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	<title>Comments on: Prizes for Amelioration</title>
	<atom:link href="http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/</link>
	<description>The Sweet Release of Reason</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 18:11:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: yscan</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12245</link>
		<dc:creator>yscan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2009 18:46:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12245</guid>
		<description>best yahoo invisible detector :- &lt;a href=&quot;http://yscan.info&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http://yscan.info&lt;/a&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>best yahoo invisible detector :- <a href="http://yscan.info" rel="nofollow">http://yscan.info</a></p>
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		<title>By: Mencius</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12244</link>
		<dc:creator>Mencius</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 10:29:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12244</guid>
		<description>In the extreme worst-case scenario, which is realistically how any such program would be implemented, quotas would apply only to imports and domestic producers would just get to sell directly at the domestic price, capturing all USG&#039;s rakeoff.

Suboptimal, certainly.  But not really complicated.  The way Washington really bleeds (my mother actually worked at DOE in renewables) is that huge quantities of money get sucked out invisibly through schemes that are too intricate for anyone to understand.  It&#039;s hard for USG to just give away money to lobbyists.  It has to come up with something clever.

Pigouvian taxes are extremely ripe for all sorts of chicanery.  And they are dwarfed by carbon credits, which are already a swamp of pure Third World sleaze.  Note that just as Washington prefers taxes to a simple quota scheme, it prefers carbon credits to taxes.  Negative selection wins again.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the extreme worst-case scenario, which is realistically how any such program would be implemented, quotas would apply only to imports and domestic producers would just get to sell directly at the domestic price, capturing all USG&#8217;s rakeoff.</p>
<p>Suboptimal, certainly.  But not really complicated.  The way Washington really bleeds (my mother actually worked at DOE in renewables) is that huge quantities of money get sucked out invisibly through schemes that are too intricate for anyone to understand.  It&#8217;s hard for USG to just give away money to lobbyists.  It has to come up with something clever.</p>
<p>Pigouvian taxes are extremely ripe for all sorts of chicanery.  And they are dwarfed by carbon credits, which are already a swamp of pure Third World sleaze.  Note that just as Washington prefers taxes to a simple quota scheme, it prefers carbon credits to taxes.  Negative selection wins again.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Mencius</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12256</link>
		<dc:creator>Mencius</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 10:29:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12256</guid>
		<description>In the extreme worst-case scenario, which is realistically how any such program would be implemented, quotas would apply only to imports and domestic producers would just get to sell directly at the domestic price, capturing all USG&#039;s rakeoff.

Suboptimal, certainly.  But not really complicated.  The way Washington really bleeds (my mother actually worked at DOE in renewables) is that huge quantities of money get sucked out invisibly through schemes that are too intricate for anyone to understand.  It&#039;s hard for USG to just give away money to lobbyists.  It has to come up with something clever.

Pigouvian taxes are extremely ripe for all sorts of chicanery.  And they are dwarfed by carbon credits, which are already a swamp of pure Third World sleaze.  Note that just as Washington prefers taxes to a simple quota scheme, it prefers carbon credits to taxes.  Negative selection wins again.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the extreme worst-case scenario, which is realistically how any such program would be implemented, quotas would apply only to imports and domestic producers would just get to sell directly at the domestic price, capturing all USG&#8217;s rakeoff.</p>
<p>Suboptimal, certainly.  But not really complicated.  The way Washington really bleeds (my mother actually worked at DOE in renewables) is that huge quantities of money get sucked out invisibly through schemes that are too intricate for anyone to understand.  It&#8217;s hard for USG to just give away money to lobbyists.  It has to come up with something clever.</p>
<p>Pigouvian taxes are extremely ripe for all sorts of chicanery.  And they are dwarfed by carbon credits, which are already a swamp of pure Third World sleaze.  Note that just as Washington prefers taxes to a simple quota scheme, it prefers carbon credits to taxes.  Negative selection wins again.</p>
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		<title>By: Gil</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12243</link>
		<dc:creator>Gil</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 05:44:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12243</guid>
		<description>You don&#039;t think there would be sweetheart deals with certain domestic oil producers?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You don&#8217;t think there would be sweetheart deals with certain domestic oil producers?</p>
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		<title>By: GilM</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12255</link>
		<dc:creator>GilM</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 05:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12255</guid>
		<description>You don&#039;t think there would be sweetheart deals with certain domestic oil producers?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You don&#8217;t think there would be sweetheart deals with certain domestic oil producers?</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Mencius</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12242</link>
		<dc:creator>Mencius</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 03:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12242</guid>
		<description>The main theoretical difference between a quota-monopoly and a Pigouvian tax is that a quota allows you to directly control the number you (presumably) care about, which is the amount of carbon emitted.

Of course, it relinquishes control over the (Pigou-equivalent) tax rate.  Because there is no way to sample the demand curve except where it intersects, any policy must lose control over one of these numbers.

Aside from this, I think the main attraction of &quot;oilpartheid&quot; is that it has no obvious way to grow hair.  Taxation schemes develop loopholes and turn into complexity furballs.  Buying oil is just buying oil.  It is relatively hard for Beltway bandits to horn in on.

And if there is no premium on domestic oil, obviously either (a) the quota is unnecessarily high, or (b) you&#039;re done.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The main theoretical difference between a quota-monopoly and a Pigouvian tax is that a quota allows you to directly control the number you (presumably) care about, which is the amount of carbon emitted.</p>
<p>Of course, it relinquishes control over the (Pigou-equivalent) tax rate.  Because there is no way to sample the demand curve except where it intersects, any policy must lose control over one of these numbers.</p>
<p>Aside from this, I think the main attraction of &#8220;oilpartheid&#8221; is that it has no obvious way to grow hair.  Taxation schemes develop loopholes and turn into complexity furballs.  Buying oil is just buying oil.  It is relatively hard for Beltway bandits to horn in on.</p>
<p>And if there is no premium on domestic oil, obviously either (a) the quota is unnecessarily high, or (b) you&#8217;re done.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Mencius</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12246</link>
		<dc:creator>Mencius</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 03:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12246</guid>
		<description>The main theoretical difference between a quota-monopoly and a Pigouvian tax is that a quota allows you to directly control the number you (presumably) care about, which is the amount of carbon emitted.

Of course, it relinquishes control over the (Pigou-equivalent) tax rate.  Because there is no way to sample the demand curve except where it intersects, any policy must lose control over one of these numbers.

Aside from this, I think the main attraction of &quot;oilpartheid&quot; is that it has no obvious way to grow hair.  Taxation schemes develop loopholes and turn into complexity furballs.  Buying oil is just buying oil.  It is relatively hard for Beltway bandits to horn in on.

And if there is no premium on domestic oil, obviously either (a) the quota is unnecessarily high, or (b) you&#039;re done.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The main theoretical difference between a quota-monopoly and a Pigouvian tax is that a quota allows you to directly control the number you (presumably) care about, which is the amount of carbon emitted.</p>
<p>Of course, it relinquishes control over the (Pigou-equivalent) tax rate.  Because there is no way to sample the demand curve except where it intersects, any policy must lose control over one of these numbers.</p>
<p>Aside from this, I think the main attraction of &#8220;oilpartheid&#8221; is that it has no obvious way to grow hair.  Taxation schemes develop loopholes and turn into complexity furballs.  Buying oil is just buying oil.  It is relatively hard for Beltway bandits to horn in on.</p>
<p>And if there is no premium on domestic oil, obviously either (a) the quota is unnecessarily high, or (b) you&#8217;re done.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: improbable</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12241</link>
		<dc:creator>improbable</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 02:40:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12241</guid>
		<description>Mencius,

What you&#039;re proposing is just about exactly equivalent to a tax. If you know how many barrels per year you want to country to consume, you can simply set the tax to the difference between the market price and the price your auction would provide. Of course, it would take a few years to adjust this right, but presumably your version would be introduced over a few years too.

One difference is that the Pigous ask that Uncle Sam reduce the income tax rate to keep his revenue constant. (You could do the same.)

A bigger one is about where this goes... in your scheme, the consumption of oil will be forever the size of the auction lot. But in a P scheme, if somebody manages to make solar/nuclear/geothermal/biofuel just a little cheaper than oil+tax, then the consumption of oil will fall off dramatically. Which is presumably good.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mencius,</p>
<p>What you&#8217;re proposing is just about exactly equivalent to a tax. If you know how many barrels per year you want to country to consume, you can simply set the tax to the difference between the market price and the price your auction would provide. Of course, it would take a few years to adjust this right, but presumably your version would be introduced over a few years too.</p>
<p>One difference is that the Pigous ask that Uncle Sam reduce the income tax rate to keep his revenue constant. (You could do the same.)</p>
<p>A bigger one is about where this goes&#8230; in your scheme, the consumption of oil will be forever the size of the auction lot. But in a P scheme, if somebody manages to make solar/nuclear/geothermal/biofuel just a little cheaper than oil+tax, then the consumption of oil will fall off dramatically. Which is presumably good.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: improbable</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12261</link>
		<dc:creator>improbable</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2008 02:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12261</guid>
		<description>Mencius,

What you&#039;re proposing is just about exactly equivalent to a tax. If you know how many barrels per year you want to country to consume, you can simply set the tax to the difference between the market price and the price your auction would provide. Of course, it would take a few years to adjust this right, but presumably your version would be introduced over a few years too.

One difference is that the Pigous ask that Uncle Sam reduce the income tax rate to keep his revenue constant. (You could do the same.)

A bigger one is about where this goes... in your scheme, the consumption of oil will be forever the size of the auction lot. But in a P scheme, if somebody manages to make solar/nuclear/geothermal/biofuel just a little cheaper than oil+tax, then the consumption of oil will fall off dramatically. Which is presumably good.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mencius,</p>
<p>What you&#8217;re proposing is just about exactly equivalent to a tax. If you know how many barrels per year you want to country to consume, you can simply set the tax to the difference between the market price and the price your auction would provide. Of course, it would take a few years to adjust this right, but presumably your version would be introduced over a few years too.</p>
<p>One difference is that the Pigous ask that Uncle Sam reduce the income tax rate to keep his revenue constant. (You could do the same.)</p>
<p>A bigger one is about where this goes&#8230; in your scheme, the consumption of oil will be forever the size of the auction lot. But in a P scheme, if somebody manages to make solar/nuclear/geothermal/biofuel just a little cheaper than oil+tax, then the consumption of oil will fall off dramatically. Which is presumably good.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: The Bellows &#187; Pigoops</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12240</link>
		<dc:creator>The Bellows &#187; Pigoops</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2008 22:21:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2008/02/12/prizes-for-amelioration/#comment-12240</guid>
		<description>[...] finds Will Wilkinson asking about subsidies for particulates that could help cool the earth. Will writes: Has anyone in the Pigou Club advanced the argument for subsidizing sulfate aerosols and black [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] finds Will Wilkinson asking about subsidies for particulates that could help cool the earth. Will writes: Has anyone in the Pigou Club advanced the argument for subsidizing sulfate aerosols and black [...]</p>
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