I thought I should point out that Joshua Greene is a utilitarian, and that it seems doubtful he thinks his data counts against utilitarianism. The point behind many of his studies, I think, is to explain the cognitive errors we make when making non-utilitarian judgments (and the fact that most people make these errors doesn’t point to a flawed utilitarianism so much as it does a flawed humanity). You should go to his homepage and read “The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment” (2004). (See also “Moral Heuristics” [2005] by Sunstein in BBS).

Also, Greene’s dissertation defends utilitarianism against its usual rejoinders–like that it is vulgar, absurd, unfair, outdated, etc.

I agree that “ought implies can,” and I am a big fan of Bill Casebeer. I think that virtue ethics is crucial. Facts about our evolution and our neurobiological makeup restrict and empower various ways in which the goal of maximizing happiness can be realized, but they are not inconsistent with utilitarianism. On the contrary, it is necessary to understand the functional constraints of a system in order to optimally restructure it. (Could an engineer ignore the laws of physics?)

Finally, you stated that you won’t believe me if I claim the values you listed are valuable only by virtue of their ties to happiness. But they are. Happiness coherently unites our value judgments in a way that none of those other candidates for intrinsic value do. For arguments in favor of happiness as the good, see Sumner’s “Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics” and Silverstein’s “In Defense of Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine” (2000).

I have trouble with Layard’s arguments from the git-go. If utility is really measurable on a ratio scale (or at least an interval scale), no one’s been able to figure out how to do it. I’m actually inclined to doubt that there there is a single dimension of “happiness” or utility at all. In any event, very little work that’s being done in psychology today requires the assumption of such a single dimension.

What kind of neurological evidence does Layard take as decisive?

Robert Campbell

I started to make a really long comment, but ended up putting my comments here.

Maybe greater utility for others doesn’t motivate me, but is it possible that avoiding greater disutility would? I take it that Hume is more inclined to think of us as sympathizing with people who are doing really poorly, rather than with people who are doing really well.

I suspect that this would meet the requirement of stability (which I totally approve of and think is the yardstick to measure morality and policy against) only if I’m right about our natural sympathies extending to those doing poorly, *and* this sympathy motivates us to action.

We should probably want some guide to changing our intuitions, and utilitarianism, at least in some versions, strikes me as a good sort of theory to use.

What sort of utilitarianism? Does anyone have much time for act utilitarianism? Clearly I’m motivated by my goals/interests, but your goals/interests don’t (necessarily) motivate me. And certainly not the goals/interests of people I don’t know about (unless I ‘feel’ for everyone, everywhere. In which case I belong in an institution. Either academic or mental).

The aggregate happiness should motivate someone from an original position point of view. If I don’t know who I’m to be (Rawls), or have an equal probability of being just anyone (Harsanyi), then I would be interested in aggregates precisely because of expected utility theory. The more aggregate utility/happiness, the more likely it is that I would fall in a category that gets greater utility/happiness. From *that* position (and only from that position?) should aggregates make a difference.

Wait: if we’re looking at legislators, we’ll want them to think a little bit about aggregate happiness levels as well.

As for the many things that you list, I believe they are worthwhile primarily because they allow people to lead fuller, happier lives. You could argue that they contribute to other ends — and even that they are goods in themselves. But if you ask people why they value achievement, friendship, health, etc., most people will say, because those things makes me happy. I think that’s a perfectly reasonable response.

My point was about aggregate happiness, the summ of all happinesses. I think that’s a very strange animal, and it’s weird why anyone would care about it.

Individuals will of course care about their own happiness, but there are many other values that they might also care about.

Try: knowledge, beauty, love, truth, honor, achievement, spiritual attainment, friendship, integrity, fidelity, creativity, exploration, adventure, charity, kindness, health, wisdom, etc., etc., etc.

You might want to argue that these things are worthwhile only because they contribute to happiness. But I won’t believe you.