There is no better way to memorialize a philosopher than argue with him. So here’s a bit from one of the only things I ever wrote about Rorty, from a 1999 Institute for Objectivist Studies online seminar. This, I think, would have been my first year in the PhD program at Maryland, so please keep that it mind.
Richard Rorty’s “Objectivity or Solidarity” is a case study in the use of false alternatives for rhetorical gain. The essay begins by presenting us with an awfully weird and unappealing choice. Rorty claims that there are just two main ways to “give sense” to our lives. Either one can make up a story about oneself in which one’s life figures in the life of a bigger community, or one can think about standing in a certain direct relationship to the mind-independent world. If you go in for the first, then you like solidarity. If you go in for the second, you like objectivity. Now, reader, pick sides!
It really is a weird choice. First, we might not care that much about being embedded in a tradition or community. And so fitting into one might not be central to some people’s sense of meaning in life. But these people don’t thereby have any overriding interest in eyeball to eyeball contact with the world-out-there. I’m sure you can give meaning to your life without questing primarily for either truth-for-its-own-sake or my-place-in-something-bigger-than-me. How about giving meaning to your life by trying to do something that makes you, the individual, happy?
It is important for Rorty to cast his argument against objectivity in terms of the meaningfulness of our lives, because Rorty’s “pragmatism” will forbid him from saying that the ideal of objectivity is objectively unworthy of belief, because false. He will be required to say merely that objectivity is not so good for us to care about, that we’ll be better off if we don’t care about it and care about solidarity instead. His way of setting up the question in terms of what “gives sense” to our lives allows him to plump for solidarity by saying that seeking solidarity (without trying to ground solidarity in objectivity) lends itself better to a meaningful life. As we shall see, he really can’t coherently claim that either. But first things first.
And I think this bit is relevant to the Yglesias/Linker debate:
As it turns out, it does not look like Rorty is articulating the commitments of liberal, western intellectuals, such that when he speaks to that audience, they are bound by those commitments to endorse what Rorty says. Rather, it looks like he is trying to dictate those commitments, to cause us to revise them. It looks as though he is pretending to be a member of our community, but that in reality he is standing outside of it, looking in, and suggesting we change our commitments in rather radical ways to suit his ideals. Rorty himself refuses solidarity with the Western Enlightenment ideals and the community centered in those ideals. So he makes up a story that will disintegrate that community and its ideals by persuading its members that it has been committed to Rorty’s ideals all along.
When Rorty says, “There is, in short, nothing wrong with the hopes of the Enlightenment” he means that there is nothing wrong except for the entire picture of man’s relationship to reality through reason upon which the Enlightenment was based. He is saying that there is nothing wrong with the hopes of the Enlightenment, except for those hopes and ideals at odds with his own. Clearly, some notion of objectivity is essential to the Enlightenment vision. Rorty’s attack on objectivity just is an attack on the Enlightenment ideals based on its conception of objectivity. But he cannot put the debate in those terms, lest he show himself too clearly as a dissenter to our ideals. Rather, he must put the debate in terms that permit him to characterize himself as someone who is articulating Enlightenment ideals and making them coherent from within. But he is, in fact, merely a wolf in Enlightenment clothing.
I have since come some way in Rorty’s direction in seeing the contingency of the Enlightenment ideals of rationality and objectivity. (In my Objectivist period, I would have seen them as something like self-evident, or immanent in the very idea of thinking. I don’t now see it this way at all.) But I’ve hardly come to be ironic about them. Grasping a thing’s contingency can be the same as grasping its rarity and preciousness — can be a reason for treating it very seriously, without irony. The ideals of rationality and objectivity in practice actually are our means of discovering what the world is like, and actually do explain a large part of the enormous moral progress humankind has made in the last few hundred years. Because I now see these ideals as more contingent and fragile than ever, I now think Rorty’s assault on objectivity is even more discreditible than I did before, and even more a violation of solidarity with those who hold fast to the norms of reason, progress, and social hope.
I’m not sure what you mean by Rorty’s “assault on objectivity”. Rorty has no problem with objectivity, just with the way philosophers, in philosophical contexts, attempt to cash it out. He thinks we should dispense with the notion — it’s not coherent enough to call an “idea” — of “intrinsic features of objects” and instead construe objectivity as “relative ease of attaining consensus among inquirers.” In this sense, science, indeed, remains the paradigm of objectivity, in that scientific consensus is much easier to come by than consensus on moral or aesthetic judgments.
It is not, however, *happenstance* that scientific consensus is easier to come by. It’s not a fluke, or coincidence. It’s just that science has a clear “criterion of success”, and that criterion is “accurate prediction”. The vast majority of scientists agree both on what their criterion should be and on how to measure accuracy. Hence, the objectivity of science.
In moral argument, however, there is no clear criterion of success. Should it be minimization of suffering, preservation of human dignity, accordance with the divine/natural law, or something else? Nor is there agreement on how to measure suffering or dignity, or how to uncover the natural law.
But such abstruse, philosophical arguments have nothing to do with the actual practice of asking for and giving reasons–for moral or scientific beliefs. Indeed, that’s exactly the *reason* that Rorty thinks we should get rid of the notion of “intrinsic features of objects”: it makes no difference to practice. So why keep knocking our heads against it?
I’m not sure what you mean by Rorty’s “assault on objectivity”. Rorty has no problem with objectivity, just with the way philosophers, in philosophical contexts, attempt to cash it out. He thinks we should dispense with the notion — it’s not coherent enough to call an “idea” — of “intrinsic features of objects” and instead construe objectivity as “relative ease of attaining consensus among inquirers.” In this sense, science, indeed, remains the paradigm of objectivity, in that scientific consensus is much easier to come by than consensus on moral or aesthetic judgments.
It is not, however, *happenstance* that scientific consensus is easier to come by. It’s not a fluke, or coincidence. It’s just that science has a clear “criterion of success”, and that criterion is “accurate prediction”. The vast majority of scientists agree both on what their criterion should be and on how to measure accuracy. Hence, the objectivity of science.
In moral argument, however, there is no clear criterion of success. Should it be minimization of suffering, preservation of human dignity, accordance with the divine/natural law, or something else? Nor is there agreement on how to measure suffering or dignity, or how to uncover the natural law.
But such abstruse, philosophical arguments have nothing to do with the actual practice of asking for and giving reasons–for moral or scientific beliefs. Indeed, that’s exactly the *reason* that Rorty thinks we should get rid of the notion of “intrinsic features of objects”: it makes no difference to practice. So why keep knocking our heads against it?
Yes. And the best explanation for “accurate prediction” (or postdiction, for that matter) is the existence of the elements in the most successful model.
There are plenty of clear criteria for success in areas that are relevant to most conceptions to morality. Wealthier, happier, longer-living people, with greater opportunity, etc., are desirable according to most major moral theories. These are things we can and should try to measure scientifically. What’s the problem? And what’s the advantage of obscurantism?
Yes. And the best explanation for “accurate prediction” (or postdiction, for that matter) is the existence of the elements in the most successful model.
There are plenty of clear criteria for success in areas that are relevant to most conceptions to morality. Wealthier, happier, longer-living people, with greater opportunity, etc., are desirable according to most major moral theories. These are things we can and should try to measure scientifically. What’s the problem? And what’s the advantage of obscurantism?
Yes. And the best way to make sense of abstract ontological claims — “elements exist!” — is to say that models featuring those elements give the best predictions. To quote the guy who gave your blog its name, “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” At some point, our spades are turned. You can insist that there’s realist bedrock beneath Rorty’s pragmatist handwaving, and Rorty can insist that there’s pragmatist bedrock beneath your realist handwaving. You can go back an forth ad infinitum. But that’s not argument; it’s ritual.
If you’re a realist scientist, and I’m a pragmatist scientist, and we both want to prove X, we go back to our labs and conduct exactly the same experiments. Our philosophical dispute has nothing to do with our practices. Rorty’s point is just that, if the realist-pragmatist debate makes no difference whatsoever to practice, why not just jettison the notion of the “real world” and the 2,000 years of pointless epistemological wheel-spinning that it has bequeathed to us?
RE ethics: Are you trying to say that Rorty is opposed to moral deliberation? The claim that there’s less consensus about its aims doesn’t imply that consensus is not something to strive for. The point was just that disputants on opposite sides of the stem cell debate probably agree less about what constitutes a winning moral argument than scientists do about what constitutes a successful experiment.
Yes. And the best way to make sense of abstract ontological claims — “elements exist!” — is to say that models featuring those elements give the best predictions. To quote the guy who gave your blog its name, “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” At some point, our spades are turned. You can insist that there’s realist bedrock beneath Rorty’s pragmatist handwaving, and Rorty can insist that there’s pragmatist bedrock beneath your realist handwaving. You can go back an forth ad infinitum. But that’s not argument; it’s ritual.
If you’re a realist scientist, and I’m a pragmatist scientist, and we both want to prove X, we go back to our labs and conduct exactly the same experiments. Our philosophical dispute has nothing to do with our practices. Rorty’s point is just that, if the realist-pragmatist debate makes no difference whatsoever to practice, why not just jettison the notion of the “real world” and the 2,000 years of pointless epistemological wheel-spinning that it has bequeathed to us?
RE ethics: Are you trying to say that Rorty is opposed to moral deliberation? The claim that there’s less consensus about its aims doesn’t imply that consensus is not something to strive for. The point was just that disputants on opposite sides of the stem cell debate probably agree less about what constitutes a winning moral argument than scientists do about what constitutes a successful experiment.
Larry, I’ve find your point weird. If the realist/pragmatist dispute makes no difference in practice, then the pragmatist should just concede the realist assumptions embodied in successful scientific practice. What is the point of arguing, for the pragmatist, that photons and curved space-time aren’t REALLY real. If it doesn’t matter, like you say, then why bother to argue as if it does? We have discovered that there are photons. Do you disagree?
Also, we have not, as a matter of scientific fact, discovered that the world’s structure is dependent on human classificatory activity. Do you disagree?
I don’t think I implied Rorty is again moral deliberation. But the rhetorical upshot of much of his writings is to discourage us from trying to settle things on rational grounds. I’m going to spend my time trying to understand what really does make people healthier, happier, wealthier, etc. Since there is a fact of the matter about all this stuff, arguing about it simply is not the same thing as trying to seduce agreement with disguised poetry.
Larry, I’ve find your point weird. If the realist/pragmatist dispute makes no difference in practice, then the pragmatist should just concede the realist assumptions embodied in successful scientific practice. What is the point of arguing, for the pragmatist, that photons and curved space-time aren’t REALLY real. If it doesn’t matter, like you say, then why bother to argue as if it does? We have discovered that there are photons. Do you disagree?
Also, we have not, as a matter of scientific fact, discovered that the world’s structure is dependent on human classificatory activity. Do you disagree?
I don’t think I implied Rorty is again moral deliberation. But the rhetorical upshot of much of his writings is to discourage us from trying to settle things on rational grounds. I’m going to spend my time trying to understand what really does make people healthier, happier, wealthier, etc. Since there is a fact of the matter about all this stuff, arguing about it simply is not the same thing as trying to seduce agreement with disguised poetry.
Yes, initially, pragmatist epistemology does seem pretty weird. Only someone who has wandered deep into the labyrinth of Platonist/Cartesian/Kantian dualism and become convinced the path leads nowhere would want to adopt such a weird view. On the other hand, Rorty would argue that the only reason it seems weird is that we got all our tools of epistemological argumentation from Plato, Descartes, and Kant in the first place: they queered the pitch.
He would, however, deny that there are any “realist assumptions embodied in scientific practice”. That’s the point in saying that the realist and the pragmatist scientists would perform the exact same experiments. Realism is just a gloss the Platonist puts on scientific practice — on any epistemic practice — after the fact. Scientific practice, in James’s terms, “pays its way”: it doesn’t need any fancy metaphysical justification.
It’s important to note, I think, that Rorty is not suggesting that scientists — or anybody else except philosophers — should change the way they talk. Scientists will still say, “Have they found the Higgs boson yet?” and “We don’t know yet whether gravitons exist.” Rorty is just saying that, when the philosophy professors, in their basement classrooms, are debating such questions as *how* (as opposed to what) words mean, and what ontological claims amount to, they jettison the Platonist/Cartesian/Kantian metaphysical apparatus.
“we have not, as a matter of scientific fact, discovered that the world’s structure is dependent on human classificatory activity”
Of course not. It’s not something we could, in principle, discover. Again, the philosophical disputes have no bearing on scientific practice. Philosophical theories are not empirically testable, which, per Rorty, is a good reason to get rid of the ones that just give rise to lots of pointless wheel-spinning.
“the rhetorical upshot of much of his writings is to discourage us from trying to settle things on rational grounds”
I think Rorty would be dismayed to think that that’s the moral people drew from his writing. There is a notion of “rationality” that Rorty, indeed, militated against: the Platonist notion of rationality as the faculty, unique to humans, that allows them to perceive ahistorical, transcultural facts. Rorty thought there were no such facts, and thus no such faculty. But he defended a notion of rationality as the “attempt to make our webs of belief more coherent.” The ungainliness of the mixed metaphor aside, that’s pretty much what all argument in ethics classes consists of: the attempt to point out internal inconsistencies in your opponent’s position.
On the other hand, I think that Rorty felt that, indispensable as rational (in his sense) argument may be to moral progress, it wasn’t nearly as effective as poetic seduction, or as he put it, “telling sad and sentimental stories.” And from the pragmatist perspective, one technique of achieving consensus is as good as another.
Yes, initially, pragmatist epistemology does seem pretty weird. Only someone who has wandered deep into the labyrinth of Platonist/Cartesian/Kantian dualism and become convinced the path leads nowhere would want to adopt such a weird view. On the other hand, Rorty would argue that the only reason it seems weird is that we got all our tools of epistemological argumentation from Plato, Descartes, and Kant in the first place: they queered the pitch.
He would, however, deny that there are any “realist assumptions embodied in scientific practice”. That’s the point in saying that the realist and the pragmatist scientists would perform the exact same experiments. Realism is just a gloss the Platonist puts on scientific practice — on any epistemic practice — after the fact. Scientific practice, in James’s terms, “pays its way”: it doesn’t need any fancy metaphysical justification.
It’s important to note, I think, that Rorty is not suggesting that scientists — or anybody else except philosophers — should change the way they talk. Scientists will still say, “Have they found the Higgs boson yet?” and “We don’t know yet whether gravitons exist.” Rorty is just saying that, when the philosophy professors, in their basement classrooms, are debating such questions as *how* (as opposed to what) words mean, and what ontological claims amount to, they jettison the Platonist/Cartesian/Kantian metaphysical apparatus.
“we have not, as a matter of scientific fact, discovered that the world’s structure is dependent on human classificatory activity”
Of course not. It’s not something we could, in principle, discover. Again, the philosophical disputes have no bearing on scientific practice. Philosophical theories are not empirically testable, which, per Rorty, is a good reason to get rid of the ones that just give rise to lots of pointless wheel-spinning.
“the rhetorical upshot of much of his writings is to discourage us from trying to settle things on rational grounds”
I think Rorty would be dismayed to think that that’s the moral people drew from his writing. There is a notion of “rationality” that Rorty, indeed, militated against: the Platonist notion of rationality as the faculty, unique to humans, that allows them to perceive ahistorical, transcultural facts. Rorty thought there were no such facts, and thus no such faculty. But he defended a notion of rationality as the “attempt to make our webs of belief more coherent.” The ungainliness of the mixed metaphor aside, that’s pretty much what all argument in ethics classes consists of: the attempt to point out internal inconsistencies in your opponent’s position.
On the other hand, I think that Rorty felt that, indispensable as rational (in his sense) argument may be to moral progress, it wasn’t nearly as effective as poetic seduction, or as he put it, “telling sad and sentimental stories.” And from the pragmatist perspective, one technique of achieving consensus is as good as another.