What does it show? That we want to live nonvirtual lives, be nonvirtual people, etc. But hedonism can accommodate those intuitions as well as any other theory. Hedonism says all value is based on, and must be ultimately explained by, sensory/affective states – because if you take those away how does anything get its value? how does the idea of value even make sense? Non-subjective and non-experiential goods are valuable, but instrumentally. The value of contact with reality, antibiotics, a vibrant economy, moral agency, etc, can’t be satisfactorily explained unless you show how those things connect up, directly or indirectly, with how somebody somewhere feels. Well-being wouldn’t be valuable without happiness — the psychological aspect of well-being. And the value of happiness must be understood, ultimately, in terms of pleasure. ~That~ is the plausible-enough insight I always thought hedonism captured, and which Nozick’s argument does nothing to weaken. I think the argument confuses objects of desire with the basis and explanation of value. It’s perfectly consistent to care about things other than pleasure and also accept that the value of those things is pleasure-based.

Of course, if we equate hedonism with a prescription like, “Seek pleasure and nothing else, because pleasure is all that matters,” then Nozick’s argument, and other arguments, do weaken hedonism. But none but the most crude hedonists would endorse that prescription.

What does it show? That we want to live nonvirtual lives, be nonvirtual people, etc. But hedonism can accommodate those intuitions as well as any other theory. Hedonism says all value is based on, and must be ultimately explained by, sensory/affective states – because if you take those away how does anything get its value? how does the idea of value even make sense? Non-subjective and non-experiential goods are valuable, but instrumentally. The value of contact with reality, antibiotics, a vibrant economy, moral agency, etc, can’t be satisfactorily explained unless you show how those things connect up, directly or indirectly, with how somebody somewhere feels. Well-being wouldn’t be valuable without happiness — the psychological aspect of well-being. And the value of happiness must be understood, ultimately, in terms of pleasure. ~That~ is the plausible-enough insight I always thought hedonism captured, and which Nozick’s argument does nothing to weaken. I think the argument confuses objects of desire with the basis and explanation of value. It’s perfectly consistent to care about things other than pleasure and also accept that the value of those things is pleasure-based.

Of course, if we equate hedonism with a prescription like, “Seek pleasure and nothing else, because pleasure is all that matters,” then Nozick’s argument, and other arguments, do weaken hedonism. But none but the most crude hedonists would endorse that prescription.

What does it show? That we want to live nonvirtual lives, be nonvirtual people, etc. But hedonism can accommodate those intuitions as well as any other theory. Hedonism says all value is based on, and must be ultimately explained by, sensory/affective states – because if you take those away how does anything get its value? how does the idea of value even make sense? Non-subjective and non-experiential goods are valuable, but instrumentally. The value of contact with reality, antibiotics, a vibrant economy, moral agency, etc, can’t be satisfactorily explained unless you show how those things connect up, directly or indirectly, with how somebody somewhere feels. Well-being wouldn’t be valuable without happiness — the psychological aspect of well-being. And the value of happiness must be understood, ultimately, in terms of pleasure. ~That~ is the plausible-enough insight I always thought hedonism captured, and which Nozick’s argument does nothing to weaken. I think the argument confuses objects of desire with the basis and explanation of value. It’s perfectly consistent to care about things other than pleasure and also accept that the value of those things is pleasure-based.

Of course, if we equate hedonism with a prescription like, “Seek pleasure and nothing else, because pleasure is all that matters,” then Nozick’s argument, and other arguments, do weaken hedonism. But none but the most crude hedonists would endorse that prescription.