Comments on: Self-Deception and Self-Construction http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/ The Sweet Release of Reason Thu, 09 Feb 2012 18:11:50 +0000 hourly 1 By: Philosophers’ Carnival :: Philosophers’ Carnival XXVII :: March :: 2006 http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7752 Philosophers’ Carnival :: Philosophers’ Carnival XXVII :: March :: 2006 Tue, 17 Oct 2006 00:25:46 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7752 [...] The Fly Bottle: http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/ [...] [...] The Fly Bottle: http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/ [...]

]]> By: bob Macintosh http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7751 bob Macintosh Fri, 31 Mar 2006 13:27:07 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7751 I think this has a lot of connection to my current obsession which is 'rational self-interest. I need to back-track some of your references and think about it. First thoughts... self is a confabulation that fills in the blind spot of awareness, but there's no neat line to be drawn around it. Isn't social confabulation the foundation of our communal life? The really real self is like the really real value of money - nutritional value, nil; calorific value negligable. I only like the stuff because the nice people at Walmart collect it. Its value depends on 'confidence', ie shared belief. I am aware of the fictional nature of the value of money, but I still function economically. Likewise I can function also with an awareness of the fictional nature of myself; there is no reason I can see why it should make me unstable. If political and religious identities are all fictional, I won't be jumping from one to another all the time, any more than I am likely to throw my pay-check on the fire because I realise that money has no intrinsic value. I think this has a lot of connection to my current obsession which is ‘rational self-interest. I need to back-track some of your references and think about it. First thoughts… self is a confabulation that fills in the blind spot of awareness, but there’s no neat line to be drawn around it. Isn’t social confabulation the foundation of our communal life? The really real self is like the really real value of money – nutritional value, nil; calorific value negligable. I only like the stuff because the nice people at Walmart collect it. Its value depends on ‘confidence’, ie shared belief. I am aware of the fictional nature of the value of money, but I still function economically. Likewise I can function also with an awareness of the fictional nature of myself; there is no reason I can see why it should make me unstable. If political and religious identities are all fictional, I won’t be jumping from one to another all the time, any more than I am likely to throw my pay-check on the fire because I realise that money has no intrinsic value.

]]> By: bob Macintosh http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7764 bob Macintosh Fri, 31 Mar 2006 13:27:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7764 I think this has a lot of connection to my current obsession which is 'rational self-interest. I need to back-track some of your references and think about it. First thoughts... self is a confabulation that fills in the blind spot of awareness, but there's no neat line to be drawn around it. Isn't social confabulation the foundation of our communal life? The really real self is like the really real value of money - nutritional value, nil; calorific value negligable. I only like the stuff because the nice people at Walmart collect it. Its value depends on 'confidence', ie shared belief. I am aware of the fictional nature of the value of money, but I still function economically. Likewise I can function also with an awareness of the fictional nature of myself; there is no reason I can see why it should make me unstable. If political and religious identities are all fictional, I won't be jumping from one to another all the time, any more than I am likely to throw my pay-check on the fire because I realise that money has no intrinsic value. I think this has a lot of connection to my current obsession which is ‘rational self-interest. I need to back-track some of your references and think about it. First thoughts… self is a confabulation that fills in the blind spot of awareness, but there’s no neat line to be drawn around it. Isn’t social confabulation the foundation of our communal life? The really real self is like the really real value of money – nutritional value, nil; calorific value negligable. I only like the stuff because the nice people at Walmart collect it. Its value depends on ‘confidence’, ie shared belief. I am aware of the fictional nature of the value of money, but I still function economically. Likewise I can function also with an awareness of the fictional nature of myself; there is no reason I can see why it should make me unstable. If political and religious identities are all fictional, I won’t be jumping from one to another all the time, any more than I am likely to throw my pay-check on the fire because I realise that money has no intrinsic value.

]]> By: Robin Hanson http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7750 Robin Hanson Mon, 20 Mar 2006 15:28:23 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7750 I agree with Blar and John Thacker - a Bayesian would not fluctuate wildly in response to each new person he met. A Bayesian's beliefs should instead follow a random walk. We can't excuse our disagreement by claiming that it would be impossible or unreasonable since we would have to dissolve our sense of self. I agree with Blar and John Thacker – a Bayesian would not fluctuate wildly in response to each new person he met. A Bayesian’s beliefs should instead follow a random walk.

We can’t excuse our disagreement by claiming that it would be impossible or unreasonable since we would have to dissolve our sense of self.

]]> By: Robin Hanson http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7754 Robin Hanson Mon, 20 Mar 2006 15:28:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7754 I agree with Blar and John Thacker - a Bayesian would not fluctuate wildly in response to each new person he met. A Bayesian's beliefs should instead follow a random walk. We can't excuse our disagreement by claiming that it would be impossible or unreasonable since we would have to dissolve our sense of self. I agree with Blar and John Thacker – a Bayesian would not fluctuate wildly in response to each new person he met. A Bayesian’s beliefs should instead follow a random walk.

We can’t excuse our disagreement by claiming that it would be impossible or unreasonable since we would have to dissolve our sense of self.

]]> By: Heaven Tree » Blog Archive » Philosohers’ Carnival http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7749 Heaven Tree » Blog Archive » Philosohers’ Carnival Sat, 18 Mar 2006 02:12:37 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7749 [...] Will Wilkinson’s Self-Deception and Self-Construction, is rather cool bit about how self-construction inevitably interweaves falsehoods with truths about our lives and what to do when otherwise smart people disagree with us. [...] [...] Will Wilkinson’s Self-Deception and Self-Construction, is rather cool bit about how self-construction inevitably interweaves falsehoods with truths about our lives and what to do when otherwise smart people disagree with us. [...]

]]> By: John Thacker http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7748 John Thacker Tue, 14 Mar 2006 17:55:43 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7748 Indeed, I just read Hanson's paper from 2002, and it (as I expected it must) depends on common priors, which is patently not true in the experimental case of car age estimation. Indeed, I just read Hanson’s paper from 2002, and it (as I expected it must) depends on common priors, which is patently not true in the experimental case of car age estimation.

]]> By: John Thacker http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7763 John Thacker Tue, 14 Mar 2006 17:55:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7763 Indeed, I just read Hanson's paper from 2002, and it (as I expected it must) depends on common priors, which is patently not true in the experimental case of car age estimation. Indeed, I just read Hanson’s paper from 2002, and it (as I expected it must) depends on common priors, which is patently not true in the experimental case of car age estimation.

]]> By: John Thacker http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7747 John Thacker Tue, 14 Mar 2006 17:52:58 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7747 <em>If we were Bayesians, every conversation with someone who disagrees with us about some proposition, but who has access to equally good information, and is able to process information at least us well as us, and who is therefore at least as likely as us to be right, ought to lead us to revise downward the probability of truth we assign to the proposition in question. In which case, we would end up changing our minds a lot.</em> The second sentence does not necessarily follow from the first If you have enough data so that your prior has a particularly sharp shape, then you're not going to end up changing your mind much simply from receiving one more piece of information, so long as you continue to also encounter information which reinforces your existing prior. Bayes' Theorem itself predicts that. And of course the paper you link to discusses the question of whether multiple possible priors from the same initial evidence are rational, another important point here. Indeed, there is a decent amount of evidence that people do react in at least somewhat a Bayesian way. <em>It is important to distinguish between a Bayesian (or a few Bayesians) in our society and a society full of Bayesians. In the latter case, I think that our concept of “belief” would cease to exist.</em> Ah, but what about a society where everyone is a Bayesian except about a few matters about which he or she feels qualified to have an independent judgement? Or, to put it another way, a society where being an "expert" or professional in a field is essentially synonymous with not performing Bayesian updates? Actually, what's more accurate, though, is that simply being an expert means having a sharper prior distribution, due to having more prior data. Thus updates occur much more slowly. I disagree with this statement from the paper: <em>"Mary's best public estimate of John's next estimate must instead equal Mary's current best estimate."</em> Unlikely, given how people argue. In the experiment as set up, it is extremely likely that, after John first gives his estimate of the car's age, Mary will initially offer not her current best estimate, but her original estimate of the car's age before hearing John's next estimate. Not only does this seem intrinsically fairer, but each can then offer a subsequent estimate that will give the other an estimation of the initial confidence in the original first guess, by seeing how far the new best estimate moved. This is naturally because the two respondents do not have identical priors; one or the other may have more experience or better judgement in estimating the age of a car. If we were Bayesians, every conversation with someone who disagrees with us about some proposition, but who has access to equally good information, and is able to process information at least us well as us, and who is therefore at least as likely as us to be right, ought to lead us to revise downward the probability of truth we assign to the proposition in question. In which case, we would end up changing our minds a lot.

The second sentence does not necessarily follow from the first If you have enough data so that your prior has a particularly sharp shape, then you’re not going to end up changing your mind much simply from receiving one more piece of information, so long as you continue to also encounter information which reinforces your existing prior. Bayes’ Theorem itself predicts that. And of course the paper you link to discusses the question of whether multiple possible priors from the same initial evidence are rational, another important point here.

Indeed, there is a decent amount of evidence that people do react in at least somewhat a Bayesian way.

It is important to distinguish between a Bayesian (or a few Bayesians) in our society and a society full of Bayesians. In the latter case, I think that our concept of “belief” would cease to exist.

Ah, but what about a society where everyone is a Bayesian except about a few matters about which he or she feels qualified to have an independent judgement? Or, to put it another way, a society where being an “expert” or professional in a field is essentially synonymous with not performing Bayesian updates? Actually, what’s more accurate, though, is that simply being an expert means having a sharper prior distribution, due to having more prior data. Thus updates occur much more slowly.

I disagree with this statement from the paper:
“Mary’s best public estimate of John’s next estimate must instead equal Mary’s current best estimate.”

Unlikely, given how people argue. In the experiment as set up, it is extremely likely that, after John first gives his estimate of the car’s age, Mary will initially offer not her current best estimate, but her original estimate of the car’s age before hearing John’s next estimate. Not only does this seem intrinsically fairer, but each can then offer a subsequent estimate that will give the other an estimation of the initial confidence in the original first guess, by seeing how far the new best estimate moved. This is naturally because the two respondents do not have identical priors; one or the other may have more experience or better judgement in estimating the age of a car.

]]> By: John Thacker http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7762 John Thacker Tue, 14 Mar 2006 17:52:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/03/12/self-deception-and-self-construction/#comment-7762 <em>If we were Bayesians, every conversation with someone who disagrees with us about some proposition, but who has access to equally good information, and is able to process information at least us well as us, and who is therefore at least as likely as us to be right, ought to lead us to revise downward the probability of truth we assign to the proposition in question. In which case, we would end up changing our minds a lot.</em> The second sentence does not necessarily follow from the first If you have enough data so that your prior has a particularly sharp shape, then you're not going to end up changing your mind much simply from receiving one more piece of information, so long as you continue to also encounter information which reinforces your existing prior. Bayes' Theorem itself predicts that. And of course the paper you link to discusses the question of whether multiple possible priors from the same initial evidence are rational, another important point here. Indeed, there is a decent amount of evidence that people do react in at least somewhat a Bayesian way. <em>It is important to distinguish between a Bayesian (or a few Bayesians) in our society and a society full of Bayesians. In the latter case, I think that our concept of “belief” would cease to exist.</em> Ah, but what about a society where everyone is a Bayesian except about a few matters about which he or she feels qualified to have an independent judgement? Or, to put it another way, a society where being an "expert" or professional in a field is essentially synonymous with not performing Bayesian updates? Actually, what's more accurate, though, is that simply being an expert means having a sharper prior distribution, due to having more prior data. Thus updates occur much more slowly. I disagree with this statement from the paper: <em>"Mary's best public estimate of John's next estimate must instead equal Mary's current best estimate."</em> Unlikely, given how people argue. In the experiment as set up, it is extremely likely that, after John first gives his estimate of the car's age, Mary will initially offer not her current best estimate, but her original estimate of the car's age before hearing John's next estimate. Not only does this seem intrinsically fairer, but each can then offer a subsequent estimate that will give the other an estimation of the initial confidence in the original first guess, by seeing how far the new best estimate moved. This is naturally because the two respondents do not have identical priors; one or the other may have more experience or better judgement in estimating the age of a car. If we were Bayesians, every conversation with someone who disagrees with us about some proposition, but who has access to equally good information, and is able to process information at least us well as us, and who is therefore at least as likely as us to be right, ought to lead us to revise downward the probability of truth we assign to the proposition in question. In which case, we would end up changing our minds a lot.

The second sentence does not necessarily follow from the first If you have enough data so that your prior has a particularly sharp shape, then you’re not going to end up changing your mind much simply from receiving one more piece of information, so long as you continue to also encounter information which reinforces your existing prior. Bayes’ Theorem itself predicts that. And of course the paper you link to discusses the question of whether multiple possible priors from the same initial evidence are rational, another important point here.

Indeed, there is a decent amount of evidence that people do react in at least somewhat a Bayesian way.

It is important to distinguish between a Bayesian (or a few Bayesians) in our society and a society full of Bayesians. In the latter case, I think that our concept of “belief” would cease to exist.

Ah, but what about a society where everyone is a Bayesian except about a few matters about which he or she feels qualified to have an independent judgement? Or, to put it another way, a society where being an “expert” or professional in a field is essentially synonymous with not performing Bayesian updates? Actually, what’s more accurate, though, is that simply being an expert means having a sharper prior distribution, due to having more prior data. Thus updates occur much more slowly.

I disagree with this statement from the paper:
“Mary’s best public estimate of John’s next estimate must instead equal Mary’s current best estimate.”

Unlikely, given how people argue. In the experiment as set up, it is extremely likely that, after John first gives his estimate of the car’s age, Mary will initially offer not her current best estimate, but her original estimate of the car’s age before hearing John’s next estimate. Not only does this seem intrinsically fairer, but each can then offer a subsequent estimate that will give the other an estimation of the initial confidence in the original first guess, by seeing how far the new best estimate moved. This is naturally because the two respondents do not have identical priors; one or the other may have more experience or better judgement in estimating the age of a car.

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