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	<title>Comments on: Ed Glaeser on Utility, Freedom, and Happiness</title>
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	<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/</link>
	<description>The Sweet Release of Reason</description>
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		<title>By: Mark</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9870</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2007 13:20:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>There is a disutility associated with having to gather and process the information associated with making the best decision among alternatives. As the set of decisions available to one increases, presumably this disutility increases in proportion. In that sense, a greater set of choices can lead to a decrease in utility unless we assume (unrealistically) that every one has full information. This assumption is what is wrong with many economic models of human behavior.

That said, whenever the government limits choices for individuals, it may be reducing their utility by eliminating a choice that would enhance any randomly chosen person&#039;s utility more than any of the choices remianing to that individual. It&#039;s tricky business.

Studies have also shown that in certain instances people lack the willpower to defer gratification and do something that is in their long term best interest because immediate temptations get in the way. This is why many people would prefer the government to force them to save for retirement - they would like to save, and realize that it is in their long term best interest, but that bobble at the store is too tempting.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a disutility associated with having to gather and process the information associated with making the best decision among alternatives. As the set of decisions available to one increases, presumably this disutility increases in proportion. In that sense, a greater set of choices can lead to a decrease in utility unless we assume (unrealistically) that every one has full information. This assumption is what is wrong with many economic models of human behavior.</p>
<p>That said, whenever the government limits choices for individuals, it may be reducing their utility by eliminating a choice that would enhance any randomly chosen person&#8217;s utility more than any of the choices remianing to that individual. It&#8217;s tricky business.</p>
<p>Studies have also shown that in certain instances people lack the willpower to defer gratification and do something that is in their long term best interest because immediate temptations get in the way. This is why many people would prefer the government to force them to save for retirement &#8211; they would like to save, and realize that it is in their long term best interest, but that bobble at the store is too tempting.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9871</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2007 13:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9871</guid>
		<description>There is a disutility associated with having to gather and process the information associated with making the best decision among alternatives. As the set of decisions available to one increases, presumably this disutility increases in proportion. In that sense, a greater set of choices can lead to a decrease in utility unless we assume (unrealistically) that every one has full information. This assumption is what is wrong with many economic models of human behavior.

That said, whenever the government limits choices for individuals, it may be reducing their utility by eliminating a choice that would enhance any randomly chosen person&#039;s utility more than any of the choices remianing to that individual. It&#039;s tricky business.

Studies have also shown that in certain instances people lack the willpower to defer gratification and do something that is in their long term best interest because immediate temptations get in the way. This is why many people would prefer the government to force them to save for retirement - they would like to save, and realize that it is in their long term best interest, but that bobble at the store is too tempting.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a disutility associated with having to gather and process the information associated with making the best decision among alternatives. As the set of decisions available to one increases, presumably this disutility increases in proportion. In that sense, a greater set of choices can lead to a decrease in utility unless we assume (unrealistically) that every one has full information. This assumption is what is wrong with many economic models of human behavior.</p>
<p>That said, whenever the government limits choices for individuals, it may be reducing their utility by eliminating a choice that would enhance any randomly chosen person&#8217;s utility more than any of the choices remianing to that individual. It&#8217;s tricky business.</p>
<p>Studies have also shown that in certain instances people lack the willpower to defer gratification and do something that is in their long term best interest because immediate temptations get in the way. This is why many people would prefer the government to force them to save for retirement &#8211; they would like to save, and realize that it is in their long term best interest, but that bobble at the store is too tempting.</p>
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		<title>By: Sam</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9869</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2007 16:11:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&quot;On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my level of happiness, because I have other objectives.&quot;

This strikes me as relying on a very narrow definition of happiness - the kind which Barry Schwartz identified last month as &quot;pleasure-seeking&quot;. Substitute something like &quot;overall and lasting satisfaction with myself and my place in the world&quot; for &quot;happiness&quot;, and it doesn&#039;t seem quite so plausible. But I imagine this is closer to what people (or at least some of them - Seligman, for instance) are getting at when they talk about &quot;maximising happiness&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my level of happiness, because I have other objectives.&#8221;</p>
<p>This strikes me as relying on a very narrow definition of happiness &#8211; the kind which Barry Schwartz identified last month as &#8220;pleasure-seeking&#8221;. Substitute something like &#8220;overall and lasting satisfaction with myself and my place in the world&#8221; for &#8220;happiness&#8221;, and it doesn&#8217;t seem quite so plausible. But I imagine this is closer to what people (or at least some of them &#8211; Seligman, for instance) are getting at when they talk about &#8220;maximising happiness&#8221;.</p>
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		<title>By: Sam</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9872</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2007 16:11:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2007/05/11/ed-glaeser-on-utility-freedom-and-happiness/#comment-9872</guid>
		<description>&quot;On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my level of happiness, because I have other objectives.&quot;

This strikes me as relying on a very narrow definition of happiness - the kind which Barry Schwartz identified last month as &quot;pleasure-seeking&quot;. Substitute something like &quot;overall and lasting satisfaction with myself and my place in the world&quot; for &quot;happiness&quot;, and it doesn&#039;t seem quite so plausible. But I imagine this is closer to what people (or at least some of them - Seligman, for instance) are getting at when they talk about &quot;maximising happiness&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my level of happiness, because I have other objectives.&#8221;</p>
<p>This strikes me as relying on a very narrow definition of happiness &#8211; the kind which Barry Schwartz identified last month as &#8220;pleasure-seeking&#8221;. Substitute something like &#8220;overall and lasting satisfaction with myself and my place in the world&#8221; for &#8220;happiness&#8221;, and it doesn&#8217;t seem quite so plausible. But I imagine this is closer to what people (or at least some of them &#8211; Seligman, for instance) are getting at when they talk about &#8220;maximising happiness&#8221;.</p>
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