But the essay raises an obvious defence of the “more choices=less freedom” position you have been attacking. More choices must always mean more freedom for one of my selves, but if it makes sense to conceive of bodies as occupied by multiple selves, then it could well be that more choices frees one self at the expense of another. And there is no reason, at least in general, to say that the exchange will be distributively fair, allowing, as Schelling does, that interpersonal comparisons of utility are both impossible in principle and often easy in practice.

So, if I have the option of spending money that would otherwise go to my (coerced) disability insurance or pension fund, then that makes my undisabled and youthful self freer, but maybe at the expense of a disabled or older self, who I selfishly don’t care about. And maybe this is distributively unjust between these selves.

But the essay raises an obvious defence of the “more choices=less freedom” position you have been attacking. More choices must always mean more freedom for one of my selves, but if it makes sense to conceive of bodies as occupied by multiple selves, then it could well be that more choices frees one self at the expense of another. And there is no reason, at least in general, to say that the exchange will be distributively fair, allowing, as Schelling does, that interpersonal comparisons of utility are both impossible in principle and often easy in practice.

So, if I have the option of spending money that would otherwise go to my (coerced) disability insurance or pension fund, then that makes my undisabled and youthful self freer, but maybe at the expense of a disabled or older self, who I selfishly don’t care about. And maybe this is distributively unjust between these selves.

Tom Schelling, perfectly himself in his moment of triumph.