1) When we plot out the future effects of “business as usual”, we’d better take into account technological change.

That sounds uncontroversial.

2) Predicting technological change is hard to do.

Also uncontroversial.

3) We owe nothing to future generations because they don’t exist and might not even exist.

I completely disagree. If they will likely exist then we must owe them something. As a totally crass intuitive approximation, if they are 50% likely to exist then we would appear to “owe them” with something 50% the weight of a current person. (This interestingly touches on abortion issues, but that’s a digression.) Of course there are other factors, it’s complicated. But I completely disagree with you here.

4) Even if we did owe something to future generations, we should take into account pluses and minuses.

This is also totally uncontroversial. Though the idea specifically applied to economic growth becomes a little more controversial. Still, I will grant you that for any future “negatives” due to environmental damage, there exists some (possibly astronomically high) appropriate level of economic growth that would provide just “compensation”, or compensation plus a surplus.

I think we do not run into problems here as long as

1) We are clear with ourselves about what we mean by “business as usual” (for example, we’re currently pumping some money into energy R&D every year… does business as usual mean that we don’t jack up the rates of expenditure? Does it refer SPECIFICALLY to the U.S., thus permitting us to be free-riders on R&D advances made by European companies, if they choose to jack up their expenditures?)

2) We are honest with ourselves about the uncertainty in our predictions. I don’t think uncertainty per se means it’s useless to try to forecast– though if there’s enough uncertainty it may become useless.

1) When we plot out the future effects of “business as usual”, we’d better take into account technological change.

That sounds uncontroversial.

2) Predicting technological change is hard to do.

Also uncontroversial.

3) We owe nothing to future generations because they don’t exist and might not even exist.

I completely disagree. If they will likely exist then we must owe them something. As a totally crass intuitive approximation, if they are 50% likely to exist then we would appear to “owe them” with something 50% the weight of a current person. (This interestingly touches on abortion issues, but that’s a digression.) Of course there are other factors, it’s complicated. But I completely disagree with you here.

4) Even if we did owe something to future generations, we should take into account pluses and minuses.

This is also totally uncontroversial. Though the idea specifically applied to economic growth becomes a little more controversial. Still, I will grant you that for any future “negatives” due to environmental damage, there exists some (possibly astronomically high) appropriate level of economic growth that would provide just “compensation”, or compensation plus a surplus.

I think we do not run into problems here as long as

1) We are clear with ourselves about what we mean by “business as usual” (for example, we’re currently pumping some money into energy R&D every year… does business as usual mean that we don’t jack up the rates of expenditure? Does it refer SPECIFICALLY to the U.S., thus permitting us to be free-riders on R&D advances made by European companies, if they choose to jack up their expenditures?)

2) We are honest with ourselves about the uncertainty in our predictions. I don’t think uncertainty per se means it’s useless to try to forecast– though if there’s enough uncertainty it may become useless.

You seem to present three reasons why we dont have moral obligations to future generations. The first two are that
1. funture generations are comprised of people who do not exist.
2. which future people exist depends on what we do now.

You say that these two facts lead to a ‘serious complication’ for arguments for the claim that we have these obligations. This is true, but there is an extensive literature on the subject (Parfit, James Woodward, Simon Shriffin) addressing these complications, which at leasts suggests that the idea of obligations to future generations are not incoherent.

The third reason you present is that
3. We don’t stand in the Humean circumstances of justice towards future generations.

But even if we accept that Humean theory, it only follows that we dont have obligations of justice towards future generations. We might have other moral obligations.

Also, I’m not sure we have to establish that the choices which lead to warming are a net harm for the future generations considered together. Does this claim derives from a summative utilitarian view? Alternatively, we might think that there are basic rights which should not be violated even if there is a net gain to others from voilating those rights.

I agree about the bias in these debates: but also, those who are more sceptical about duties seem to be more sceptical about the science and optimistic about technofixes. The biases are on both sides.

You seem to present three reasons why we dont have moral obligations to future generations. The first two are that
1. funture generations are comprised of people who do not exist.
2. which future people exist depends on what we do now.

You say that these two facts lead to a ‘serious complication’ for arguments for the claim that we have these obligations. This is true, but there is an extensive literature on the subject (Parfit, James Woodward, Simon Shriffin) addressing these complications, which at leasts suggests that the idea of obligations to future generations are not incoherent.

The third reason you present is that
3. We don’t stand in the Humean circumstances of justice towards future generations.

But even if we accept that Humean theory, it only follows that we dont have obligations of justice towards future generations. We might have other moral obligations.

Also, I’m not sure we have to establish that the choices which lead to warming are a net harm for the future generations considered together. Does this claim derives from a summative utilitarian view? Alternatively, we might think that there are basic rights which should not be violated even if there is a net gain to others from voilating those rights.

I agree about the bias in these debates: but also, those who are more sceptical about duties seem to be more sceptical about the science and optimistic about technofixes. The biases are on both sides.

I don’t see anything incoherent about such duties. It just means that you likely can’t ground them in a person-affecting moral theory. If you, on other hand, think there are some impersonal values or principles, then there are such duties. This is of course standard fare since Reasons and Persons. But it seems that you are antecedently committed to skepticism about impersonal values. That needs to be justified. It seems, at any rate, that commonsense morality endorses some impersonal values, such as desert, among others.

I don’t see anything incoherent about such duties. It just means that you likely can’t ground them in a person-affecting moral theory. If you, on other hand, think there are some impersonal values or principles, then there are such duties. This is of course standard fare since Reasons and Persons. But it seems that you are antecedently committed to skepticism about impersonal values. That needs to be justified. It seems, at any rate, that commonsense morality endorses some impersonal values, such as desert, among others.

Any sign of willingness to lay out these metrics and fight over them one by one?

I submit the approach is distinguishable both from stonewalling, and from the conclusory Chicken Little Al Gore Rhythm(TM).