Daniel Larison kindly responds at length. There’s too much to discuss in one post. I’ll start here:
In any case, the two posts in question are expositions of the observation that conservatives do not hold his kind of libertarian assumptions about national identity and borders, because, among other things, they do not and cannot take liberty to be the moral baseline. They make distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, nationals and non-nationals, which they consider to be not simply prudent but actually obligatory and right. Neither do conservatives, or most people for that matter, judge the efficiacy and worthiness of U.S. immigration policy on the basis of whether it aids the populations of ”developing” nations, because we do not think that it is the role of the U.S. government to set its policies to maximise the prosperity of the populatiions of “developing” nations. Having put up a rather eccentric set of standards, Mr. Wilkinson finds that conservatives are not measuring up. That’s all very well, but I don’t know that it tells us very much. That is why I wrote the concluding remarks that I did.
Well, I’m not taking liberty as the moral baseline. My baseline in these posts has been primarily a concern for human well-being. People improve their material condition chiefly through cooperative exchange. Rules that restrict the liberty of people to move to where the economic opportunities are directly negatively affect their prospects. Whether or not you take a condition of liberty as the baseline, the fact is that people do worse in a world where their liberty is denied. Or at least that is my claim. Like everyone else, I make the distinction between citizen and non-citizen, national and non-national. But, like Daniel in his better moments, I also think it is possible to consider our obligations to others as fellow human beings, and not only as countrymen, teammates, or fraternity brothers. The issue between Daniel and me isn’t over the fact that some people are citizens and other people aren’t. The issue has to do with the moral salience or relevance of this fact. Daniel seems to me to want to either deny the possibility of prioritizing our humanity over our more local, exclusive attachments, or to affirm the perversity of doing so. I agree that it is “eccentric” to ask whether the global system of mostly sealed borders hurts people — even when those people don’t go to our church, or live in our town, or hold the same passport as we do, or speak our language, or look much like us. But good people will ask it anyway. If they find that the system does hurt people, good people will not consider this irrelevant to policy.
He berates conservatives for privileging the interests of fellow citizens and countrymen (which he finds “morally abhorrent”), but beyond asserting that this act of privileging is wrong he does not give any persuasive reason why this should be so, except to fall back on his assumption that distinguishing between citizen and non-citizen is arbitrary and wrong.
This is silly. I don’t deny that fellow citizens may have special obligations to one another, so I can’t deny that the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is “wrong,” though it is pretty arbitrary. Yes, I deny that it is generally morally permissible to weigh the interests of citizens more highly than the interests of non-citizens. But with no persuasive reason? Perhaps part of the problem here is a conflict in views about which set of assumptions is the default, and thus who bears the burden of establishing something different. Daniel apparently finds it intuitive or natural that someone born in Minnesota must weigh the interests of someone born on a U.S. Naval base in the Philipines more heavily than the interests of his co-workers who live a mile away across the Canadian border. I don’t find this intuitive at all. I don’t find it that intuitive or natural that I owed a person less regard on Tuesday because they weren’t sworn in as a citizen until Wednesday. The reasons I think privileging the interests of people of my nationality is wrong are basically the reasons I would cite when explaining why privileging the interests of people of the same race or the same sex is wrong. Nationality, like race and sex, is generally a morally irrelevant attribute. If Daniel is unmoved by the assumption that the lives and interests of black, whites, men, women, Ethiopians, Danes, and Americans ought to be weighed equally, unless there is a very special justification for weighing them unequally, then I am not sure what I will be able to say to him.
Yes, United States policy doesn’t govern Ethiopians (those not already in the U.S., at least), so the U.S. needn’t have their interests specifically in mind when crafting its public health policy. But the issue is rather more complicated when the policies in question are policies for assigning nationality or legal residency. It is up to democratic citizens to choose these policies. How heavily ought we (and every other democratic public) weigh the interests of people we might admit within our borders? My position is more heavily. Daniel’s position seems to be “not at all,” if that’s what we want. And he seems to think that’s what we should want.
Will, have you ever been in a foreign country and ran into an American? If so, didn’t you feel connected with that person? Didn’t you feel like you knew them a little bit better than the natives even if you’ve never met them before?
Don’t you feel a connection with your friends and family and if you were to meet them unexpectedly on the street, wouldn’t you treat them different then the strangers around you?
Wanting to feel connected isn’t arbitrary. With whom we choose to be connected may be, but its at least a little determined by biology and history.
Will, have you ever been in a foreign country and ran into an American? If so, didn’t you feel connected with that person? Didn’t you feel like you knew them a little bit better than the natives even if you’ve never met them before?
Don’t you feel a connection with your friends and family and if you were to meet them unexpectedly on the street, wouldn’t you treat them different then the strangers around you?
Wanting to feel connected isn’t arbitrary. With whom we choose to be connected may be, but its at least a little determined by biology and history.
Will, A felt sense of affiliation isn’t the issue. I get pretty damn excited if I meet someone else from Iowa. And I feel a special connection with my friends and family. But I don’t think it would be right to let two strangers die in order to save my sister. If that was the choice, I know I’d want to save her, and I might even do it. But we are talking about doing the right thing here. It would be completely miraculous if our attachments and prejudices were a failsafe guide to right action, wouldn’t it?
Anyway, what does wanting to feel connected have to do with prohibiting people from seeking opportunities to help themselves through voluntary cooperation?
Will, A felt sense of affiliation isn’t the issue. I get pretty damn excited if I meet someone else from Iowa. And I feel a special connection with my friends and family. But I don’t think it would be right to let two strangers die in order to save my sister. If that was the choice, I know I’d want to save her, and I might even do it. But we are talking about doing the right thing here. It would be completely miraculous if our attachments and prejudices were a failsafe guide to right action, wouldn’t it?
Anyway, what does wanting to feel connected have to do with prohibiting people from seeking opportunities to help themselves through voluntary cooperation?
“Daniel apparently finds it intuitive or natural that someone born in Minnesota must weigh the interests of someone born on a U.S. Naval base in the Philipines more heavily than the interests of his co-workers who live a mile away across the Canadian border. I don’t find this intuitive at all.”
As a Canadian living in southern Ontario, I have to say I feel more of a connection with people from, say, Edmonton or Halifax than with those just across the border in Buffalo. To me it does make sense that, at least when it comes to matters of government policy, we consider the interests of other Canadians above those of Americans; and I can’t think of many people who would disagree.
If it’s merely a matter of competing intuitions, then the debate may be difficult to arbirtrate. But I would hazard that Daniel’s position is the one held by most of the people most of the time, because people generally happen to recognize obligations to family members or neighbours or fellow citizens prior to obligations to “humanity”.
I was wondering if you could expand on the position you’re defending here. In taking human well-being as your moral baseline, are you adopting a kind of utilitarian ethics? What considerations are relevant to a moral act, on your account? Do these differ when it comes to politics? You have probably dealt with these questions already in the past, and I notice that in an earlier posting you say that you incline toward the moral philosophy of Hume and Smith, but it might be helpful if you spelled out these issues.
“Daniel apparently finds it intuitive or natural that someone born in Minnesota must weigh the interests of someone born on a U.S. Naval base in the Philipines more heavily than the interests of his co-workers who live a mile away across the Canadian border. I don’t find this intuitive at all.”
As a Canadian living in southern Ontario, I have to say I feel more of a connection with people from, say, Edmonton or Halifax than with those just across the border in Buffalo. To me it does make sense that, at least when it comes to matters of government policy, we consider the interests of other Canadians above those of Americans; and I can’t think of many people who would disagree.
If it’s merely a matter of competing intuitions, then the debate may be difficult to arbirtrate. But I would hazard that Daniel’s position is the one held by most of the people most of the time, because people generally happen to recognize obligations to family members or neighbours or fellow citizens prior to obligations to “humanity”.
I was wondering if you could expand on the position you’re defending here. In taking human well-being as your moral baseline, are you adopting a kind of utilitarian ethics? What considerations are relevant to a moral act, on your account? Do these differ when it comes to politics? You have probably dealt with these questions already in the past, and I notice that in an earlier posting you say that you incline toward the moral philosophy of Hume and Smith, but it might be helpful if you spelled out these issues.
Dave, Part of what I am insisting is that a nation-state is not more than a jurisdiction for government. Of course, when a governing body writes rules, it writes them with the interests of those who fall within its jurisdiction in mind. But again, the rules I’m interested in are rules about who is and is not allowed in the jurisdiction. It is perverse to ignore or discount the interests of those who would greatly benefit were they to be allowed in.
I certainly tend to feel more of a “connection” to other Americans than I do to Ethiopians, just as I tend to feel more of a connection to people who attended my High School than those who didn’t. But I just don’t think this sense of connection has much if any bearing on the weight we give to people’s interests in distinctively moral deliberation.
I fully understand the fact of the expanding circle of affinities, and there is of course nothing wrong with putting your own kids first, etc. But I strongly resist the idea that the construct of national citizenship defines a strong set of exclusive mutual obligations. It is true that we are heavily conditioned to identify with our nationalities, but I don’t think our conditioning has much by way of normative teeth.
Americans weighing the interests of Americans more heavily than that of Canadians makes about as much sense as Iowans weighing the interests of Iowans more heavily than that of Minnesotans. There is no principled reason why moving up to the nation-level jurisdiction should leave us with profound exclusive obligations. This is especially clear when we realize that it is a completely open option to define a larger jurisdiction. Texas wasn’t always a part of the United States. And the U.S., Canada, and Mexico weren’t always a part of a North American Union. But they could be. And we could reconstruct our sense of the bounds of attachment, just as many Germans and Danes now see themselves as Europeans. To think today’s system of political organization somehow maps on to a deeper moral reality strikes me as pretty naive.
Dave, Part of what I am insisting is that a nation-state is not more than a jurisdiction for government. Of course, when a governing body writes rules, it writes them with the interests of those who fall within its jurisdiction in mind. But again, the rules I’m interested in are rules about who is and is not allowed in the jurisdiction. It is perverse to ignore or discount the interests of those who would greatly benefit were they to be allowed in.
I certainly tend to feel more of a “connection” to other Americans than I do to Ethiopians, just as I tend to feel more of a connection to people who attended my High School than those who didn’t. But I just don’t think this sense of connection has much if any bearing on the weight we give to people’s interests in distinctively moral deliberation.
I fully understand the fact of the expanding circle of affinities, and there is of course nothing wrong with putting your own kids first, etc. But I strongly resist the idea that the construct of national citizenship defines a strong set of exclusive mutual obligations. It is true that we are heavily conditioned to identify with our nationalities, but I don’t think our conditioning has much by way of normative teeth.
Americans weighing the interests of Americans more heavily than that of Canadians makes about as much sense as Iowans weighing the interests of Iowans more heavily than that of Minnesotans. There is no principled reason why moving up to the nation-level jurisdiction should leave us with profound exclusive obligations. This is especially clear when we realize that it is a completely open option to define a larger jurisdiction. Texas wasn’t always a part of the United States. And the U.S., Canada, and Mexico weren’t always a part of a North American Union. But they could be. And we could reconstruct our sense of the bounds of attachment, just as many Germans and Danes now see themselves as Europeans. To think today’s system of political organization somehow maps on to a deeper moral reality strikes me as pretty naive.
One could make a conservative argument that affirms a belief in a moral distinction between citizen and non-citizen, but still says that our minimum moral standard is appallingly low. That conservatives fail to make this argument is significant, especially from a group of people who claim to be uniquely concerned about morality.
One could make a conservative argument that affirms a belief in a moral distinction between citizen and non-citizen, but still says that our minimum moral standard is appallingly low. That conservatives fail to make this argument is significant, especially from a group of people who claim to be uniquely concerned about morality.
To some degree trade, especially that across time and distance, requires a sense that the person you’re trading with is one of “us”. History is littered with examples of this: the Maghribi Traders, merchant guilds, gold rush spontaneous order property rights… the EU.
You could say these institutions are just monopolies extracting rents and reducing freedom. You could say that in a righteous world there would be no such institutions, but most of the people that study them (Clay/Wright and Greif are all at Stanford) believe they enable trade. By enforcing cooperation between “us,” these institutions create even the possibility of trade. For most contracts intended to create trade across time or space, at least one of the parties has an incentive to renege. Once you send me the load of wheat on credit, why would I pay you back? Institutions that enforce cooperation make this less likely.
The size and scope of these institutions are limited by biology (and history… most institutional change doesn’t happen immediately, it evolves). How does our brain decide who is “us” and who is “them”? Why can we only cooperate with one of “us”? This is where our feelings of affiliation enter the picture.
To some degree trade, especially that across time and distance, requires a sense that the person you’re trading with is one of “us”. History is littered with examples of this: the Maghribi Traders, merchant guilds, gold rush spontaneous order property rights… the EU.
You could say these institutions are just monopolies extracting rents and reducing freedom. You could say that in a righteous world there would be no such institutions, but most of the people that study them (Clay/Wright and Greif are all at Stanford) believe they enable trade. By enforcing cooperation between “us,” these institutions create even the possibility of trade. For most contracts intended to create trade across time or space, at least one of the parties has an incentive to renege. Once you send me the load of wheat on credit, why would I pay you back? Institutions that enforce cooperation make this less likely.
The size and scope of these institutions are limited by biology (and history… most institutional change doesn’t happen immediately, it evolves). How does our brain decide who is “us” and who is “them”? Why can we only cooperate with one of “us”? This is where our feelings of affiliation enter the picture.
Will, Excellent comments. That’s the sort of consideration that really means something. If local affiliation helps enable extended cooperation, then that’s a good reason to reinforce local affiliation. If local affiliation is used to cut off the possibility of extended cooperation, then not so much.
Will, Excellent comments. That’s the sort of consideration that really means something. If local affiliation helps enable extended cooperation, then that’s a good reason to reinforce local affiliation. If local affiliation is used to cut off the possibility of extended cooperation, then not so much.
Citizen vs. non-citizen is morally not important? If so then reparations owed by an aggressor country and its citizens, should be levied throughout the world, and paid to all countries? Patents issued in one country are thereby enforceable everywhere? The distinction between enemy combatants and fellow citizens is arbitrary? We don’t owe loyalty to fellow nationals when foreigners attack within our borders? American sovereignty is arbitrary folderol? Is the distinction between criminals and non-criminals arbitrary and socially constructed?
Citizen vs. non-citizen is morally not important? If so then reparations owed by an aggressor country and its citizens, should be levied throughout the world, and paid to all countries? Patents issued in one country are thereby enforceable everywhere? The distinction between enemy combatants and fellow citizens is arbitrary? We don’t owe loyalty to fellow nationals when foreigners attack within our borders? American sovereignty is arbitrary folderol? Is the distinction between criminals and non-criminals arbitrary and socially constructed?