I will also point out the difference between taboos (which function on those who hold them), and laws (which are enforced against those who violate them).

Did the original comment of mine post?

This doesn’t seem to be terribly troubling in other contexts–if someone doesn’t buy the basic axioms of logic, there’s clearly no way to argue them into it (except, perhaps, by making it clear that they really DO buy them, perhaps unawares)–I don’t know that it’s any more so in the moral context.

It sounds to me almost exactly like David Gauthier’s ‘constrained maximizers.’ That we agree to constrain our individual maximization within some boundaries that allow us to avoid the unsettling prisoner’s dilemma type games. Come to think of it, it also sounds a bit like Amartya Sen’s metarankings which explicitly incorporates ‘commitment’ to avoid strategies of straight maximization. (‘Rational Fools’ is the article where he first introduces the ideas, and I think you can get it off JSTOR).

Here’s a question: To what extent do we engage in upholding somewhat obviously dumb social norms as a test? Consider: Some sets of norms, or beliefs, are implausible, absurd, or easily refuted (like the Pinker story about women and their math abilities). The more easily refutable, the more likely it is that those who maintain the norm in the face of objections are seen as thorough cooperators (or definite constrained maximizers).

Here’s a further question, on point for people like you and I. In recent times, I’ve found myself losing my conviction in ‘natural rights.’ It seems too much like a ‘just-so’ story. If we share the intuition, great! If we don’t? Trouble. And there doesn’t seem to me to be very convincing retorts to someone who says, to our positing the right not to be killed–to take the most compelling ‘right’–”I don’t buy it.”

Offering my doubts, I’ve been subject to some borderline ostracism from radical (used non-pejoratively) Austrians, and ARI objectivists. The latter group was harshest (I used to electronically consort with these ruffians). (Which is why, incidentally, I enjoyed your letters to the younger, still objectivist, Will).

To say I don’t buy the rights story is to say that I’m unwilling to play their game. *Even if* I still come to libertarian conclusions (from contractarian/conventionalist foundational positions, or from a consequentialist public policy perspective).

It sounds to me almost exactly like David Gauthier’s ‘constrained maximizers.’ That we agree to constrain our individual maximization within some boundaries that allow us to avoid the unsettling prisoner’s dilemma type games. Come to think of it, it also sounds a bit like Amartya Sen’s metarankings which explicitly incorporates ‘commitment’ to avoid strategies of straight maximization. (‘Rational Fools’ is the article where he first introduces the ideas, and I think you can get it off JSTOR).

Here’s a question: To what extent do we engage in upholding somewhat obviously dumb social norms as a test? Consider: Some sets of norms, or beliefs, are implausible, absurd, or easily refuted (like the Pinker story about women and their math abilities). The more easily refutable, the more likely it is that those who maintain the norm in the face of objections are seen as thorough cooperators (or definite constrained maximizers).

Here’s a further question, on point for people like you and I. In recent times, I’ve found myself losing my conviction in ‘natural rights.’ It seems too much like a ‘just-so’ story. If we share the intuition, great! If we don’t? Trouble. And there doesn’t seem to me to be very convincing retorts to someone who says, to our positing the right not to be killed–to take the most compelling ‘right’–”I don’t buy it.”

Offering my doubts, I’ve been subject to some borderline ostracism from radical (used non-pejoratively) Austrians, and ARI objectivists. The latter group was harshest (I used to electronically consort with these ruffians). (Which is why, incidentally, I enjoyed your letters to the younger, still objectivist, Will).

To say I don’t buy the rights story is to say that I’m unwilling to play their game. *Even if* I still come to libertarian conclusions (from contractarian/conventionalist foundational positions, or from a consequentialist public policy perspective).

This doesn’t seem to be terribly troubling in other contexts–if someone doesn’t buy the basic axioms of logic, there’s clearly no way to argue them into it (except, perhaps, by making it clear that they really DO buy them, perhaps unawares)–I don’t know that it’s any more so in the moral context.

I will also point out the difference between taboos (which function on those who hold them), and laws (which are enforced against those who violate them).

Did the original comment of mine post?

Will has a great post about taboos and their role in social coordination. Adherence to taboos signals unconditional cooperation or an unconditional disposition to punish (usually the latter), providing a clear structure for coordination. Because family…