I find it significant that it’s in the direction that, given economic growth over the period, would tend to make the implied comparison sound more dramatic than the underlying numbers actually are. The rich number gets puffed up by the economic growth over the period (because it increases income) while the poor number is chosen not to reflect growth (because growth doesn’t necessarily affect share)? That seems pretty good evidence that if Furman is a dishonest advocate, he’s a leftist. (And I hope that in this context I may be forgiven for crafting the sort of prose which misleads careless readers into a logical fallacy which says something which technically isn’t what I wrote.)

I find it significant that it’s in the direction that, given economic growth over the period, would tend to make the implied comparison sound more dramatic than the underlying numbers actually are. The rich number gets puffed up by the economic growth over the period (because it increases income) while the poor number is chosen not to reflect growth (because growth doesn’t necessarily affect share)? That seems pretty good evidence that if Furman is a dishonest advocate, he’s a leftist. (And I hope that in this context I may be forgiven for crafting the sort of prose which misleads careless readers into a logical fallacy which says something which technically isn’t what I wrote.)

I know you must reduce the liberty of rich people to do this, but I am not sure if this is really inconsistent with what Rawls says. (I am no expert, and you probably are, so you can take this as a request for clarification).

I know you must reduce the liberty of rich people to do this, but I am not sure if this is really inconsistent with what Rawls says. (I am no expert, and you probably are, so you can take this as a request for clarification).

1) Inequality per se simply is unjust
2) We should maximize aggregate utility; poor people’s marginal utility of money is higher
3) We should maximize aggregate utility; lots of people care about poor people; thus we should redistribute because it helps poor people and makes rich people feel better due to empathy effects
4) Inequality in money causes inequality of future opportunity (education, safe neighborhood, nutrition, etc.). Thus we must alleviate the first to alleviate the second.

There are responses to all of these. (1) depends on your notion of justice. (2) I think has some truth to it; I think maximum aggregate utility is a reasonable goal to shoot for. (3) is interesting — it may not strongly argue for coercive taxation over voluntary donations; also, it may be difficult to measure the empathy effect in terms of money; finally, it is not clear that mere preference is a reasonable pretext for public policy. (4) is another reason why I support redistribution. You seem to argue that we should focus more specifically on the mechanisms (schooling, nutrition, etc.) by which having less money hurts your chances for economic achievement. That’s fair enough. Note that this is a hard thing to do, however. I am not convinced as you are that it is harmful to use money as a reasonable, temporary proxy, so long as we are committed to doing the research it takes to find out the real (i.e. more specific) causes. [Plus, as I mentioned, I can go for some redistribution because of (2)]

1) Inequality per se simply is unjust
2) We should maximize aggregate utility; poor people’s marginal utility of money is higher
3) We should maximize aggregate utility; lots of people care about poor people; thus we should redistribute because it helps poor people and makes rich people feel better due to empathy effects
4) Inequality in money causes inequality of future opportunity (education, safe neighborhood, nutrition, etc.). Thus we must alleviate the first to alleviate the second.

There are responses to all of these. (1) depends on your notion of justice. (2) I think has some truth to it; I think maximum aggregate utility is a reasonable goal to shoot for. (3) is interesting — it may not strongly argue for coercive taxation over voluntary donations; also, it may be difficult to measure the empathy effect in terms of money; finally, it is not clear that mere preference is a reasonable pretext for public policy. (4) is another reason why I support redistribution. You seem to argue that we should focus more specifically on the mechanisms (schooling, nutrition, etc.) by which having less money hurts your chances for economic achievement. That’s fair enough. Note that this is a hard thing to do, however. I am not convinced as you are that it is harmful to use money as a reasonable, temporary proxy, so long as we are committed to doing the research it takes to find out the real (i.e. more specific) causes. [Plus, as I mentioned, I can go for some redistribution because of (2)]