An example of rhetorical importance:

Economists talk a lot about prefernces and what actions reveal about them. But they do not offer any ways of evaluating what is within (what you call) individuals’ choice sets and how much individuals know about that. So, when they (or you) say such things as:

“If something else had been more preferred it would have been chosen instead…”

this framework tells us nothing about what could have been chosen/what the agent knew could have been chosen (i.e. how to bring about). Strictly speaking, they should say:

“If SOME OTHER WORLD STATE had been more preferred, could have been chosen, and the agent knew that, then it would have been chosen instead.”

There is a rhetorically significant ambiguity here, trading on the difference between (a) ability to choose different world state and (b) ability to choose different consumer goods for your money… the some total of which choices influences only a miniscule aspect of one’s well-being

An example of normative methodological importance:

Sen and Arrow are cautiously and rigorously making points about the relationship between individual and social preferences/choices. On the other hand, the majority of libertarian neoclassical economists (and, less relevantly, libertarian non-neoclassical economists) dogmatically eschew any discussion of this relationship. Rather they predicate all inquiries on the assumption that seemingly trivial individual choices sum to the only acceptable concept of social choices and, often, that there is not even any such thing as social preference/choice.

An example of rhetorical importance:

Economists talk a lot about prefernces and what actions reveal about them. But they do not offer any ways of evaluating what is within (what you call) individuals’ choice sets and how much individuals know about that. So, when they (or you) say such things as:

“If something else had been more preferred it would have been chosen instead…”

this framework tells us nothing about what could have been chosen/what the agent knew could have been chosen (i.e. how to bring about). Strictly speaking, they should say:

“If SOME OTHER WORLD STATE had been more preferred, could have been chosen, and the agent knew that, then it would have been chosen instead.”

There is a rhetorically significant ambiguity here, trading on the difference between (a) ability to choose different world state and (b) ability to choose different consumer goods for your money… the some total of which choices influences only a miniscule aspect of one’s well-being

An example of normative methodological importance:

Sen and Arrow are cautiously and rigorously making points about the relationship between individual and social preferences/choices. On the other hand, the majority of libertarian neoclassical economists (and, less relevantly, libertarian non-neoclassical economists) dogmatically eschew any discussion of this relationship. Rather they predicate all inquiries on the assumption that seemingly trivial individual choices sum to the only acceptable concept of social choices and, often, that there is not even any such thing as social preference/choice.

“I don’t think you should believe everything people claim about their experience and their desires, but it is possible to extract something.”

How much should I believe, then? Who does the believing? What do they get to do with what they have allegedly gleaned? I reject that you can know more about a person’s preferences from what they say than from what they choose to do. It seems that you just believe that there are people who can say they want something but not choose it when it is available. I simply don’t buy that.

“I don’t think you should believe everything people claim about their experience and their desires, but it is possible to extract something.”

How much should I believe, then? Who does the believing? What do they get to do with what they have allegedly gleaned? I reject that you can know more about a person’s preferences from what they say than from what they choose to do. It seems that you just believe that there are people who can say they want something but not choose it when it is available. I simply don’t buy that.

This is a reaonsable position to take in the case of TV, though I think it is wrong. Some economists even argue this about people who try and fail to quit smoking. (More reasonable people talk about hyperbolic discounting and the problem of identity.) But what about the morphine experiment that WW describes? He claims that there are doses of morphine that do not affect experience, but do affect decision-making. This should not be surprising; the brain is not a unitary whole.

This extreme example is not very relevant to policy decisions today, but, if you buy it, it shows that your categorical position is wrong. I don’t think you should believe everything people claim about their experience and their desires, but it is possible to extract something.

This is a reaonsable position to take in the case of TV, though I think it is wrong. Some economists even argue this about people who try and fail to quit smoking. (More reasonable people talk about hyperbolic discounting and the problem of identity.) But what about the morphine experiment that WW describes? He claims that there are doses of morphine that do not affect experience, but do affect decision-making. This should not be surprising; the brain is not a unitary whole.

This extreme example is not very relevant to policy decisions today, but, if you buy it, it shows that your categorical position is wrong. I don’t think you should believe everything people claim about their experience and their desires, but it is possible to extract something.

“1. Hedonistic pleasure is nothing like an accurate measure of human well being. Thinking in that way undermines and trivializes the magnificently complex beings that humans are. We must take into account things like health, morality, joy(deep lasting happiness), delayed satisfaction, enablement etc. etc.”

Okay, sure. But whose job is it to account for my health, my morality, my joy, my delayed satisfaction, my enablement, and my etc. etc.? My claim is merely that, if *I* am not very good at stating to you what my preferences are (that is, I act in a way contrary to what I say I wish to do), you can do no better than I in determining what does and does not promote my health, morality, and so on. And if you can do no better than I in determining what brings me joy, and if freedom is a good thing in and of itself, then giving you power to determine what I do leaves me worse off every time, for even if you do as well as I would have, I am still worse off by the loss of freedom.

For arguments for paternalism to work, some individuals must be able to know more of other’s preferences than those individuals themselves know. You may know better than your child that it doesn’t *really* want to touch the hot stove, because it doesn’t know that it will be burned. I have a hard time believing that you know that people don’t want the high from illicit drugs. People know of the devastation these substances can bring upon their bodies and their lives, but they choose to ingest them anyway. How can you *know* that you’ll make them better off by prohibiting their actions?

“1. Hedonistic pleasure is nothing like an accurate measure of human well being. Thinking in that way undermines and trivializes the magnificently complex beings that humans are. We must take into account things like health, morality, joy(deep lasting happiness), delayed satisfaction, enablement etc. etc.”

Okay, sure. But whose job is it to account for my health, my morality, my joy, my delayed satisfaction, my enablement, and my etc. etc.? My claim is merely that, if *I* am not very good at stating to you what my preferences are (that is, I act in a way contrary to what I say I wish to do), you can do no better than I in determining what does and does not promote my health, morality, and so on. And if you can do no better than I in determining what brings me joy, and if freedom is a good thing in and of itself, then giving you power to determine what I do leaves me worse off every time, for even if you do as well as I would have, I am still worse off by the loss of freedom.

For arguments for paternalism to work, some individuals must be able to know more of other’s preferences than those individuals themselves know. You may know better than your child that it doesn’t *really* want to touch the hot stove, because it doesn’t know that it will be burned. I have a hard time believing that you know that people don’t want the high from illicit drugs. People know of the devastation these substances can bring upon their bodies and their lives, but they choose to ingest them anyway. How can you *know* that you’ll make them better off by prohibiting their actions?

1. Hedonistic pleasure is nothing like an accurate measure of human well being. Thinking in that way undermines and trivializes the magnificently complex beings that humans are. We must take into account things like health, morality, joy(deep lasting happiness), delayed satisfaction, enablement etc. etc.

2. Perhaps it is not our job as individuals to limit the freedom of our peers for their own good, but there are certainly circumstances and relationships where that is not only permissible, but necessary and desired. It is certainly not rude of a father to disallow his child the freedom to touch a hot stove or to play with dangerous objects. Nor is it rude of our government to make cocaine illegal.
Clearly there are certain things that someone (government being the most likely candidate) ought to protect the public from. And certainly freedom and choice should not be unreasonably restricted for they are good things in their own right. The question is one of degree. We disallow cocaine, but allow tobbacco which kills far more. We restrict gambling, but encourage stock market speculation. We restict toxins in our food, but allow gluttony. The difficulty lies in finding that appropriate balence. Let us help them find that balence and Let us pray that those making these decisions are wise beyond their year and have all our best intrests at heart.

1. Hedonistic pleasure is nothing like an accurate measure of human well being. Thinking in that way undermines and trivializes the magnificently complex beings that humans are. We must take into account things like health, morality, joy(deep lasting happiness), delayed satisfaction, enablement etc. etc.

2. Perhaps it is not our job as individuals to limit the freedom of our peers for their own good, but there are certainly circumstances and relationships where that is not only permissible, but necessary and desired. It is certainly not rude of a father to disallow his child the freedom to touch a hot stove or to play with dangerous objects. Nor is it rude of our government to make cocaine illegal.
Clearly there are certain things that someone (government being the most likely candidate) ought to protect the public from. And certainly freedom and choice should not be unreasonably restricted for they are good things in their own right. The question is one of degree. We disallow cocaine, but allow tobbacco which kills far more. We restrict gambling, but encourage stock market speculation. We restict toxins in our food, but allow gluttony. The difficulty lies in finding that appropriate balence. Let us help them find that balence and Let us pray that those making these decisions are wise beyond their year and have all our best intrests at heart.

Precisely. *I* can determine whether something is a ‘like’ or a ‘want’. I am suspicious of somebody else’s ability to determine it for me.

—
L,

I thought I understood Tyler; perhaps now I find myself mistaken. It seems that my response to your ideas goes like this: suppose people’s stated preferences don’t match their revealed preferences. First off, how do we know that somebody’s stated preference is their preference? It seems that we should trust what people do more than what they say they want to do. Second, suppose that their stated preferences are the truth. In that case, they are free to change their behavior. I simply categorically refuse to believe that people consistently choose things that make them unhappy.(1)

(1) That is, once somebody discovers something to be unsatisfying, they give it up. It does not follow that they’ll do any better with the substitute they choose, just that they’ll give up something that already doesn’t do the business.

Precisely. *I* can determine whether something is a ‘like’ or a ‘want’. I am suspicious of somebody else’s ability to determine it for me.

—
L,

I thought I understood Tyler; perhaps now I find myself mistaken. It seems that my response to your ideas goes like this: suppose people’s stated preferences don’t match their revealed preferences. First off, how do we know that somebody’s stated preference is their preference? It seems that we should trust what people do more than what they say they want to do. Second, suppose that their stated preferences are the truth. In that case, they are free to change their behavior. I simply categorically refuse to believe that people consistently choose things that make them unhappy.(1)

(1) That is, once somebody discovers something to be unsatisfying, they give it up. It does not follow that they’ll do any better with the substitute they choose, just that they’ll give up something that already doesn’t do the business.