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I was the one who morphed things into a free-a-slave-or-get-a-billion-dollars situation, I think. But I don’t think that there is anything especially Randian about my doing so. I’m not a Randian. I used to be. But here I’m just wondering about what Will’s (and others’) views are about how much more weight an agent can give his self-interest. I assume that Will would not give infinite weight to his self-interests, as a Randian would. But I imagine that he thinks it’s okay to give some more weight to one’s self-interest than to others’. (His comment about Schmidtz’s view seems to confirm this.)

I thinkg it is okay to give more weight to one’s self-interest. And I think it’s an interesting project to figure out how much more weight we can, morally speaking, give our interests over those of others. (Separately, I think it’s interesting to see how much weight a person puts on his self-interest, apart from his moral views.) That’s why I changed the course of the discussion a bit. I mean, giving some stranger, who is basically a free person,a billion dollars over freeing some other person, you don’t know, from slavery, IS a no-brainer. I think setting the situation up so that one has to weigh ONE’S self-interest against those of the slave is a bit more interesting.

Finally, good point about the messy facts about the world. But an interesting thing, I think, is that most people who would not take the billion dollars over freeing the slave do not think in economic terms. So, their not going about freeing a slave every once in awhile might still tell us something about their view about morality. And again, I think that could be interesting (and useful).

I was the one who morphed things into a free-a-slave-or-get-a-billion-dollars situation, I think. But I don’t think that there is anything especially Randian about my doing so. I’m not a Randian. I used to be. But here I’m just wondering about what Will’s (and others’) views are about how much more weight an agent can give his self-interest. I assume that Will would not give infinite weight to his self-interests, as a Randian would. But I imagine that he thinks it’s okay to give some more weight to one’s self-interest than to others’. (His comment about Schmidtz’s view seems to confirm this.)

I thinkg it is okay to give more weight to one’s self-interest. And I think it’s an interesting project to figure out how much more weight we can, morally speaking, give our interests over those of others. (Separately, I think it’s interesting to see how much weight a person puts on his self-interest, apart from his moral views.) That’s why I changed the course of the discussion a bit. I mean, giving some stranger, who is basically a free person,a billion dollars over freeing some other person, you don’t know, from slavery, IS a no-brainer. I think setting the situation up so that one has to weigh ONE’S self-interest against those of the slave is a bit more interesting.

Finally, good point about the messy facts about the world. But an interesting thing, I think, is that most people who would not take the billion dollars over freeing the slave do not think in economic terms. So, their not going about freeing a slave every once in awhile might still tell us something about their view about morality. And again, I think that could be interesting (and useful).

[Messy facts about the world: the buy-a-slave-to-free-him-or-her has some unpleaant dynamic effects that should be apparent to libertarians who pride themselves in thinking in economic terms.]

For what it’s worth, I travelled much the same path as Will, and have ended up in mich the same place– and, like him, view the thought experiment as offering a ridiculously easy choice.

Note that the economic benefit to any one person of a 75% reduction in the size of the U.S. government is of the order of magnitude of thousands of dollars per year, not millions. And ending the oppression of women worldwide means, among other things, moving at least hundreds of millions of human beings out of borderline-slavery situations including not only sex slavery but also coerced, child, and violent marriages. This is surely ridiculously easier than the billion-dollars-vs.-one-slave equation. Anyone opting for the U.S. gov’t reduction on self-interested grounds would be morally deficient; but anyone opting for it on nationalistic grounds is morally very strange, since willing to choose lesser-benefit-for-fewer-others over greater-benefit-for-more-others.

[Messy facts about the world: the buy-a-slave-to-free-him-or-her has some unpleaant dynamic effects that should be apparent to libertarians who pride themselves in thinking in economic terms.]

For what it’s worth, I travelled much the same path as Will, and have ended up in mich the same place– and, like him, view the thought experiment as offering a ridiculously easy choice.

Note that the economic benefit to any one person of a 75% reduction in the size of the U.S. government is of the order of magnitude of thousands of dollars per year, not millions. And ending the oppression of women worldwide means, among other things, moving at least hundreds of millions of human beings out of borderline-slavery situations including not only sex slavery but also coerced, child, and violent marriages. This is surely ridiculously easier than the billion-dollars-vs.-one-slave equation. Anyone opting for the U.S. gov’t reduction on self-interested grounds would be morally deficient; but anyone opting for it on nationalistic grounds is morally very strange, since willing to choose lesser-benefit-for-fewer-others over greater-benefit-for-more-others.

And you’ve mentioned Schmidtz’s theory before, I think. I’ll have to actually read that book where he discusses it. Sounds like a theory I might be interested in accepting.

And you’ve mentioned Schmidtz’s theory before, I think. I’ll have to actually read that book where he discusses it. Sounds like a theory I might be interested in accepting.

You’re right that one’s life might not be so happy if they chose to take the billion dollars over freeing the slave. There are a few things to say about this, actually, though.

I think there are plenty of people that would be able to be happier if they pushed the billion dollar button than the free-the-slave one. For them, at least, it would be in their self-interest to take the money.

Also, I actually think that many of us have enough money to free a slave right now. It’s my impression that one can go over to the far east and buy a sex slave and then set them free. I seem to remember reading part of some NYT series on that last year. I don’t know how much that would cost, but it seems that for many people, it wouldn’t hurt them financially very much. And if they are willing to forgo a billion dollars to free the slave, then it seems they should be willing to give up a MUCH smaller chunk of money to free a slave. Especially if giving up the money won’t negatively affect their financial stading in any significant way. BUT I would guess that more people are willing to say that they would forgo the billion dollars than are willing to spend a few thousand (or whatever) to free a sex slave in asia. I think that’s interesting. And I wonder why exactly that is. (I mean, I can think of some explanations. But I have no real idea which is the best one.)

Lastly, I think we can change the thought experiment such that if you press the button that gives you the money you are also given a pill that erases your knowledge of the slave. That way you get all the money and none of the guilt. Now THAT would almost certainly be the egoistic choice. But I imagine that changing the situation in that way would NOT change Will’s choice or his judgment that pressing the billion dollar button is morally unacceptable.

You’re right that one’s life might not be so happy if they chose to take the billion dollars over freeing the slave. There are a few things to say about this, actually, though.

I think there are plenty of people that would be able to be happier if they pushed the billion dollar button than the free-the-slave one. For them, at least, it would be in their self-interest to take the money.

Also, I actually think that many of us have enough money to free a slave right now. It’s my impression that one can go over to the far east and buy a sex slave and then set them free. I seem to remember reading part of some NYT series on that last year. I don’t know how much that would cost, but it seems that for many people, it wouldn’t hurt them financially very much. And if they are willing to forgo a billion dollars to free the slave, then it seems they should be willing to give up a MUCH smaller chunk of money to free a slave. Especially if giving up the money won’t negatively affect their financial stading in any significant way. BUT I would guess that more people are willing to say that they would forgo the billion dollars than are willing to spend a few thousand (or whatever) to free a sex slave in asia. I think that’s interesting. And I wonder why exactly that is. (I mean, I can think of some explanations. But I have no real idea which is the best one.)

Lastly, I think we can change the thought experiment such that if you press the button that gives you the money you are also given a pill that erases your knowledge of the slave. That way you get all the money and none of the guilt. Now THAT would almost certainly be the egoistic choice. But I imagine that changing the situation in that way would NOT change Will’s choice or his judgment that pressing the billion dollar button is morally unacceptable.

Luka, I’m not sure there is such a thing as the correct moral theory. There is, I believe, correct moral behavior, but it is not well-described by a theory, any more than a “theory of wines” will describe, in advance of experience, which wines will be the best. The more contextualistic one’s moral non-theory becomes, the less useful abstractly specified thought experiments are bound to be, because almost all the relevant information is in the “omitted measurements.” Even if we have identical moral sensibilities, our response to an abstractly characterized situation will differ depending on how our minds (probably subconsciously) have filled in some of the details.

How’s that for not actually answering your question.

OK. . . If I have a theory, it is something like Schmidtz’s moral dualism. There is an egoistic, self-centered component to morality. But then there is also a social, coordinative component, which requires limiting self-interest locally in some ways to enable an overall pattern of cooperative interaction that tends to advance each person’s global self-interest. Some dispositions, practices, and virtues, are more geared toward optimizing the mutually advantageous cooperative pattern. When these become internalized into one’s identity, the tension between “self-interest” and “morality” are reduced, since “altruistic” dispositions will have been brought inside the agent’s conception of the “self” and it’s “interest.”