But, more generally, action in general, and consumption in particular, is permissible as long as it does not constitute a harm. Chet’s buying a boat may not actually make him better off, but justice doesn’t demand maximal prudence. It simply prohibits injustice. My Rawlsian point was that your sense of having your relative position harmed by Chet’s yacht does not amount to real injustice on Chets part, so does not demand rectification or correction.

But, more generally, action in general, and consumption in particular, is permissible as long as it does not constitute a harm. Chet’s buying a boat may not actually make him better off, but justice doesn’t demand maximal prudence. It simply prohibits injustice. My Rawlsian point was that your sense of having your relative position harmed by Chet’s yacht does not amount to real injustice on Chets part, so does not demand rectification or correction.

In the status game, Will and you both argue that preferences for status should be discounted (or something similar. Take that as a simplification for purposes of argument). But if we discount Chet’s desire to have a bigger yacht than his neighbor, we also have to discount his neighbor’s desire to have a bigger yacht than Chet; thus for policy purposes, we would not want to encourage or discourage Chet from producing on those grounds alone. Chet is attempting to benefit himself at another’s expense, apparently, but the premise of the post is that we shouldn’t register the harm to the other on our utilitometer. So the only utility change we’re left with is “Chet works hard, produces stuff, raises standard of living,” which seems to me a good thing.

In the status game, Will and you both argue that preferences for status should be discounted (or something similar. Take that as a simplification for purposes of argument). But if we discount Chet’s desire to have a bigger yacht than his neighbor, we also have to discount his neighbor’s desire to have a bigger yacht than Chet; thus for policy purposes, we would not want to encourage or discourage Chet from producing on those grounds alone. Chet is attempting to benefit himself at another’s expense, apparently, but the premise of the post is that we shouldn’t register the harm to the other on our utilitometer. So the only utility change we’re left with is “Chet works hard, produces stuff, raises standard of living,” which seems to me a good thing.

I suppose that it’s possible for the Rawlsian approach to add to your anti-Layard argument if you can come up with a principled way to have the benefits that people gain by getting ahead in the status game count, while the harms to others from falling behind in the status game do not count, but this seems hard to do. It is more likely that ruling out certain preferences in our normative judgments would weaken the argument made in your first quick response (that status games create new status rather than merely redistributing existing status), since there’s a good chance that a principled application of the Rawlsian approach would lead us to decide that at least some of these status-benefits have no value.

I suppose that it’s possible for the Rawlsian approach to add to your anti-Layard argument if you can come up with a principled way to have the benefits that people gain by getting ahead in the status game count, while the harms to others from falling behind in the status game do not count, but this seems hard to do. It is more likely that ruling out certain preferences in our normative judgments would weaken the argument made in your first quick response (that status games create new status rather than merely redistributing existing status), since there’s a good chance that a principled application of the Rawlsian approach would lead us to decide that at least some of these status-benefits have no value.