I am glad to see Ross explicitly lay out in his gracious rejoinder what he takes the alternative to the liberal moral baseline to be:
I suppose I prefer to think that constitutionalism and Judeo-Christian ethics are the moral baseline where government action is concerned. That is, I believe that the government of the United States should strive to “form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” and do so without trampling on any of the liberties enumerated in the Constitution; at the same time, I would prefer that America’s leaders pursue policies that are broadly consonant with the Judeo-Christian tradition. (No wars of aggression, for instance.) And I’m pretty sure that “unrestricted voluntary cooperation between human beings” isn’t a liberty that the Constitution protects, since the Congress is explicitly granted the power to regulate both interstate and international commerce.
Fair enough, though I don’t think specifically Judeo-Christian ethics are an acceptable baseline in a pluralistic society with tens of millions of citizens who do not accept the authority of that ethical tradition. That said, observing the principle of equal liberty (i.e., “that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty to every other man”) with regard to trade in labor is also perfectly consonant with both the Judeo-Christian tradition and the U.S. Constitution. So Ross’s baseline seems to me largely irrelevant to his restrictionism, other than not obviously ruling it out. And, as a moral matter, it does nothing to establish what I see as his nationalism: the preference for the well-being of co-citizens over non-citizens, or the preference for reductions in inequality among citizens over even larger reductions of inequality between citizens and non-citizens.
The ultimate reason to endorse liberal principles is that adherence to them produces conditions under which human beings are most likely to thrive (according to the broadest variety of different conceptions of thriving). Even from a nationalist point of view, it is necessary to justify deviations from the principles that are most likely to improve the welfare of the nation’s citizens. The argument Ross had offered seemed to be based on the idea that, although de facto not-completely-restricted trade in labor with Mexican workers likely produces net benefits for the nation, these benefits come at the expense of some of the least well-off citizens. The unarticulated argument, I take it, is that certain patterns of material holdings are, for one reason or another, in the interest of the nation, and so that it may be morally legitimate to restrict the liberties of all citizens, and reduce the average national material well-being, so that less well-off citizens may be made better off (or not worse off).
Even if we hold fixed nationalist assumptions, this line of thinking is unconvincing. If we’re worried about patterns of material holdings, then we could, alternatively, not further restrict the freedom of citizens to trade in labor with migrant workers, go ahead and realize the economic surplus, and then reallocate some portion of the surplus to achieve the desired pattern of holdings. This produces a gain all around – even if we don’t take the welfare of migrant workers into account — and without restricting the liberty of citizens to cooperate with others to mutual advantage. So it is hard to see how what I called a “Rawlsian nationalist” worried about the national pattern of income and holdings could rationally use this worry as a lever for restrictions on the inflow of foreign workers.
I appreciate Ross’s meditation on the relationship between Christianity and immigration policy (I think Christianity, which sees all souls as having equal value under the eyes of God, is pretty flatly incompatible with all but the most tepid nationalisms, but nobody’s going to take my heathen word for it) which I think identifies one of the chief issue of contention between us.
There are all sorts of variables that the government of a Christian society should weigh when deciding how many migrants to admit, chief among them the effect of migration on civil peace and political stability, both of which are taken somewhat for granted in contemporary America but which have historically been rather fragile things. How to weigh these variables is a point on which intelligent people, Christian and otherwise, can disagree.
I would say we are a society containing a large majority of Christians, not a Christian society, but I agree that “civil peace and political stability” are at the heart of the issue. Statist liberals often worry about the destabilizing effects of income inequality. Statist conservatives often worry about the destabilizing effects of cultural change. Ross evidently worries about both, which puts him at odds with cosmopolitan dynamism on two separate fronts. In this sense, I think Ross’s concerns about eroding American national identity and nation-level economic inequality are of a piece. But I think the actual evidence of destabilization, either from national economic inequality or from immigrant-led social change, is very scant. I, for one, think we are in a period of both rapidly evolving American cultural identity and increasing social, political, and economic stability. Ross is right that this is an argument worth having, and I think we’re starting to have it, which is good. Let the data soar!
But, I’ve got to insist, the arguments over (a) whether the existence of political boundaries and co-citizenship is a conversation-stopper when it comes to matters of justice, and (b) over the amount of moral consideration to give to the well-being of non-citizens when it comes to assessing the costs and benefits of trade, are also worth having (i.e., worth not avoiding.)
Reihan has also written a long, meaty rejoinder (and who doesn’t take pleasure in Reihan’s long, meaty rejoinder?). I’ll get to that a bit later when I get a chance.
Facts? I see no facts. Only moral posturing. But I’ll be glad to introduce facts. For instance, employers shift the cost of alien workers to taxpayers, who usually have no idea who they’re subsidizing. Many of these jobs Americans won’t do are jobs that can’t be done profitably in the U.S. *at any wage.* Textiles, for instance. U.S. or alien workers at $0 in the U.S. still cannot compete with Cambodians, without tariffs and subsidies. Even Mexicans can’t compete with Cambodians. Illegal alien labor is just another subsidy for businesses that would have closed down long ago. It might be a different story if the employer was obligated to cover every cost of the employee to the taxpayer. Then you would see immigration restricted to skilled workers. But then that wouldn’t be humanitarian migration, it would be the wealthy getting wealthier, which is not what Will is talking about.
Facts? I see no facts. Only moral posturing. But I’ll be glad to introduce facts. For instance, employers shift the cost of alien workers to taxpayers, who usually have no idea who they’re subsidizing. Many of these jobs Americans won’t do are jobs that can’t be done profitably in the U.S. *at any wage.* Textiles, for instance. U.S. or alien workers at $0 in the U.S. still cannot compete with Cambodians, without tariffs and subsidies. Even Mexicans can’t compete with Cambodians. Illegal alien labor is just another subsidy for businesses that would have closed down long ago. It might be a different story if the employer was obligated to cover every cost of the employee to the taxpayer. Then you would see immigration restricted to skilled workers. But then that wouldn’t be humanitarian migration, it would be the wealthy getting wealthier, which is not what Will is talking about.
Suppose a majority of American public opinion is not on your side. Do you believe this is one of those issues (like e.g., slavery, or Jim Crow) where the government’s first obligation is to ensure voluntary exchange, above the wishes of the electorate?
Suppose a majority of American public opinion is not on your side. Do you believe this is one of those issues (like e.g., slavery, or Jim Crow) where the government’s first obligation is to ensure voluntary exchange, above the wishes of the electorate?
Also…
The ultimate reason to endorse liberal principles is that adherence to them produces conditions under which human beings are most likely to thrive (according to the broadest variety of different conceptions of thriving).
This is a crucial, under-argued point that requires clarification. For example:
1) Are some people’s conceptions of “thriving” supposed to be dismissed out-of-hand in this moral calculus? What are the rules for dismissing someone’s conception of thriving?
2) If 5 people have 5 different “conceptions of thriving”, yielding 5 different preference-orderings on e.g. immigration policies, how do we decide whether “liberalism” or “statism” or “communism” or “authoritarianism” best satisfies these conceptions in the aggregate? What is the method of aggregating? Is this a weighted average of 5 different cardinal utility functions? Is it a minimax criterion?
I’m sure you’d agree that there is a lot to unpack in your statement.
If you want to be consequentialist about your liberalism, why not abandon liberalism and become a full consequentalist: evaluate each public-policy question on a case-by-case basis, looking at preference functions and attempting the best synthesis of everyone’s preferences? You seem to believe that such “nuts and bolts” work can be short-circuited in general, on consequentialist grounds. That’s an extraordinarily interesting claim.
Also…
The ultimate reason to endorse liberal principles is that adherence to them produces conditions under which human beings are most likely to thrive (according to the broadest variety of different conceptions of thriving).
This is a crucial, under-argued point that requires clarification. For example:
1) Are some people’s conceptions of “thriving” supposed to be dismissed out-of-hand in this moral calculus? What are the rules for dismissing someone’s conception of thriving?
2) If 5 people have 5 different “conceptions of thriving”, yielding 5 different preference-orderings on e.g. immigration policies, how do we decide whether “liberalism” or “statism” or “communism” or “authoritarianism” best satisfies these conceptions in the aggregate? What is the method of aggregating? Is this a weighted average of 5 different cardinal utility functions? Is it a minimax criterion?
I’m sure you’d agree that there is a lot to unpack in your statement.
If you want to be consequentialist about your liberalism, why not abandon liberalism and become a full consequentalist: evaluate each public-policy question on a case-by-case basis, looking at preference functions and attempting the best synthesis of everyone’s preferences? You seem to believe that such “nuts and bolts” work can be short-circuited in general, on consequentialist grounds. That’s an extraordinarily interesting claim.
Actually, as I think about it, most alien labor is probably unproductive makework. The most efficient division of labor would be a) bring in high skill talent to the U.S. and b) ship low skill labor (agriculture, primarily) overseas. Like any sort of unproductive subsidy, subsidizing makework in the U.S. ultimately doesn’t benefit anyone.
Actually, as I think about it, most alien labor is probably unproductive makework. The most efficient division of labor would be a) bring in high skill talent to the U.S. and b) ship low skill labor (agriculture, primarily) overseas. Like any sort of unproductive subsidy, subsidizing makework in the U.S. ultimately doesn’t benefit anyone.
MK, First, I do think we have a pre-instutional right to exchange, so, yes, I think it is an obligation to secure that right even if it is democratically opposed. Second, I think American sentiment toward immigration and open labor markets is actually rather positive. In the current debate, restrictionists are simply most salient; they aren’t the necessarily the majority. Additionally, one important function of public arguments in democracies is to change public sentiment.
Also…
Yes, there is a lot to unpack. Short answer: I’m a pluralist about consequences, so there’s no aggregation. I think there is a pretty broad overlap in various American conceptions of well-being, and I’m aiming for the overlap. Disagreements are obviously most salient, but data on health, the development of capacities, life-satisfaction, and other quality of life metrics are deeply persuasive to huge swathes of the population. There are, of course, elements of every conception that get left out of the overlap. For instance, I have very strong views about autonomy that are not widely shared in other conceptions of well-being. Some conservatives have strong views about the centrality to well-being of cultural stasis and “thick” identities, which are by their nature threatened by the sense of contingency bred by markets and cultural diversity. This is also outside the overlap. I think a lot of public argument is argument over what we’re going to count as good or bad public reasons. We’ve stopped counting certain kinds of racist, sexist, and homophobic arguments as providing public reasons in quite a short period of time. That’s probably partly why Reihan, Larison, etc., got so testy from what they wrongly took to be an intimation of racism: if you’re guilty of racism, you’re outside the pale. I would in fact like certain kinds of “national identity” considerations to be considered more like racism than they currently are. I think they know or sense that some of their main political themes are screwed if they are. So we fight elliptically about what does count as a good reason in a public argument, since there is no definitive objective metric by which to gain agreement on policy. A bit of tangent there….
MK, First, I do think we have a pre-instutional right to exchange, so, yes, I think it is an obligation to secure that right even if it is democratically opposed. Second, I think American sentiment toward immigration and open labor markets is actually rather positive. In the current debate, restrictionists are simply most salient; they aren’t the necessarily the majority. Additionally, one important function of public arguments in democracies is to change public sentiment.
Also…
Yes, there is a lot to unpack. Short answer: I’m a pluralist about consequences, so there’s no aggregation. I think there is a pretty broad overlap in various American conceptions of well-being, and I’m aiming for the overlap. Disagreements are obviously most salient, but data on health, the development of capacities, life-satisfaction, and other quality of life metrics are deeply persuasive to huge swathes of the population. There are, of course, elements of every conception that get left out of the overlap. For instance, I have very strong views about autonomy that are not widely shared in other conceptions of well-being. Some conservatives have strong views about the centrality to well-being of cultural stasis and “thick” identities, which are by their nature threatened by the sense of contingency bred by markets and cultural diversity. This is also outside the overlap. I think a lot of public argument is argument over what we’re going to count as good or bad public reasons. We’ve stopped counting certain kinds of racist, sexist, and homophobic arguments as providing public reasons in quite a short period of time. That’s probably partly why Reihan, Larison, etc., got so testy from what they wrongly took to be an intimation of racism: if you’re guilty of racism, you’re outside the pale. I would in fact like certain kinds of “national identity” considerations to be considered more like racism than they currently are. I think they know or sense that some of their main political themes are screwed if they are. So we fight elliptically about what does count as a good reason in a public argument, since there is no definitive objective metric by which to gain agreement on policy. A bit of tangent there….
bjkad: “most alien labor is probably unproductive makework.” Wow. Bzzt! You’re disqualified! American employers are clamoring for alien labor because unproductive make-work somehow enriches them? The largely migrant-built ten story condo building (real bricks and everything) going up next to my office sure LOOKS like it will be nice to live in.
bjkad: “most alien labor is probably unproductive makework.” Wow. Bzzt! You’re disqualified! American employers are clamoring for alien labor because unproductive make-work somehow enriches them? The largely migrant-built ten story condo building (real bricks and everything) going up next to my office sure LOOKS like it will be nice to live in.
Taxpayers at the bottom are net consumers of government services, and you have to figure those costs in. The Fairfax county budget this year will be $3.3 billion in a county with 1 million people, at a rate of $3,300 per person. Does anyone think that construction workers in Fairfax county pay $3,300 in local taxes? Or that each consumes less than $3,300 in services? There is no such thing as cheap labor. Once you figure those costs in, even aliens in industries protected from foreign competition are probably uneconomic.
Taxpayers at the bottom are net consumers of government services, and you have to figure those costs in. The Fairfax county budget this year will be $3.3 billion in a county with 1 million people, at a rate of $3,300 per person. Does anyone think that construction workers in Fairfax county pay $3,300 in local taxes? Or that each consumes less than $3,300 in services? There is no such thing as cheap labor. Once you figure those costs in, even aliens in industries protected from foreign competition are probably uneconomic.
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“That’s probably partly why Reihan, Larison, etc., got so testy from what they wrongly took to be an intimation of racism: if you’re guilty of racism, you’re outside the pale.”
I can’t speak for Reihan, but in my case I objected to it as strongly as I did because it seemed to give the impression of that kind of accusation. Even though I accept now that it wasn’t such an accusation, at least not directly, I objected to it because I thought it was false and because it seemed to be designed to shut down argument rather than illuminate anything. However, if you believe that “certain kinds” of national identity considerations should be regarded as being more like racism, that suggests that you think those who have these considerations are rather more like racists than most people would take them to be, which would seem to make the harping on about Ross’ nationalism to be less of a description and more of an anathema. It seems to me that it can’t be terribly good for the “theme” of liberty to tie it to transnationalism and enrichment of corporations, but that’s just me.
“That’s probably partly why Reihan, Larison, etc., got so testy from what they wrongly took to be an intimation of racism: if you’re guilty of racism, you’re outside the pale.”
I can’t speak for Reihan, but in my case I objected to it as strongly as I did because it seemed to give the impression of that kind of accusation. Even though I accept now that it wasn’t such an accusation, at least not directly, I objected to it because I thought it was false and because it seemed to be designed to shut down argument rather than illuminate anything. However, if you believe that “certain kinds” of national identity considerations should be regarded as being more like racism, that suggests that you think those who have these considerations are rather more like racists than most people would take them to be, which would seem to make the harping on about Ross’ nationalism to be less of a description and more of an anathema. It seems to me that it can’t be terribly good for the “theme” of liberty to tie it to transnationalism and enrichment of corporations, but that’s just me.
Will, Thanks for the response. I’m still trying to pin down this statement:
The ultimate reason to endorse liberal principles is that adherence to them produces conditions under which human beings are most likely to thrive (according to the broadest variety of different conceptions of thriving).
Ideally it would be nice to give this an explicit logical structure, with quantifications, etc. But if I read your response correctly, there may be no such translation of your statement. The best I could do would be something like:
There is a broad swath (95+ %) of the population that agrees that a broad swath of things are to be valued. My valuing function (let’s say ordinal rather than cardinal) is incommensurable with yours. It is not analytically true that liberalism is Pareto-optimal– in fact, it’s probably just not true at all, since some people don’t like liberalism. However, if you restrict attention to the overlapping values of the agreeing 95+%, you end up with a multidimensional space: there are a bunch of axes, one for each value, and there is a mapping from world-states to points in the multidimensional value space. Since the different axes/values are incommensurable, Pareto is the only acceptable ordering of points in the multi-dim space. Now, you are saying that within this space, liberalism is pretty much Pareto optimal.
Well, already I have a question. If Pareto is our only guide here, how can you make a unique claim about liberalism? Aren’t there many, many incommensurable Pareto-optimal points? Presumably not all of these are liberalism?
I’m certainly inferring things here you haven’t precisely said. If I’ve said something you wouldn’t say, please let me know.
Will, Thanks for the response. I’m still trying to pin down this statement:
The ultimate reason to endorse liberal principles is that adherence to them produces conditions under which human beings are most likely to thrive (according to the broadest variety of different conceptions of thriving).
Ideally it would be nice to give this an explicit logical structure, with quantifications, etc. But if I read your response correctly, there may be no such translation of your statement. The best I could do would be something like:
There is a broad swath (95+ %) of the population that agrees that a broad swath of things are to be valued. My valuing function (let’s say ordinal rather than cardinal) is incommensurable with yours. It is not analytically true that liberalism is Pareto-optimal– in fact, it’s probably just not true at all, since some people don’t like liberalism. However, if you restrict attention to the overlapping values of the agreeing 95+%, you end up with a multidimensional space: there are a bunch of axes, one for each value, and there is a mapping from world-states to points in the multidimensional value space. Since the different axes/values are incommensurable, Pareto is the only acceptable ordering of points in the multi-dim space. Now, you are saying that within this space, liberalism is pretty much Pareto optimal.
Well, already I have a question. If Pareto is our only guide here, how can you make a unique claim about liberalism? Aren’t there many, many incommensurable Pareto-optimal points? Presumably not all of these are liberalism?
I’m certainly inferring things here you haven’t precisely said. If I’ve said something you wouldn’t say, please let me know.
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nice post
This post was years ago and I would like to thank the author of this article. It really served as a guide for me.