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Paternalism is justified by reference to the imperfection and irrationality of human nature, but these same traits count against human beings acting through government to limit imperfection and irrationality.

This is a good point, but the level of abstraction at which you raise it makes it sound more damaging to the paternalist case than it really is. A smoker intentionally lights up under the influence of nicotine cravings. Even a legislature consisting only of chain smokers will not be led by their nicotine cravings to write a law promoting smoking. The imperfections/irrationalities of human beings in government are not necessarily the same as those of the individual. In a particular instance (e.g., smoking bans) a paternalist might argue that government is clearer-sighted and deliberative IN THAT INSTANCE than the individual. (At the same time, leaders’ besetting vice is a tendency to lose touch with reality — submitting them to elections by the people, sobers up the government in ways that IT needs sobering up.)
I can certainly see how two imperfect friends, who are imperfect in different ways might make each other more perfect by offering their advice and recognizing each other’s area of superiority. Individuals and their democratically elected, constitutionally limited government might balance each other similarly.

As for your final conclusion, if I understand what you mean by ameliorative markets correctly (e.g., sulfur-tax or carbon-tax, cap and trade?), these seem best suited to getting agent A to recognize a cost to agent B as a cost to himself — they “internalize” externalities.
When we come to correcting for an individual’s failure to appreciate his own long-term good, they seem to fall afoul of a much more pernicious version of the problem you raise for paternalism: they attempt to use the individual’s long term rationality to correct for his deficiency in long-term rationality. They try to correct individual long-term irrationality (with respect to health) by appeal to his long-term rationality (with respect to money). This seems silly, because very few people value their money more than their health — the problem is an irrational discounting of future satisfactions brought by either health or money. What you need to compensate for the long-term irrationality of smoking is a short term inconvenience, like having to go out and smoke in the cold, not another long-term disincentive, like finding yourself more deeply in debt at the end of the year than you would otherwise have been (a disincentive you can avoid by never adding up how much cigarettes have cost you over the year).

Paternalism is justified by reference to the imperfection and irrationality of human nature, but these same traits count against human beings acting through government to limit imperfection and irrationality.

This is a good point, but the level of abstraction at which you raise it makes it sound more damaging to the paternalist case than it really is. A smoker intentionally lights up under the influence of nicotine cravings. Even a legislature consisting only of chain smokers will not be led by their nicotine cravings to write a law promoting smoking. The imperfections/irrationalities of human beings in government are not necessarily the same as those of the individual. In a particular instance (e.g., smoking bans) a paternalist might argue that government is clearer-sighted and deliberative IN THAT INSTANCE than the individual. (At the same time, leaders’ besetting vice is a tendency to lose touch with reality — submitting them to elections by the people, sobers up the government in ways that IT needs sobering up.)
I can certainly see how two imperfect friends, who are imperfect in different ways might make each other more perfect by offering their advice and recognizing each other’s area of superiority. Individuals and their democratically elected, constitutionally limited government might balance each other similarly.

As for your final conclusion, if I understand what you mean by ameliorative markets correctly (e.g., sulfur-tax or carbon-tax, cap and trade?), these seem best suited to getting agent A to recognize a cost to agent B as a cost to himself — they “internalize” externalities.
When we come to correcting for an individual’s failure to appreciate his own long-term good, they seem to fall afoul of a much more pernicious version of the problem you raise for paternalism: they attempt to use the individual’s long term rationality to correct for his deficiency in long-term rationality. They try to correct individual long-term irrationality (with respect to health) by appeal to his long-term rationality (with respect to money). This seems silly, because very few people value their money more than their health — the problem is an irrational discounting of future satisfactions brought by either health or money. What you need to compensate for the long-term irrationality of smoking is a short term inconvenience, like having to go out and smoke in the cold, not another long-term disincentive, like finding yourself more deeply in debt at the end of the year than you would otherwise have been (a disincentive you can avoid by never adding up how much cigarettes have cost you over the year).

I have prior empirical knowledge about what different breeds of dog weigh. For your analogy to work, I’d need prior knowledge about what fraction of their income people ought to save, or the range in which this fraction falls. I don’t get my knowledge about “ought” from empirical evidence and my introspection just comes up blank on the question of how much others should save.

But suppose that I though I really knew what other people should be saving. Well, I tell my friend he saves too little. He tells me that actually I’m saving too much. How do we decide? At best, we should be able to adress the issue with some method sufficiently clear that we can tell whether or not we are even applying it. Well, we can look at the consequences of different savings rates, but how much we value those effects is subjective. Then what?

Finally, I’d agree with “…we are all entitled to make bad choices if we pay the consequences,” except that it has some odd implications for a person who really wants to do something terribly bad: May I smash your foot if I’m willing to pay your hospital bill and serve jail time? I guess there are bullets to bite that go along with any view, but I’d rather bite the bullet that says a kid really has the right not to be interfered with crossing the street.

I have prior empirical knowledge about what different breeds of dog weigh. For your analogy to work, I’d need prior knowledge about what fraction of their income people ought to save, or the range in which this fraction falls. I don’t get my knowledge about “ought” from empirical evidence and my introspection just comes up blank on the question of how much others should save.

But suppose that I though I really knew what other people should be saving. Well, I tell my friend he saves too little. He tells me that actually I’m saving too much. How do we decide? At best, we should be able to adress the issue with some method sufficiently clear that we can tell whether or not we are even applying it. Well, we can look at the consequences of different savings rates, but how much we value those effects is subjective. Then what?

Finally, I’d agree with “…we are all entitled to make bad choices if we pay the consequences,” except that it has some odd implications for a person who really wants to do something terribly bad: May I smash your foot if I’m willing to pay your hospital bill and serve jail time? I guess there are bullets to bite that go along with any view, but I’d rather bite the bullet that says a kid really has the right not to be interfered with crossing the street.

I have here a pug and a Newfoundland. i won’t tell you what their weight is. Which one is heavier?

I suspect you get the right answer more often than chance.

I don’t disagree with you that we should be cautious about imposing what we believe to be the right preferences over those that revealed by uncoerced behaviour. One reason is that we might be wrong. Another is we might be biased. But even if we are right, and unbiased, there is still a third answer, which is that we are all entitled to make bad choices if we pay the consequences.

That third answer is a pretty good one, 99% of the time. But you wouldn’t use it for four year olds wanting to cross Sixth Avenue.

I have here a pug and a Newfoundland. i won’t tell you what their weight is. Which one is heavier?

I suspect you get the right answer more often than chance.

I don’t disagree with you that we should be cautious about imposing what we believe to be the right preferences over those that revealed by uncoerced behaviour. One reason is that we might be wrong. Another is we might be biased. But even if we are right, and unbiased, there is still a third answer, which is that we are all entitled to make bad choices if we pay the consequences.

That third answer is a pretty good one, 99% of the time. But you wouldn’t use it for four year olds wanting to cross Sixth Avenue.

You write “Odd. I would think it is much easier to accurately rank magnitudes than to know what they are.”

I’m thinking of a number A and a range from X to Y. I won’t tell you what the values of A, X and Y are. Rank them.

You continue “More importantly, I took the point of your original comment to be that our revealed preferences can’t be wrong. But they can.”

Maybe so. I lack the confidence to claim that any particular instance of revealed preferences is wrong. Thre is too much temptation to confuse the right preferences for others to have with my own likes and dislikes.

You write “Odd. I would think it is much easier to accurately rank magnitudes than to know what they are.”

I’m thinking of a number A and a range from X to Y. I won’t tell you what the values of A, X and Y are. Rank them.

You continue “More importantly, I took the point of your original comment to be that our revealed preferences can’t be wrong. But they can.”

Maybe so. I lack the confidence to claim that any particular instance of revealed preferences is wrong. Thre is too much temptation to confuse the right preferences for others to have with my own likes and dislikes.

Odd. I would think it is much easier to accurately rank magnitudes than to know what they are.

More importantly, I took the point of your original comment to be that our revealed preferences can’t be wrong. But they can. I can like carbs too much, or smoke too much, or read crap. I can even know that my preferences are bad, and want to change them.

This does *not* mean that someone is entitled to impose my true preferences on me. There may be a value to autonomy that trumps other-imposed perfection. But we can be liberals without saying that revealed preferences are just given, above cognitive crticism or improvement. That is too high a price to pay for liberalism.

Odd. I would think it is much easier to accurately rank magnitudes than to know what they are.

More importantly, I took the point of your original comment to be that our revealed preferences can’t be wrong. But they can. I can like carbs too much, or smoke too much, or read crap. I can even know that my preferences are bad, and want to change them.

This does *not* mean that someone is entitled to impose my true preferences on me. There may be a value to autonomy that trumps other-imposed perfection. But we can be liberals without saying that revealed preferences are just given, above cognitive crticism or improvement. That is too high a price to pay for liberalism.

I think you’re asserting the consequent or something. If I know what D is, and I know what B is, then I know whether B

I think you’re asserting the consequent or something. If I know what D is, and I know what B is, then I know whether B