Comments on: Frankfurt on the Equality Fetish http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/ The Sweet Release of Reason Tue, 22 May 2012 20:28:45 +0000 hourly 1 By: Rob http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5823 Rob Fri, 27 May 2005 04:43:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5823 Frankfurt is just blatantly inconsistent on this: any set of rules which made distributional outcomes a part of justice would have this alleged feature of focusing attention on the holdings of others, because the holdings of others will have to be in conformity with the distributional outcomes, so his own view, sufficientarianism, must face the same problem. The critique also seems to conflate the questions of 'how should I live' and 'how should we live' (or in other terms, ethics and morality), because it assumes that a justice-derived concern with the holdings of others must convert itself into defect of personal ethics, specifically, a failure to live one's own life by one's own lights. This seems to me to be a mistake, because there are certainly ways in which I can be incredibly concerned about the justice or injustice of holdings of others, without that reflecting badly on my personal ethics: indeed, such a concern may be ethically good - should such people exist, genuinely crusading trial lawyers, who are definitionally concerned with the injustice of some holdings, seem to have some ethically good features in virtue of that concern. Frankfurt is just blatantly inconsistent on this: any set of rules which made distributional outcomes a part of justice would have this alleged feature of focusing attention on the holdings of others, because the holdings of others will have to be in conformity with the distributional outcomes, so his own view, sufficientarianism, must face the same problem. The critique also seems to conflate the questions of ‘how should I live’ and ‘how should we live’ (or in other terms, ethics and morality), because it assumes that a justice-derived concern with the holdings of others must convert itself into defect of personal ethics, specifically, a failure to live one’s own life by one’s own lights. This seems to me to be a mistake, because there are certainly ways in which I can be incredibly concerned about the justice or injustice of holdings of others, without that reflecting badly on my personal ethics: indeed, such a concern may be ethically good – should such people exist, genuinely crusading trial lawyers, who are definitionally concerned with the injustice of some holdings, seem to have some ethically good features in virtue of that concern.

]]> By: monkyboy http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5822 monkyboy Tue, 24 May 2005 21:55:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5822 Silly poor people, yearning for medical care, decent schools for their children and not having to eat dog food in their old age. Pay no attention to the rich people behind the curtain, look inside yourselves instead...maybe there's an organ you could sell! Silly poor people, yearning for medical care, decent schools for their children and not having to eat dog food in their old age.

Pay no attention to the rich people behind the curtain, look inside yourselves instead…maybe there’s an organ you could sell!

]]> By: Gabriel Mihalache http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5821 Gabriel Mihalache Tue, 24 May 2005 11:58:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5821 There's a small typo: "improtance" It could be said that <em>any</em> set of fixed rules, such as morality, is alienating, because life is a process of discovery and refinement. Living by axiomatic rules alienated from life, or at least denies the flourishing of life as a goal (along the lines of Nietzsche's critique of morality-as-against-life) Another view might be that morality ought to be seen as an external restriction on Economics thinking (strategies) That it should be viewed like scarcity. A given. Equality would then not be in conflict with sound economic thinking, but a restriction (self-)imposed on it. There’s a small typo: “improtance”

It could be said that any set of fixed rules, such as morality, is alienating, because life is a process of discovery and refinement. Living by axiomatic rules alienated from life, or at least denies the flourishing of life as a goal (along the lines of Nietzsche’s critique of morality-as-against-life)

Another view might be that morality ought to be seen as an external restriction on Economics thinking (strategies) That it should be viewed like scarcity. A given. Equality would then not be in conflict with sound economic thinking, but a restriction (self-)imposed on it.

]]> By: Gabriel Mihalache http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5818 Gabriel Mihalache Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5818 There's a small typo: "improtance" It could be said that <em>any</em> set of fixed rules, such as morality, is alienating, because life is a process of discovery and refinement. Living by axiomatic rules alienated from life, or at least denies the flourishing of life as a goal (along the lines of Nietzsche's critique of morality-as-against-life) Another view might be that morality ought to be seen as an external restriction on Economics thinking (strategies) That it should be viewed like scarcity. A given. Equality would then not be in conflict with sound economic thinking, but a restriction (self-)imposed on it. There’s a small typo: “improtance”

It could be said that any set of fixed rules, such as morality, is alienating, because life is a process of discovery and refinement. Living by axiomatic rules alienated from life, or at least denies the flourishing of life as a goal (along the lines of Nietzsche’s critique of morality-as-against-life)

Another view might be that morality ought to be seen as an external restriction on Economics thinking (strategies) That it should be viewed like scarcity. A given. Equality would then not be in conflict with sound economic thinking, but a restriction (self-)imposed on it.

]]> By: monkyboy http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5819 monkyboy Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5819 Silly poor people, yearning for medical care, decent schools for their children and not having to eat dog food in their old age. Pay no attention to the rich people behind the curtain, look inside yourselves instead...maybe there's an organ you could sell! Silly poor people, yearning for medical care, decent schools for their children and not having to eat dog food in their old age.

Pay no attention to the rich people behind the curtain, look inside yourselves instead…maybe there’s an organ you could sell!

]]> By: Rob http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2005/05/24/frankfurt-on-the-equality-fetish/#comment-5820 Rob Wed, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=720#comment-5820 Frankfurt is just blatantly inconsistent on this: any set of rules which made distributional outcomes a part of justice would have this alleged feature of focusing attention on the holdings of others, because the holdings of others will have to be in conformity with the distributional outcomes, so his own view, sufficientarianism, must face the same problem. The critique also seems to conflate the questions of 'how should I live' and 'how should we live' (or in other terms, ethics and morality), because it assumes that a justice-derived concern with the holdings of others must convert itself into defect of personal ethics, specifically, a failure to live one's own life by one's own lights. This seems to me to be a mistake, because there are certainly ways in which I can be incredibly concerned about the justice or injustice of holdings of others, without that reflecting badly on my personal ethics: indeed, such a concern may be ethically good - should such people exist, genuinely crusading trial lawyers, who are definitionally concerned with the injustice of some holdings, seem to have some ethically good features in virtue of that concern. Frankfurt is just blatantly inconsistent on this: any set of rules which made distributional outcomes a part of justice would have this alleged feature of focusing attention on the holdings of others, because the holdings of others will have to be in conformity with the distributional outcomes, so his own view, sufficientarianism, must face the same problem. The critique also seems to conflate the questions of ‘how should I live’ and ‘how should we live’ (or in other terms, ethics and morality), because it assumes that a justice-derived concern with the holdings of others must convert itself into defect of personal ethics, specifically, a failure to live one’s own life by one’s own lights. This seems to me to be a mistake, because there are certainly ways in which I can be incredibly concerned about the justice or injustice of holdings of others, without that reflecting badly on my personal ethics: indeed, such a concern may be ethically good – should such people exist, genuinely crusading trial lawyers, who are definitionally concerned with the injustice of some holdings, seem to have some ethically good features in virtue of that concern.

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