Also, wouldn’t put the just savings principles this way. The saving principles doesn’t satisfy maximin, but rather constrains the difference principle (which is roughly maximin).
I do not think that Rawls says that maximin operates between generations. The parties in the original position, though they do not know what generation they are in, know that all the people in the original position are their contempories. Still, Rawls says that it virtually represents everyone from all time, since we do not yet know what our time is. But the principle he draws is not maximin, but what would have wanted the previous generation to save. It involves a notion of reciprocity, which I think becomes far more important in the later Rawls.

P.S. I’m wondering: how much do you think the just saving principles is like the rest of Rawls’ contract doctrine and how much is more like the places where Rawls seems to pull basically ethical precepts from choice in the Original Position (like natural duties)?

I’m a little confused by this comment. This does not seem to be one of Rawls’ fundamental commitments. I’m not sure where he even says this, or why he would want to avoid it. There’s nothing wrong with changing the basic structure. Rawls does not want to renegotiate the two principles of justice that govern the choice of the basic structure, that’s true. But circumstances can change, or our knowledge about means can change, such that we think an altered basic structure would better fulfil the two principles of justice chosen in the OP.

“But isn’t the point of choosing from the OP that we’re choosing institutions for all time?”

I don’t think so. I remember that Rawls talks about a 4 stage process. Only the first stage has the full veil of ignorance. In this stage, we do not choose institutions at all, but only principles, principles which will later be used to judge and select among institutional structures. So we do not choose institutions for all time in the first stage, but choose principles for all time (or basically for all time- I’m not sure how relevant this is, but Rawls also talks in section 44 on justice between generations about how, if we go far enough back, the general conception of justice would have prevailed.) The second and third stage are the constitutional and legislative stage. In the constitutional stage we do not know who we are in society, but we do the general facts about our society (So presumably we would know what generation we are in). And once we get the legislative stage, there is definitely no problem with altering laws affecting the basic structure at different times.

I’m a little confused by this comment. This does not seem to be one of Rawls’ fundamental commitments. I’m not sure where he even says this, or why he would want to avoid it. There’s nothing wrong with changing the basic structure. Rawls does not want to renegotiate the two principles of justice that govern the choice of the basic structure, that’s true. But circumstances can change, or our knowledge about means can change, such that we think an altered basic structure would better fulfil the two principles of justice chosen in the OP.

“But isn’t the point of choosing from the OP that we’re choosing institutions for all time?”

I don’t think so. I remember that Rawls talks about a 4 stage process. Only the first stage has the full veil of ignorance. In this stage, we do not choose institutions at all, but only principles, principles which will later be used to judge and select among institutional structures. So we do not choose institutions for all time in the first stage, but choose principles for all time (or basically for all time- I’m not sure how relevant this is, but Rawls also talks in section 44 on justice between generations about how, if we go far enough back, the general conception of justice would have prevailed.) The second and third stage are the constitutional and legislative stage. In the constitutional stage we do not know who we are in society, but we do the general facts about our society (So presumably we would know what generation we are in). And once we get the legislative stage, there is definitely no problem with altering laws affecting the basic structure at different times.

Also, wouldn’t put the just savings principles this way. The saving principles doesn’t satisfy maximin, but rather constrains the difference principle (which is roughly maximin).
I do not think that Rawls says that maximin operates between generations. The parties in the original position, though they do not know what generation they are in, know that all the people in the original position are their contempories. Still, Rawls says that it virtually represents everyone from all time, since we do not yet know what our time is. But the principle he draws is not maximin, but what would have wanted the previous generation to save. It involves a notion of reciprocity, which I think becomes far more important in the later Rawls.

P.S. I’m wondering: how much do you think the just saving principles is like the rest of Rawls’ contract doctrine and how much is more like the places where Rawls seems to pull basically ethical precepts from choice in the Original Position (like natural duties)?