DC Ward One Councliman Jim Graham has a little poll on his website asking “Should the DC Council act to eliminate smoking in indoor workplaces?” (On the left column, a ways down.) Apparently the anti-freedom forces at Smoke-Free DC already got the word out and they’re way ahead in the poll. Will you help? Tell my councilman that DC should not violate the rights of business owners to run their establishments as they choose.
Monthly Archives: February 2005
Misunderstanding Social Security
Elizabeth Anderson, of the University of Michigan and left2right, has heroically taken up the thankless task of very clearly illustrating the fact that mainstream contemporary academic American liberalism is, at its core, an essentially reactionary creed built around the conservation of the institutions of the “New Deal” and the “Great Society,” and the protection of the interests of the affiliated political rentier class. One would thus imagine that Anderson would at least understand the institutions she is trying to conserve against the forces of reform. But, no, not so much with the understanding.
Anderson argues that whatever the other faults of Social Security benefit calculators like Heritage’s, “It forgets that Social Security is a form of social insurance, not a simple retirement plan. So it’s comparing apples with oranges.”
Of course, readers of the Annals of Improbable Research understand that apples and oranges are eminently comparable. But more importantly, Social Security is emphatically not a form of social insurance — unless we arbitrarily stipulate that any redistributive transfer is ipso facto a form of insurance by providing people with resources that they could use to protect themselves from risk. Social Security is: a tax and a transfer. That’s it. It’s not insurance, not legally, not in structure, and not in fact.
The Roosevelt administration defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by arguing before the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis that it did not establish a social insurance program. The Court agreed, and reaffirmed this point 23 years late in Fleming v. Nestor where it determined that Social Security taxes are just taxes, and that individuals have no right to any benefit on the basis of having paid these taxes.
It is true that successive governments have maintained a deceptive program structure and system of admininstration intended to trick citizens into believing that there is a connection between their so-called “contributions” and their benefits, and that Social Security is a kind of insurance. Roosevelt fully intended for citizens to mistakenly believe that their payroll tax constituted a kind of insutance premium. He vehemently opposed paying benefits out of the general fund because that would impede the goal of deluding taxpayers. No one thinks they are entitled to some kind of cash transfer from the government simply because they have paid their taxes. And the SSA to this day continues to encourage the systematic deception of the citizens of the US.
You would imagine that a liberal would deplore a system of paternalistically motivated noble lies and would forcefully argue against this kind of deception as a transgression against democracy, which is what it is. We are angry when the government uses lies in order to circumvent the democratic process by causing citizens to misrepresent their options. Think of Bush and the WMD. We ought to be incensed when the government entrenches lies into the very structure of the welfare system.
Anderson has either been taken in by the lie, is trying to perpetuate it, or has a notion of insurance so broad that anything that cushions people against risk, such as exercising regularly, wearing a bicycle helmet, or cultivating a network of altruistic friends and family, counts as “insurance.” In any case, she ought to admit that Social Security is not an insurance program according to the law or according to ordinary usage, and she should stand up for transparency and democracy by condemning the purposefully deceptive structure and rhetoric of the American Social Security system.
Arms Races, Happiness, and other Goods
I strolled up Mass Ave to Brookings this afternoon to hear Richard Layard speak on his new book Happiness. Layard, an unreconstructed Benthamite, is worried by the fact that, once a certain threshold in absolute wealth had been crossed, people’s self-reported happiness is correlated with their perception of their place in the distribution of income, i.e., by their relative wealth. Layard’s worry is that there is an arms race. Each of us tries to improve our relative position. But since everyone else is trying simultaneously to improve their relative position, very few end up succeeding in moving up relative to the others.
We’ve all perhaps moved up in absolute wealth, but that doesn’t matter so much for our happiness once we’ve crossed the critical threshold. All we’ve done is made a futile rush for a higher relative position, and ended up no happier. But we could have been spending our time doing better things.
Layard suggested that higher taxes might be worth having because it would create a disincentive to work, and this might help create a truce in the relative position arms race, freeing everyone to pursue activities that would positively promote their happiness.
Blah. Blah.
First of all, maybe the lesson we should take from this is that people just value status, period, independent of its hedonic effects. That is, perhaps the value of status cannot be reduced to the value of happiness. Casual empiricism would seem to confirm that people behave in predictably hedonically non-maximizing ways in order to maximize status. And it seem to me that many people find it very difficult to release a privileged relative position, even if they recognize that maintaining the position is making them unhappy. (Source: VH1: Behind the Music).
Some people — pehaps many people — would, other things equal, prefer an additional unit of status over several additional units of happiness. And in arms races over relative position, some people do move up. As long as the arms race does not make you significantly less happy, then it can be worth the gamble to jump in and try to be one of the few folks who succeeds in pulling ahead.
(Suppose that you’re very likely to stay in the same spot if you get in the race. And that when people pull ahead, they pull way ahead, but when people fall behind, they fall only a little bit. So even if you’re more likely to fall behind than jump ahead, the upside can still look big.)
Additionally, it can very well be the case that people are generally less happy when they have a lower relative position, more happy when they have a higher position, but don’t value higher position because it will make them happier. They value higher position because it is higher position, and getting higher position tends to make us happy because we value it, and we are generally made happy by getting what we value.
OK, let’s shift gears. Suppose I have written a transcendently great poem. Yet it very complex, and not very accessible. That said, a fair number people take great pleasure in it. However, this pleasure is swamped by the disutility caused to people who, before reading my poem, had thought that they were potentially great poets, but now are made to despair by the realization that they will never attain the heights of my poetic accomplishment.
Have I done a good or bad thing by writing my poem? Obviously: a good thing. The poem is transcendently great! It’s aesthetic value has next to nothing to do with its effect on net utility. Why care if it makes some people feel bad in comparison? Well, there is no reason to care.
To change the example slightly, suppose my poem raises the bar on poem-quality, and all my competitors rush out to write poems that will be even better than transcendently great. However, the effect of this is sheer frustration. They can never do it; I’m just that good! And here they went and wasted all that time failing to write transcendently great poems when they could have been lying in the sunshine, getting massages, or freebasing Prozac. IS THIS A PROBLEM WE NEED TO BE WORRIED ABOUT?
If the greatness of my poem creates negative externalities, they need to be negative externalities we have reason to care about if we’re going to take them into account in policy making. Parfit or Scanlon, in an argument against the pure preference satisfaction theory, give the example of a person who prefers that Uranus has six moons over any other number of moons (or something like that). If it turns out that Uranus does have six moons, is that guy any better off in any sense that we have a reason to care about? Well Parfit/Scanlon don’t think so, and neither do I.
Similarly, if you are a small person, and my success makes you burn with pained resentment, do we have any reason to take your pained resentment into account when evaluating the value of my success. I think not. The problem here is your unreasonable reaction, not my success.
Back to the poetry arms race. Suppose all those lesser poets are made unhappy by their persistent failure to achieve at a trancendent level despite their years of mindbending labor. Should we conclude that the arms race was a bad thing? Obviously not if it led to the creation of a lot of poety which, if not transcendently great, is still great. Maybe the lesser poets can learn to take satisfaction in the value they’ve created, despite their subordinate position in the pantheon of poets. But if they can’t that’s their problem, not a social problem. Similarly, if folks fail to make any progress in the race for relative economic position, they will have still improved everyone’s absolute economic position, which is just good. They will also have produced many wonderful conveniences, objects of beauty, wonder, delight, and technical merit. They will have increased the sum of human knowledge. They will have opened up new avenues of possibility for human life.
Gentlemen, on your marks!
The "Grace of Congress" Problem
What’s wrong with people owning things? Well, if people own things, then the government doesn’t really control it. Apparently it is worrying if the benevolent members of the political class don’t have the discretion to spend your money. I think it is impossible to defend on moral grounds that other things being equal, if the choice is between individual ownership and state control, we should choose state control.
One of the arguments in favor of individual ownership is that property rights create a shield against political predation. Yglesias, who seems to think that other things equal it’s better for the political class to control resources, blithely says, “Why worry!?“:
One [remark on the issue of the relative security provided by legally binding property rights versus the discretion of the politicians] is that while I’ve heard much touching concern from certain privatizers about this “Grace of Congress” issue, the more typical conservatarian complaint about Social Security is that due to the ever-growing voting power of senior citizens it is, in practice, nearly impossible to cut Social Security benefits. So the whole issue strikes me as being of academic concern only.
Matt is pulling a kind of probably unconscious bait and switch here. This is all too common among conservative opponents of progress on social security. Unless there is structural reform of the social security system, such as the implementation of personal retirement accounts, either there will be VERY LARGE future tax increases or VERY LARGE future benefit cuts. The problem with Big Senior’s hegemony and reactionary impulse is not that it makes benefits cuts permanently impossible by constituting an indefeasible coalition, it just pushes the decision into the future while the problem continues to mount. The further into the future we push the problem, the bigger the benefit cuts or tax increases will need to be.
Now, politicians are indeed averse to cutting benefits, due in part to the electoral muscle of Big Senior. Yet they are also averse to raising taxes, due to the electoral muscle of taxpayers. Unless we do something quite soon, the tax increases will need to be quite large. This may not be politically easy, and it is quite realistic to imagine that voters may prefer to cut benefits rather severely in order to avoid giant tax increases, at which point, politicians will cut benefits. Matt’s bait and switch consists in having us imagine that voter demand over policy-bundles remains constant despite the fact that the demographic unsustainability of the system will force tough trade-offs that will alter voter demand.
Matt’s argument is that senior citizens will never allow benefit cuts and so the “Grace of Congress” point is simply academic. Congress will always grace us, so why worry? Well, if Matt is right about the intrasigence of Big Senior, we’re going to need a giant payroll tax increase. Indeed, those who wish to stall serious structural reform are arguing for huge tax increases by default. But the real prospect of a huge tax increase is precisely the sort of thing that will shift voter demand so as to make benefits cuts politically feasible. And so by stalling, Matt is helping to bring into being the conditions under which the Grace of Congress argument gets real teeth.
Unless there is serious structural reform, reduced benefits become increasingly likely. That’s why it’s simply dishonest and incoherent to confuse a politician’s promise with a credible guarantee. There is no guarantee. There are no guaranteed benefits. There are promised benefits — promised by people who honor their promises when it benefits them. And, credibility of politicians aside, given the structure of the system, the promise cannot be kept.
The “conservatarian” argument is clearly not that Big Senior obstructionism regarding reform locks in a sure benefit level, but that it threatens benefits by making the problem ever more acute. At some point, the problem is so acute that the Big Senior coalition will not be political decisve regarding the issue of benefit levels. One main point of reform is to avoid the need to choose between tax increases and benefit cuts, and the political uncertainty the necessity of such choices would create.
Just Savings and Dynamic Contractualism
I don’t understand the principal of just savings.
Rawls says that parties to the OP will pick a principle of savings that satisfies maximin, that maximizes the welfare of the least-well off group. But I cannot make intelligible to myself just who the least well-off group is here in the inter-generational context. It may turn out the best off person in generation 1 is much less well off than the least well off in generation 7.
So, OK, suppose I’m a party to the OP. I don’t know which generation I’m in. So, I’ve got to assume I’m in generation 1, on the assumption that later generations are better off because of the accumulation of capital. And I am suppose to ask how much I am willing to save, on the assumption that generation 0 has saved at the same rate, and that future generations will follow the same principle. I am assumed to have my children and grandchildren in my (primary goods maximizing) welfare function in order to ensure I don’t choose to save nothing. But it seems that there’s no firm place to stand.
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Social Security: The Big Lie
I wish everyone would read Paul Romer’s “Preferences, Promise, and the Politics of Entitlement,” in Individual and Social Responsibility, edited by Victor Fuchs.
Romer tells the story of exactly how concerted and intentional is the deceptive rhetoric of Social Security. The ideas of SS as “insurance,” the payroll tax as “contributions,” and the “trust fund” were purposeful rhetorical ruses deployed to lock in political support for the program. The point was to create the illusion that a tax plus a regressive transfer from the young to the old (which could not have maintained political support) is instead a form of social insurance, which it manifestly is not. The illusion — the lie — has succeeded brilliant. Indeed, Romer’s paper suggests that Social Security may be the best example of purposefully deceptive framing for political gain in the history of the United States. (That’s the lesson I take from it, in any case.)
Unfortunately the paper is not exactly online, but you can probably make your way through it using the Amazon “Search Inside” function (link above).
Endogeneity and Justice
For various reasons I have gotten pretty involved in the literature on endogenous preference change. My first push came from reading Rawls. As I see it, the key difference between Rawlsian contractarianism and Buchanan/Gauthier rational choice contractarianism is not just that Rawls posits a sense of justice, a capacity enabling agents to be motivated by considerations that nicely allow for the choice of non-Nash, Pareto-improving strategies (Gauthier’s “constrained maximization” gets you this, as does McClennan’s closely related “resolute choice”) but that Rawls has something of an account of endogenous preference change that accounts for the convergence of the right and the good and thus the stability of social ordered according to the principles of “justice as fairness.”
The trouble with theories of endogenous preference change is that they seem the ruination of neo-classical theories of efficiency. The usual Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks (or Marshallian, if you like),criteria for efficiency work only by holding preferences fixed or exogenous. We evaluate the desirability in changes by tracking their relation to people’s preferences. If a change makes someone better off and no one worse off, in terms of preference satisfaction, then it is worth doing. But if a change can modify individuals’ preference-profiles themselves, then our efficiency criterion becomes a moving target, and one becomes quickly mired in paradox.
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simulated persona = "Ayn Rand"
Tim’s link to Andrej Bauer’s primer on Objectivism reminded me that the cartoon Rand of our zeitgest dreams was never put to better use than by the astounding artificially intelligent replicated personas of Forum 2000. Here AI Andrej discusses the axiom of identity with AI Ayn. Also try here, and here.
That Reason’s so-called Rand-O-Rama failed to acknowledge Forum 2000 shows the editorial staff to be so overoccupied with working obscure song lyrics into the titles of blog posts, outsider art, waxing lyrical about New Jersey, and generally kpeping nihilism fresh, that they neglected to touch on the ubiquity of Rand’s spirit in the bygone heyday of the information superhighway.
The Most Opposite Thing Ever
This absolutely arbitrary and wonderful Observer article about indie guys who also happen to like football contains some gems. My favorite:
And what about the girls? Indie-rock girlfriends, who thought that when they started dating music boys they were leaving football Sunday behind forever, are pissed off to discover that they thought they were getting Joe Strummer but actually got Joe Buck. In fact, at the league-championship party in Bushwick, the host’s girlfriend took off during the game to do the most opposite thing ever—make a mix tape on the occasion of her friend’s little sister’s first period.
The most opposite thing ever!
The Larry White Privatization Plan
I would enthusiastically endorse the Larry White plan if it was possible for the state to credibly commit to refusing benefits to people who fail to invest.
Here’s Larry’s idea:
Here’s how it works: we give Ms. Smith, a worker, the right to opt out of paying $100 in social security payroll taxes provided she also opts out of (say) $103 in future Social Security benefits. She can now save her $100 privately. She will consider herself better off opting out if she thinks she can earn a return of better than $103 for each $100 saved. Voila, who could object?
Maybe we can throw in a little benign paternalism, and have the payroll taxes automatically roll into some kind of investment account by default.
Anyway, nice idea.