Will: That’s exactly my point. You cannot wake up knowing how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Abundant choice is good because it exercises that part of our selves where we learn to distinguish important choices from meaningless ones, life-fulfilling ones from empty ones. It also helps us learn what is “good enough” in each situation so that we can satisfice — which is a crucial skill even in low choice environments.

I think we color the discussion a bit by focusing on consumer choices — something for which many people have disdain. Imagine we’re talking about love. If a Don Juan has hundreds of girls throwing themselves at him, he might sample all of them until his resources are squandered, randomly choose one (or a few) without much thought, freeze up and choose nothing, choose one but switch when he grows envious of his friend’s choice, or choose poorly based purely on superficial characteristics. But surely the more interesting story is one where he learns (through mistakes) what is important in choosing love — even if he can’t fix it or get it right in the end. Isn’t he a better person, with this knowledge, than the one who never faced the choices because a consumer advocacy group picked a perfectly pleasant lady for him? What if he would have been slightly happier overall with the non-choice?

I’m not saying that having choices is not important, only that, the more you know about the choices you and others face, the more meaningless they will seem unless certain conditiions are met. It’s far from clear to me that “exercising our will” in making choices that would appear arbitrary if we were better informed makes us human.

Choice is the vehicle through which we both discover our selves and create our selves.

We are better people if we confront choices — superficial or substantive, tempting or difficult, selfish or selfless — even if we choose poorly, than we would have been if we had been sheltered from them. Because we exercised the basis of our humanity, our will.

Perhaps we should toss aside happiness and return to a quest for areté through our struggle with choice.

Certainly that’s a better outcome than denying our heterogeneity or giving in to base impulses like envy of those who choose more wisely.

The question then becomes, as Will says, what if anything can be done to help people engage the possible opportunities in a more self-aware manner?

The problem with stoic freedom is that it has no value except for coping. (Not to slight coping, but its not the kind of value upon which libertarians are seeking to build a conception of the good society.)

The problem with existential freedom is that it really isn’t freedom at all. In free will 101 we are confronted with a dilemma between determined choices and arbitrary ones. Is an arbitrary choice really a free one? Existentialism alternatively celebrates and dreads the observation that individuals’ actions result from arbitrary choices about what to find meaningful and how. But the more seriously we take the free will 101 question, the more we should reject the existentialists’ understanding of our choices as free.

A satisfying account of freedom of choices will be one that gives conditions for choices being free ones. But the conditions will have to go deeper than individual inclinations or else we’re back to existentialism. In order to have a free society we have to have individual choices determined in the right way. I think a large part of that right way will be individuals having sophisticated understandings of the structure of the society in which they live and the interrelations among our various individual plights and ambitions.

That which increases our ability to act on this understanding to our mutual and collective benefit increases our freedom. That which distracts us from the attempt, perhaps by satisfying our arbitrary desires, decreases it. Stoic freedom abandons the need for effective action. Existential freedom abandones the need for shared understandings (or says, perhaps correctly, that its impossible).

The problem with stoic freedom is that it has no value except for coping. (Not to slight coping, but its not the kind of value upon which libertarians are seeking to build a conception of the good society.)

The problem with existential freedom is that it really isn’t freedom at all. In free will 101 we are confronted with a dilemma between determined choices and arbitrary ones. Is an arbitrary choice really a free one? Existentialism alternatively celebrates and dreads the observation that individuals’ actions result from arbitrary choices about what to find meaningful and how. But the more seriously we take the free will 101 question, the more we should reject the existentialists’ understanding of our choices as free.

A satisfying account of freedom of choices will be one that gives conditions for choices being free ones. But the conditions will have to go deeper than individual inclinations or else we’re back to existentialism. In order to have a free society we have to have individual choices determined in the right way. I think a large part of that right way will be individuals having sophisticated understandings of the structure of the society in which they live and the interrelations among our various individual plights and ambitions.

That which increases our ability to act on this understanding to our mutual and collective benefit increases our freedom. That which distracts us from the attempt, perhaps by satisfying our arbitrary desires, decreases it. Stoic freedom abandons the need for effective action. Existential freedom abandones the need for shared understandings (or says, perhaps correctly, that its impossible).

Choice is the vehicle through which we both discover our selves and create our selves.

We are better people if we confront choices — superficial or substantive, tempting or difficult, selfish or selfless — even if we choose poorly, than we would have been if we had been sheltered from them. Because we exercised the basis of our humanity, our will.

Perhaps we should toss aside happiness and return to a quest for areté through our struggle with choice.

Certainly that’s a better outcome than denying our heterogeneity or giving in to base impulses like envy of those who choose more wisely.

The question then becomes, as Will says, what if anything can be done to help people engage the possible opportunities in a more self-aware manner?