymptotic approximation that never applies in actual (finite) markets. By and large it may be a useful approximation, but I'm not convinced it is here, and I'm not sure you should be either. Will, You’re obviously right on (b) but I still don’t buy (a), at least not at your supposed level of certainty.

Of course there’s noise, and of course its likely to be bigger than any change you induce. But that doesn’t change the fact that you’ve still shifted the center around which the noise is distributed.

Assuming (plausibly) that supply changes at all in response to demand, it seems to me that such responses could either be continuous or have discontinuities. In the continuous case the effect of your action is obvious: small but not nonexistent. On the other hand, if there are discontinuities in response, this does indeed mean that most of the time your action will have no effect, but it also means that in a small proportion of cases it can have an effect if it helps make it over the discontinuity threshold: that is, you’ve got a small probability of a somewhat larger effect.

As I said before, neither a small effect nor a small probability of an effect is identical to no effect. Rather, no effect seems to me to be an asymptotic approximation that never applies in actual (finite) markets. By and large it may be a useful approximation, but I’m not convinced it is here, and I’m not sure you should be either.

]]> By: Bill Gardner http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12458 Bill Gardner Mon, 25 Feb 2008 15:04:45 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12458 I'll try to say that more clearly. Your concern is that the noise in the market will obscure the small impact of my one time decision to buy a chicken. But if the problem is noise, the expected effect of consistently abstaining would be small but non-zero. (One chicken / week, though, is not small, if you think that life matters.) I’ll try to say that more clearly. Your concern is that the noise in the market will obscure the small impact of my one time decision to buy a chicken. But if the problem is noise, the expected effect of consistently abstaining would be small but non-zero. (One chicken / week, though, is not small, if you think that life matters.)

]]> By: Bill Gardner http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12480 Bill Gardner Mon, 25 Feb 2008 15:04:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12480 I'll try to say that more clearly. Your concern is that the noise in the market will obscure the small impact of my one time decision to buy a chicken. But if the problem is noise, the expected effect of consistently abstaining would be small but non-zero. (One chicken / week, though, is not small, if you think that life matters.) I’ll try to say that more clearly. Your concern is that the noise in the market will obscure the small impact of my one time decision to buy a chicken. But if the problem is noise, the expected effect of consistently abstaining would be small but non-zero. (One chicken / week, though, is not small, if you think that life matters.)

]]> By: Bill Gardner http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12457 Bill Gardner Mon, 25 Feb 2008 14:34:10 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/22/moral-duties-in-contexts-of-partial-compliance/#comment-12457 "At the time of your choice, all of the relevant chickens have already been killed. And your choice not to eat one tonight will have no detectable effect on demand (won’t depress the price of chicken meat) and so will not induce lower future chicken meat production." Thanks, excellent answer. Clearly, I am wrong to think that I have a moral relationship to an individual chicken. So this _is_ a collective action problem -- thanks for showing me how this is so. I drafted an answer that was more or less what conchis wrote. I'll respond to your answer to him. "A single individual’s choice in isolation will be completely lost in the noise of normal fluctuations in demand (caused by a sale in a close substitute, e.g.)." Yes, my effect on demand will not be noticed. Does that mean it does not exist? In the long run, do we not expect the price to respond to the actual demand for chickens, not the perceived demand for chickens? (So I am now talking about the practice of vegetarianism, not the decision to eat chicken tonight.) And, so, smoothing over my lifetime, won't I exert a small, unmeasurable, but non-zero force of (say) 1 chicken / week on the suppliers? It seems like this is a different collective action problem than, say voting. The chance that my vote will affect a binary outcome is more or less nil. But the slaughter of chickens is not an all or nothing event. “At the time of your choice, all of the relevant chickens have already been killed. And your choice not to eat one tonight will have no detectable effect on demand (won’t depress the price of chicken meat) and so will not induce lower future chicken meat production.”

Thanks, excellent answer. Clearly, I am wrong to think that I have a moral relationship to an individual chicken. So this _is_ a collective action problem — thanks for showing me how this is so.

I drafted an answer that was more or less what conchis wrote. I’ll respond to your answer to him. “A single individual’s choice in isolation will be completely lost in the noise of normal fluctuations in demand (caused by a sale in a close substitute, e.g.).” Yes, my effect on demand will not be noticed. Does that mean it does not exist? In the long run, do we not expect the price to respond to the actual demand for chickens, not the perceived demand for chickens? (So I am now talking about the practice of vegetarianism, not the decision to eat chicken tonight.) And, so, smoothing over my lifetime, won’t I exert a small, unmeasurable, but non-zero force of (say) 1 chicken / week on the suppliers?

It seems like this is a different collective action problem than, say voting. The chance that my vote will affect a binary outcome is more or less nil. But the slaughter of chickens is not an all or nothing event.

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