Comments on: Questions for Particularists http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/ The Sweet Release of Reason Thu, 09 Feb 2012 18:11:50 +0000 hourly 1 By: John S Bolton http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10955 John S Bolton Thu, 04 Oct 2007 01:09:15 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10955 I'm gratified to see that my objections have been allowed to stand without contradiction. I’m gratified to see that my objections have been allowed to stand without contradiction.

]]> By: John S Bolton http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10964 John S Bolton Thu, 04 Oct 2007 01:09:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10964 I'm gratified to see that my objections have been allowed to stand without contradiction. I’m gratified to see that my objections have been allowed to stand without contradiction.

]]> By: Carter http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10954 Carter Sun, 30 Sep 2007 23:10:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10954 So because Americans favoring countrymen over foreigners is wrong, Americans are obliged to allow the mass immigration of foreigners who place the interests of clan and religion above everything else. Brilliant. "Start from an egalitarian baseline" No. So because Americans favoring countrymen over foreigners is wrong, Americans are obliged to allow the mass immigration of foreigners who place the interests of clan and religion above everything else. Brilliant.

“Start from an egalitarian baseline”

No.

]]> By: Carter http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10958 Carter Sun, 30 Sep 2007 23:10:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10958 So because Americans favoring countrymen over foreigners is wrong, Americans are obliged to allow the mass immigration of foreigners who place the interests of clan and religion above everything else. Brilliant. "Start from an egalitarian baseline" No. So because Americans favoring countrymen over foreigners is wrong, Americans are obliged to allow the mass immigration of foreigners who place the interests of clan and religion above everything else. Brilliant.

“Start from an egalitarian baseline”

No.

]]> By: bjk http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10953 bjk Sun, 30 Sep 2007 11:51:33 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10953 Libertarianism apparently leads to universal humanitarianism, but so does communism. No matter where you start, you conveniently end up at universal humanitarianism. Libertarianism apparently leads to universal humanitarianism, but so does communism. No matter where you start, you conveniently end up at universal humanitarianism.

]]> By: bjk http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10965 bjk Sun, 30 Sep 2007 11:51:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10965 Libertarianism apparently leads to universal humanitarianism, but so does communism. No matter where you start, you conveniently end up at universal humanitarianism. Libertarianism apparently leads to universal humanitarianism, but so does communism. No matter where you start, you conveniently end up at universal humanitarianism.

]]> By: Ben A http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10952 Ben A Sat, 29 Sep 2007 23:25:25 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10952 Will, I am a great fan of your writing generally, but I fear your attempt to confound opponents of liberal immigration policy has led you into a bit of a mess. In brief, you hold 'particularism' to a standard that cannot be met by any pluralist or agent-centered ethical theory, and imply without argument (here, and elsewhere in your writing on immigration) that no non-particularist theory could lead to particularlist policies. Most of these problems have been noted by blar and tstockman above but briefly: 1. Are we morally allowed to privilege our own interests over the interests of others? Most of us feel the answer is yes, but the argument is not a lay-up. Sam Scheffler has written whole books on this, as you doubtless know. So it's hardly a mark of lack of seriousness to be able to provide a "complete schedule of prices" weighing your particular interests against the interests of strangers. 2. Once one endorses *any* value pluralism it is possible to formulate dilemmas and tough trade-offs. Aren't you a value pluralist? (human freedom and human well-being, perhaps?) Can you provide a schedule of prices in all trade-off cases? 3. Even a decidedly non-particularist moral philosophy could imply highly particularist institutions and policies. Let us stipulate the ultimate non-particularist ethics: hedonic utilitarianism. While we have no special moral obligations to our children or countrymen under this stipulation, it may be utility-maximizing for parents to feel a special obligation to their children, or for people to feel strong loyalty to their tribe, or for the world to be divided into sovereign states. If so, we should be functionally particularist. (You are likely familiar with the analogous claim that even if we deny a moral right to property, we should support the institution of private property because it leads to good consequences). Will, I am a great fan of your writing generally, but I fear your attempt to confound opponents of liberal immigration policy has led you into a bit of a mess. In brief, you hold ‘particularism’ to a standard that cannot be met by any pluralist or agent-centered ethical theory, and imply without argument (here, and elsewhere in your writing on immigration) that no non-particularist theory could lead to particularlist policies. Most of these problems have been noted by blar and tstockman above but briefly:

1. Are we morally allowed to privilege our own interests over the interests of others? Most of us feel the answer is yes, but the argument is not a lay-up. Sam Scheffler has written whole books on this, as you doubtless know. So it’s hardly a mark of lack of seriousness to be able to provide a “complete schedule of prices” weighing your particular interests against the interests of strangers.

2. Once one endorses *any* value pluralism it is possible to formulate dilemmas and tough trade-offs. Aren’t you a value pluralist? (human freedom and human well-being, perhaps?) Can you provide a schedule of prices in all trade-off cases?

3. Even a decidedly non-particularist moral philosophy could imply highly particularist institutions and policies. Let us stipulate the ultimate non-particularist ethics: hedonic utilitarianism. While we have no special moral obligations to our children or countrymen under this stipulation, it may be utility-maximizing for parents to feel a special obligation to their children, or for people to feel strong loyalty to their tribe, or for the world to be divided into sovereign states. If so, we should be functionally particularist. (You are likely familiar with the analogous claim that even if we deny a moral right to property, we should support the institution of private property because it leads to good consequences).

]]> By: Ben A http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10962 Ben A Sat, 29 Sep 2007 23:25:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10962 Will, I am a great fan of your writing generally, but I fear your attempt to confound opponents of liberal immigration policy has led you into a bit of a mess. In brief, you hold 'particularism' to a standard that cannot be met by any pluralist or agent-centered ethical theory, and imply without argument (here, and elsewhere in your writing on immigration) that no non-particularist theory could lead to particularlist policies. Most of these problems have been noted by blar and tstockman above but briefly: 1. Are we morally allowed to privilege our own interests over the interests of others? Most of us feel the answer is yes, but the argument is not a lay-up. Sam Scheffler has written whole books on this, as you doubtless know. So it's hardly a mark of lack of seriousness to be able to provide a "complete schedule of prices" weighing your particular interests against the interests of strangers. 2. Once one endorses *any* value pluralism it is possible to formulate dilemmas and tough trade-offs. Aren't you a value pluralist? (human freedom and human well-being, perhaps?) Can you provide a schedule of prices in all trade-off cases? 3. Even a decidedly non-particularist moral philosophy could imply highly particularist institutions and policies. Let us stipulate the ultimate non-particularist ethics: hedonic utilitarianism. While we have no special moral obligations to our children or countrymen under this stipulation, it may be utility-maximizing for parents to feel a special obligation to their children, or for people to feel strong loyalty to their tribe, or for the world to be divided into sovereign states. If so, we should be functionally particularist. (You are likely familiar with the analogous claim that even if we deny a moral right to property, we should support the institution of private property because it leads to good consequences). Will, I am a great fan of your writing generally, but I fear your attempt to confound opponents of liberal immigration policy has led you into a bit of a mess. In brief, you hold ‘particularism’ to a standard that cannot be met by any pluralist or agent-centered ethical theory, and imply without argument (here, and elsewhere in your writing on immigration) that no non-particularist theory could lead to particularlist policies. Most of these problems have been noted by blar and tstockman above but briefly:

1. Are we morally allowed to privilege our own interests over the interests of others? Most of us feel the answer is yes, but the argument is not a lay-up. Sam Scheffler has written whole books on this, as you doubtless know. So it’s hardly a mark of lack of seriousness to be able to provide a “complete schedule of prices” weighing your particular interests against the interests of strangers.

2. Once one endorses *any* value pluralism it is possible to formulate dilemmas and tough trade-offs. Aren’t you a value pluralist? (human freedom and human well-being, perhaps?) Can you provide a schedule of prices in all trade-off cases?

3. Even a decidedly non-particularist moral philosophy could imply highly particularist institutions and policies. Let us stipulate the ultimate non-particularist ethics: hedonic utilitarianism. While we have no special moral obligations to our children or countrymen under this stipulation, it may be utility-maximizing for parents to feel a special obligation to their children, or for people to feel strong loyalty to their tribe, or for the world to be divided into sovereign states. If so, we should be functionally particularist. (You are likely familiar with the analogous claim that even if we deny a moral right to property, we should support the institution of private property because it leads to good consequences).

]]> By: Tom Myers http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10951 Tom Myers Sat, 29 Sep 2007 14:21:17 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10951 I assume you'd call me an unprincipled particularist, e.g. I spend more freely for my kids' education than (via taxes and donations) for my neighbor's kids, yet I spend more freely for these than (via state taxes) for others in my state, more freely for these than (via federal taxes) for others in the US, and beyond that I contribute to various groups for education in Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand and so forth -- yet this is not a rigid hierarchy. I do what I can, balancing costs, as I think most of us do. I suppose that my new daughter-in-law, a Greek citizen but US graduate student, has been partially supported by my state and federal taxes, and I think that's fine. (Back when I had to supervise graduate students, some were US citizens and some were not, but all were partially supported by US taxes, and that was fine too.) Assuming she gets dual citizenship eventually, that will entitle her to more entitlements, including a vote on which entitlements US citizens should be entitled to, and I think that's also fine, even when she disagrees with me. I would therefore like to propose a model for unprincipled particularism of the sort that I try to follow. Basically I think people like me feel pulled or pushed by links to others which we interpret as implicit and explicit contracts; some of these are probably hard-wired as evolutionary psychology tries to describe, and others not. Some of them are equivalence relations readily interpreted as group memberships, and others not. There is no fixed decision procedure, no deontic-logic theorem-prover that settles choices for people like me, not even an attempt at perfect consistency: I suspect it's more like a Minsky society-of-mind arrangement, a constant debate between very stupid speakers saying "this is okay." and "this is Good!" and, of course, "no no No Very Bad!" They represent links, some of which carry responsibility, some of which are memberships. US citizenship is a moderately consensual membership; it would be more consensual if it were easier to come and go (and I would like that. I would like that a lot.) It seems perfectly reasonable to me that US citizens should agree, through their representatives, to do more for each other than they do for those who have not joined up. This applies to most consensual groups. Some of these are pretty feeble: I wouldn't even be aware of my <a href="http://www.cng70.org/index_files/Page2917.htm" rel="nofollow">high school class</a> as a continuing, consensual group (derived, of course, from a non-consensual origin) if it hadn't been for an <a href="http://www.instapundit.com/archives2/006666.php" rel="nofollow">instapundit interview</a> of <a href="http://www.cng70.org/index_files/Page1260.htm" rel="nofollow"> classmate</a>. Still, it's likely that there is some marginal request which, other things being equal, I would reject from a random member of h.sap, but would agree to from one of those people that I very hazily remember from almost forty years ago. I take it you disapprove; you would prefer to feel as strongly linked to everyone as to anyone. I'm skeptical that this is even possible, so I doubt that you can really achieve the logical consistency which you seem to think desirable. In fact, I doubt that you believe it: so I've probably misunderstood. I'd appreciate an exposition on what you mean by "particularism"... or of course, point to previous expositions. I assume you’d call me an unprincipled particularist, e.g. I spend more freely for my kids’ education than (via taxes and donations) for my neighbor’s kids, yet I spend more freely for these than (via state taxes) for others in my state, more freely for these than (via federal taxes) for others in the US, and beyond that I contribute to various groups for education in Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand and so forth — yet this is not a rigid hierarchy. I do what I can, balancing costs, as I think most of us do. I suppose that my new daughter-in-law, a Greek citizen but US graduate student, has been partially supported by my state and federal taxes, and I think that’s fine. (Back when I had to supervise graduate students, some were US citizens and some were not, but all were partially supported by US taxes, and that was fine too.) Assuming she gets dual citizenship eventually, that will entitle her to more entitlements, including a vote on which entitlements US citizens should be entitled to, and I think that’s also fine, even when she disagrees with me.
I would therefore like to propose a model for unprincipled particularism of the sort that I try to follow.
Basically I think people like me feel pulled or pushed by links to others which we interpret as implicit and explicit contracts; some of these are probably hard-wired as evolutionary psychology tries to describe, and others not. Some of them are equivalence relations readily interpreted as group memberships, and others not. There is no fixed decision procedure, no deontic-logic theorem-prover that settles choices for people like me, not even an attempt at perfect consistency: I suspect it’s more like a Minsky society-of-mind arrangement, a constant debate between very stupid speakers saying “this is okay.” and “this is Good!” and, of course, “no no No Very Bad!” They represent links, some of which carry responsibility, some of which are memberships.
US citizenship is a moderately consensual membership; it would be more consensual if it were easier to come and go (and I would like that. I would like that a lot.) It seems perfectly reasonable to me that US citizens should agree, through their representatives, to do more for each other than they do for those who have not joined up. This applies to most consensual groups. Some of these are pretty feeble: I wouldn’t even be aware of my high school class as a continuing, consensual group (derived, of course, from a non-consensual origin) if it hadn’t been for an instapundit interview of classmate. Still, it’s likely that there is some marginal request which, other things being equal, I would reject from a random member of h.sap, but would agree to from one of those people that I very hazily remember from almost forty years ago. I take it you disapprove; you would prefer to feel as strongly linked to everyone as to anyone. I’m skeptical that this is even possible, so I doubt that you can really achieve the logical consistency which you seem to think desirable. In fact, I doubt that you believe it: so I’ve probably misunderstood. I’d appreciate an exposition on what you mean by “particularism”… or of course, point to previous expositions.

]]> By: Tom Myers http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10957 Tom Myers Sat, 29 Sep 2007 14:21:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/09/28/questions-for-particularists/#comment-10957 I assume you'd call me an unprincipled particularist, e.g. I spend more freely for my kids' education than (via taxes and donations) for my neighbor's kids, yet I spend more freely for these than (via state taxes) for others in my state, more freely for these than (via federal taxes) for others in the US, and beyond that I contribute to various groups for education in Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand and so forth -- yet this is not a rigid hierarchy. I do what I can, balancing costs, as I think most of us do. I suppose that my new daughter-in-law, a Greek citizen but US graduate student, has been partially supported by my state and federal taxes, and I think that's fine. (Back when I had to supervise graduate students, some were US citizens and some were not, but all were partially supported by US taxes, and that was fine too.) Assuming she gets dual citizenship eventually, that will entitle her to more entitlements, including a vote on which entitlements US citizens should be entitled to, and I think that's also fine, even when she disagrees with me. I would therefore like to propose a model for unprincipled particularism of the sort that I try to follow. Basically I think people like me feel pulled or pushed by links to others which we interpret as implicit and explicit contracts; some of these are probably hard-wired as evolutionary psychology tries to describe, and others not. Some of them are equivalence relations readily interpreted as group memberships, and others not. There is no fixed decision procedure, no deontic-logic theorem-prover that settles choices for people like me, not even an attempt at perfect consistency: I suspect it's more like a Minsky society-of-mind arrangement, a constant debate between very stupid speakers saying "this is okay." and "this is Good!" and, of course, "no no No Very Bad!" They represent links, some of which carry responsibility, some of which are memberships. US citizenship is a moderately consensual membership; it would be more consensual if it were easier to come and go (and I would like that. I would like that a lot.) It seems perfectly reasonable to me that US citizens should agree, through their representatives, to do more for each other than they do for those who have not joined up. This applies to most consensual groups. Some of these are pretty feeble: I wouldn't even be aware of my <a href="http://www.cng70.org/index_files/Page2917.htm" rel="nofollow">high school class</a> as a continuing, consensual group (derived, of course, from a non-consensual origin) if it hadn't been for an <a href="http://www.instapundit.com/archives2/006666.php" rel="nofollow">instapundit interview</a> of <a href="http://www.cng70.org/index_files/Page1260.htm" rel="nofollow"> classmate</a>. Still, it's likely that there is some marginal request which, other things being equal, I would reject from a random member of h.sap, but would agree to from one of those people that I very hazily remember from almost forty years ago. I take it you disapprove; you would prefer to feel as strongly linked to everyone as to anyone. I'm skeptical that this is even possible, so I doubt that you can really achieve the logical consistency which you seem to think desirable. In fact, I doubt that you believe it: so I've probably misunderstood. I'd appreciate an exposition on what you mean by "particularism"... or of course, point to previous expositions. I assume you’d call me an unprincipled particularist, e.g. I spend more freely for my kids’ education than (via taxes and donations) for my neighbor’s kids, yet I spend more freely for these than (via state taxes) for others in my state, more freely for these than (via federal taxes) for others in the US, and beyond that I contribute to various groups for education in Afghanistan, Iraq, Thailand and so forth — yet this is not a rigid hierarchy. I do what I can, balancing costs, as I think most of us do. I suppose that my new daughter-in-law, a Greek citizen but US graduate student, has been partially supported by my state and federal taxes, and I think that’s fine. (Back when I had to supervise graduate students, some were US citizens and some were not, but all were partially supported by US taxes, and that was fine too.) Assuming she gets dual citizenship eventually, that will entitle her to more entitlements, including a vote on which entitlements US citizens should be entitled to, and I think that’s also fine, even when she disagrees with me.
I would therefore like to propose a model for unprincipled particularism of the sort that I try to follow.
Basically I think people like me feel pulled or pushed by links to others which we interpret as implicit and explicit contracts; some of these are probably hard-wired as evolutionary psychology tries to describe, and others not. Some of them are equivalence relations readily interpreted as group memberships, and others not. There is no fixed decision procedure, no deontic-logic theorem-prover that settles choices for people like me, not even an attempt at perfect consistency: I suspect it’s more like a Minsky society-of-mind arrangement, a constant debate between very stupid speakers saying “this is okay.” and “this is Good!” and, of course, “no no No Very Bad!” They represent links, some of which carry responsibility, some of which are memberships.
US citizenship is a moderately consensual membership; it would be more consensual if it were easier to come and go (and I would like that. I would like that a lot.) It seems perfectly reasonable to me that US citizens should agree, through their representatives, to do more for each other than they do for those who have not joined up. This applies to most consensual groups. Some of these are pretty feeble: I wouldn’t even be aware of my high school class as a continuing, consensual group (derived, of course, from a non-consensual origin) if it hadn’t been for an instapundit interview of classmate. Still, it’s likely that there is some marginal request which, other things being equal, I would reject from a random member of h.sap, but would agree to from one of those people that I very hazily remember from almost forty years ago. I take it you disapprove; you would prefer to feel as strongly linked to everyone as to anyone. I’m skeptical that this is even possible, so I doubt that you can really achieve the logical consistency which you seem to think desirable. In fact, I doubt that you believe it: so I’ve probably misunderstood. I’d appreciate an exposition on what you mean by “particularism”… or of course, point to previous expositions.

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