Comments on: Value Monism & Public Reason: More Layard Flogging

By: Auros

Auros — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 15:31:00 +0000

I’ve always figured that “happiness” in Utilitarianism has to be relative to the individual; it isn’t a scalar (it might be made up of several components, such as freedom, economic and physical well-being, sense of spiritual fulfillment, etc), and the process of aggregating it and weighting the components will not be agreed upon by all individuals — finding a compromise for all of these factors, that most people can agree on, is the highest goal of politics. With the system of values agreed upon, the social scientists can go to work trying to measure what actual policies will best implement those values.

By: Insiderman

Insiderman — Mon, 20 Jun 2005 09:24:00 +0000

“I am, in fact, willing to sacrifice some measure of happiness to ensure my autonomy, or to accomplish something of great value. I would, in fact, be willing to face suffering and death if that was required to preserve my freedom. And it’s pretty easy to point out that happiness is instrumental to other values.”

Stop being stumped, Rob L. Will reverses the logic in the last sentence. “It’s pretty easy to point out that other values are instrumental to happiness” should be the issue.

There’s also an issue with the difference between “pleasure” and happiness.” Sometimes we seek transitive “pleasure” at the expense of longer-term “happiness.” Usually that’s the result of not actually knowing the value of the longer-term happiness.

For example, I may get great pleasure in killing someone that really annoys me at the moment, but I will not achieve any sense of long-term happiness at the killing… for too many reasons to list here.

This is why people sacrifice PLEASURE in the short-term for the hope of long-term HAPPINESS. This is the basis for many religious arguments, serving in the military, etc. The latter assumes you don’t get some sort of pleasure from slogging through swamps, killing people, etc.

The Utilitarians are getting a bad rap in Will’s post.

By: Rob L.

Rob L. — Sun, 19 Jun 2005 07:10:00 +0000

Will: must a comprehensive conception of value (CCV) thus be unanimously deemed true in order for it — or any CCV — to become a legitimate basis for a just society? Or, if not, then what is the threshhold beyond which dissent from a CCV renders that CCV unsuitable (unjust?) as dispositive for (an otherwise just) society?

Excellent, illuminating post. I’m just stumped by your formulation here. If you could please just expound upon this point. Thanks!

By: Rob L.

Rob L. — Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000

Excellent, illuminating post. I’m just stumped by your formulation here. If you could please just expound upon this point. Thanks!

By: Insiderman

Insiderman — Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000

“I am, in fact, willing to sacrifice some measure of happiness to ensure my autonomy, or to accomplish something of great value. I would, in fact, be willing to face suffering and death if that was required to preserve my freedom. And it’s pretty easy to point out that happiness is instrumental to other values.”

Stop being stumped, Rob L. Will reverses the logic in the last sentence. “It’s pretty easy to point out that other values are instrumental to happiness” should be the issue.

The Utilitarians are getting a bad rap in Will’s post.

By: Auros

Auros — Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000

By: The Buckingham Inquirer

The Buckingham Inquirer — Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000

Philosophy Carnival XV

My apologies for the delay, but I am pleased to announce Philosophy Carnival XV, covering the best posts from around the philosophy blogosphere for the month of June (and a few from late May). This month’s carnival neatly divides into three cat…