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	<title>Comments on: I&#039;m Baffled by Taxes as Truces in Positional Races</title>
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	<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/</link>
	<description>The Sweet Release of Reason</description>
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		<title>By: vendqpoc</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8546</link>
		<dc:creator>vendqpoc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2006 22:50:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8546</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;qovftmonzaq...&lt;/strong&gt;

rspqrrdnq zzlivelu rvyyj sienkxnw ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>qovftmonzaq&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>rspqrrdnq zzlivelu rvyyj sienkxnw &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Mike D</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8545</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike D</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2006 19:30:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8545</guid>
		<description>Will -- as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.

Can&#039;t we understand the Layard &quot;tax as truce&quot; concept within a prisoner&#039;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#039;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#039;s the arms-race analogy.

Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)
The payoff matrix is
       S       R
S    10, 10   6,12

R    12, 6    8, 8
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.

But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:
      S       R
S   10, 10   8,10
R   10, 8    6, 6
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.

It&#039;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#039;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#039;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#039;s site: &quot;It&#039;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#039;s a lot easier to lie without them.&quot; (With theory, for example)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Will &#8212; as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.</p>
<p>Can&#8217;t we understand the Layard &#8220;tax as truce&#8221; concept within a prisoner&#8217;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#8217;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#8217;s the arms-race analogy.</p>
<p>Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)<br />
The payoff matrix is<br />
       S       R<br />
S    10, 10   6,12</p>
<p>R    12, 6    8, 8<br />
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.</p>
<p>But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:<br />
      S       R<br />
S   10, 10   8,10<br />
R   10, 8    6, 6<br />
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#8217;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#8217;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.<br />
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#8217;s site: &#8220;It&#8217;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#8217;s a lot easier to lie without them.&#8221; (With theory, for example)</p>
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		<title>By: Mike D</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8559</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike D</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2006 19:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8559</guid>
		<description>Will -- as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.

Can&#039;t we understand the Layard &quot;tax as truce&quot; concept within a prisoner&#039;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#039;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#039;s the arms-race analogy.

Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)
The payoff matrix is
       S       R
S    10, 10   6,12

R    12, 6    8, 8
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.

But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:
      S       R
S   10, 10   8,10
R   10, 8    6, 6
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.

It&#039;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#039;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#039;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#039;s site: &quot;It&#039;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#039;s a lot easier to lie without them.&quot; (With theory, for example)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Will &#8212; as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.</p>
<p>Can&#8217;t we understand the Layard &#8220;tax as truce&#8221; concept within a prisoner&#8217;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#8217;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#8217;s the arms-race analogy.</p>
<p>Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)<br />
The payoff matrix is<br />
       S       R<br />
S    10, 10   6,12</p>
<p>R    12, 6    8, 8<br />
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.</p>
<p>But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:<br />
      S       R<br />
S   10, 10   8,10<br />
R   10, 8    6, 6<br />
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#8217;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#8217;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.<br />
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#8217;s site: &#8220;It&#8217;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#8217;s a lot easier to lie without them.&#8221; (With theory, for example)</p>
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		<title>By: Mike D</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8560</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike D</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2006 19:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8560</guid>
		<description>Will -- as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.

Can&#039;t we understand the Layard &quot;tax as truce&quot; concept within a prisoner&#039;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#039;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#039;s the arms-race analogy.

Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)
The payoff matrix is
       S       R
S    10, 10   6,12

R    12, 6    8, 8
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.

But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:
      S       R
S   10, 10   8,10
R   10, 8    6, 6
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.

It&#039;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#039;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#039;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#039;s site: &quot;It&#039;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#039;s a lot easier to lie without them.&quot; (With theory, for example)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Will &#8212; as conchis points out, the precise mathematical way in which we model preferences matters quite a bit.  Math in economics is a pain sometimes, but the alternative is worse.</p>
<p>Can&#8217;t we understand the Layard &#8220;tax as truce&#8221; concept within a prisoner&#8217;s dilemma-type framework?  IIRC, the key feature of the model isn&#8217;t that it is Zero-Sum, but rather that it is Negative Sum.  That&#8217;s the arms-race analogy.</p>
<p>Suppose there are 2 choices: slack (S) or rat-race (R)<br />
The payoff matrix is<br />
       S       R<br />
S    10, 10   6,12</p>
<p>R    12, 6    8, 8<br />
Without a tax, the dominant strategy is to rat-race.</p>
<p>But then the government comes in and puts a tax on rat-racers, possibly redistributing the proceeds to slackers, or at least lowering the tax burden slackers would otherwise bear.  So the payoff matrix becomes:<br />
      S       R<br />
S   10, 10   8,10<br />
R   10, 8    6, 6<br />
Now the dominant strategy is to slack.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s easy to write down a model where Layard&#8217;s policy recommendations are Pareto improving.  I just did it in 5 minutes. Go me!  But I can also write down a model which gives everyone negative infinite utility if they don&#8217;t give Layard the Nobel Prize.<br />
As I think I read on Tyler Cowen&#8217;s site: &#8220;It&#8217;s easy to lie with statistics, but it&#8217;s a lot easier to lie without them.&#8221; (With theory, for example)</p>
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		<title>By: Chad Van Schoelandt</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8544</link>
		<dc:creator>Chad Van Schoelandt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Jul 2006 04:57:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8544</guid>
		<description>In ragards to your statements: &quot;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&quot; and &quot;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&quot;

The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&quot;Give me liberty or give me death.&quot; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.

Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.

To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#039;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In ragards to your statements: &#8220;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&#8221; and &#8220;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&#8221;</p>
<p>The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&#8220;Give me liberty or give me death.&#8221; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.</p>
<p>Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.</p>
<p>To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#8217;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</p>
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		<title>By: Chad Van Schoelandt</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8557</link>
		<dc:creator>Chad Van Schoelandt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Jul 2006 04:57:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8557</guid>
		<description>In ragards to your statements: &quot;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&quot; and &quot;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&quot;

The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&quot;Give me liberty or give me death.&quot; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.

Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.

To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#039;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In ragards to your statements: &#8220;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&#8221; and &#8220;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&#8221;</p>
<p>The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&#8220;Give me liberty or give me death.&#8221; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.</p>
<p>Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.</p>
<p>To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#8217;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</p>
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		<title>By: Chad Van Schoelandt</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8558</link>
		<dc:creator>Chad Van Schoelandt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Jul 2006 04:57:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8558</guid>
		<description>In ragards to your statements: &quot;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&quot; and &quot;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&quot;

The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&quot;Give me liberty or give me death.&quot; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.

Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.

To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#039;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In ragards to your statements: &#8220;the tax isn’t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field–displacing the status race to another dimension of competition.&#8221; and &#8220;identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign.&#8221;</p>
<p>The very difficulty of coming up with the substitute may be reason to suspect it would be a truce of sorts. Let me put it the following way. When I gave up competing for relative wealth, I started competing for (hypothetically) intellectual debates or some such. Al Gore, when he lost the election, instead of relative wealth decided to compete with rugged outdoorsmanship, and after that decided to compete for top environmental advocate. You may compete along the dimension of how much you love liberty (&#8220;Give me liberty or give me death.&#8221; That is how much I love it!) or along the demention of best dressed in a philosophy department. Some may even suggest that you would try to have a better blog than others.</p>
<p>Now, money is an obvious competition, and physical stuff is sometimes, but note that people compete physically along different dimensions.</p>
<p>To this extent, we are not in the same sort of competition as with relative wealth. The problem with relative wealth is that too many people are competing on the same field so there are not enough winners. When we disperse and all compete for different things, our winning is not mutually exclusive. No matter how much better your blog is than Gore&#8217;s, he is a better environmental activist than you, and you can both be happy and prideful about it.</p>
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		<title>By: Will Wilkinson</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8543</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Wilkinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2006 19:48:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8543</guid>
		<description>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#039;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong--which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#039;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field--displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.

Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#039;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#039;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#039;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#039;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &quot;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&quot; least-cost avoider arguments.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#8217;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong&#8211;which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#8217;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field&#8211;displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.</p>
<p>Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#8217;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#8217;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#8217;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#8217;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &#8220;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&#8221; least-cost avoider arguments.</p>
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		<title>By: Will Wilkinson</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8555</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Wilkinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2006 19:48:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8555</guid>
		<description>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#039;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong--which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#039;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field--displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.

Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#039;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#039;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#039;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#039;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &quot;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&quot; least-cost avoider arguments.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#8217;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong&#8211;which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#8217;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field&#8211;displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.</p>
<p>Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#8217;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#8217;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#8217;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#8217;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &#8220;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&#8221; least-cost avoider arguments.</p>
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		<title>By: Will Wilkinson</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8556</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Wilkinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jul 2006 19:48:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/07/11/im-baffled-by-taxes-as-truces-in-positional-races/#comment-8556</guid>
		<description>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#039;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong--which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#039;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field--displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.

Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#039;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#039;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#039;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#039;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &quot;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&quot; least-cost avoider arguments.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You guys are awesome. Thanks. Yeah: duh. It looks like the relative strength of our preference for relative and absolute income is going to do a lot of work. I think part of what I&#8217;m groping at is that these arguments have the most force when the preference for relative income is extremely strong&#8211;which makes the zero-sum aspects of the game seem irremediable.  But when the relative preferences are strongest, willingness to pay in effort is going to be pretty insensitive to price. That just might mean that the tax needs to be high. But in that case, in which relative preference is very strong, the tax isn&#8217;t exactly calling a truce so much as pushing the fight to another battle field&#8211;displacing the status race to another dimension of competition. The relevant question then is really whether the net externalities from the substitute positional race are more or less than the income or consumption race.</p>
<p>Layard seems to argue that (1) people have an extremely strong taste for relative position and (2) if you push them off the income/consumption race, the competition won&#8217;t just pop up on another, possibly more harmful, dimension. He implies the only alternative to income/consumption-oriented labor is leisure, and argues that people don&#8217;t race on the leisure dimension. Maybe. But that&#8217;s not the only relevant dimension. (1) implies that people won&#8217;t stop competing just because competition on one dimension has become too expensive. All the tax will have done is lower the relative cost of competing on another dimension. So, an argument for tax-as-truce that involves (1), requires an additional argument identifying the most likely substitute dimension, and showing that competition on this dimension will be more benign. An argument without (1) will have a hard time sustaining itself against &#8220;you can always just choose not to care about relative material position&#8221; least-cost avoider arguments.</p>
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