The new Philosophical Gourmet Report is out. Maryland moved up to 25 in the overall. Good show Maryland!
Monthly Archives: November 2004
Baker Review
So, directly below you’ll find the book review that was apparently a little too saucy for Brainwash, having appeared there from some time Sunday evening to some time Monday morning. Conservative donors and all that, I suppose. (Do take note, if you’ve ever considered writing for Brainwash.) Please note that the foul, foul language is all Baker’s, which I quote purely for critical purposes.
I do think the point I’m attributing to (or reading into) the book is an important one, and worth thinking about, and so I present the review, with minor modifications of the original (which, naturally enough, may be found in the Google cache) here for your pleasure and edification.
Politics vs. the Catalpa Tree: Checkpoint by Nicholson Baker
Checkpoint, by Nicholson Baker, New York: Knopf, 115 pages, $15.95
The resounding Republican victory left legions of Bush-haters in manic disbelief, with trembling fistfuls of perfectly good hair. The voters, naturally, have come under fire. There is talk of exodus to Canada. Under such conditions one can easily imagine some would-be Blue State Czolgosz thumbing through Nicholson Baker’s new novella, Checkpoint, nodding, dreaming filthy dreams of execucide.
Bush’s reëlection may drive Nicholson Baker to put his head through a wall, but it’s the best thing that could happen to his sales. Checkpoint has sold poorly so far because it’s a mediocre book. Nevertheless, Baker is one of the best writers of his generation, celebrated for his crystalline exaltations of the mundane and his pioneering exploration of neglected masturbatory possibilities. Although it is, by Baker’s usual standards, a middling production, Checkpoint did occasion something of a second-order news event as critics and commentators from across the notional left-right spectrum rose to condemn it for immorality, bad taste, or both. Checkpoint is centrally occupied with volcanic outrage over the Iraq war and the crazed desire to murder George W. Bush, and therefore makes up in controversy what it lacks in quality.
Checkpoint poses as the transcript of a taped conversation between an unhinged left-wing conspiracy theorist named Jay and his old friend, Ben, an amateur photographer and commonplace, pusillanimous, middle-aged subscriber to (one imagines) The Utne Reader. Jay has called Ben to his room in a hotel near the White House where they commiserate about the evil of Bush and his advisors (“these rusted hulks, these zombies”), the raw, outrageous injustice of the war in Iraq, and Jay’s plan to murder the president with wacky imaginary weapons (flying saw blades; uranium boulder; homing bullets “marinated” in a box with a picture of president; specially brainwashed scorpion for Cheney; a hammer).
Ben, it turns out, largely agrees with Jay on the facts, and he assents to the preliminary moral verdict: Bush is corrupt; his administration is criminal; he is tantamount to a murderer. But Ben dissents on the ultimate verdict: justice does not demand that Bush be translated from high office to a yet higher sphere. The difference between the two men, as trifling as they seem in ideological terms, is the subject of the book. How, Baker asks, may we remain sane in a world of intolerable cruelty, injustice, and corruption? Kill the president? No.
The answer, and it is a good answer: get a camera.
Baker’s critics perhaps felt free to flout the usual standards of criticism and indulge in daft moralizing because Checkpoint itself seems to be a daftly moralistic book. Tim Noah called it “a work of pornography.” In a huffy, matronly review, Leon Wieseltier called it a “scummy little book.” Rush Limbaugh said . . . well, he didn’t like it. But it is less daftly moralistic than it first appears, as it is in many ways an indictment of the deforming effects of the hyper-heightened moral sensibility it seems to exemplify.
Checkpoint makes plain that Jay, Baker’s Bush-loathing nutcase, is in fact a nutcase. One cannot be like Jay without fraying the delicate threads in the weave of a decent life. Jay himself recognizes that he has paid a dear price for his compulsive over-politicization. Speaking of his ex-wife, he says:
I just wore Lila out. You know? With me, everything’s political. I mean, she’s political too, but not as much . . . I’ve made a bollix of my life, that’s for sure.
Jay cannot find the safety on his hair-trigger sense of injustice, and so cannot fail to wreak collateral damage on his loved ones, leaving him perpetually outraged and alone. Not a ringing endorsement.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the raving Jay does often speak for Baker, who has admitted to obsession over the war. As David Gates wrote in Newsweek:
“Checkpoint” did, in fact, originate in Baker’s own fury, grief and helplessness over Iraq. “I was plodding
along, writing my little books,” he says, “and then suddenly this thing speared into my life and it just took me over.” He lost a month of 2003 to his obsession with the news, swore off Google News and blogs–he now has a Post-It on his screen saying ONLY E-MAIL and finally wrote the first draft of “Checkpoint” in April 2004, during the siege of Fallujah, because he could think about nothing else. As he typed, he found himself weeping.
If one is familiar with Baker’s autobiographical writings, one can detect a lot of Baker in Jay.(Compare to the above: “Jay: I’d been reading Daily Kos and the Agonist, Talking Points Memo, checking Google News twenty times a day.”) All the same, he is embarrassed by Jay, which should be no surprise. It is Baker’s peculiar form of generosity to share with us his awkward relation to himself, as he does in Vox and The Fermata, where he frankly shares, not wholly unashamed, his uncomfortably weird sexual imagination, or in U and I, where he explores in clinical detail his ridiculously vain obsession with John Updike.
Here, in Checkpoint, Baker lay bare his moral obsessiveness and political crankery for our discomfiting inspection. He does his best, through Ben, to talk himself down, to convince himself that justice–politics–does not exhaust goodness. Baker appears to be trying to convince himself (or some shade of himself) that the life of aesthetic engagement, the life of the novelist, is not an irresponsible, trivializing evasion of the supreme moral imperative. Or, rather less grandly, that irresponsible, trivializing evasion through art is less bad than killing the President.
Much of Checkpoint bounces back and forth between talk of murder and photography. Ben relates to Jay his new interest in expensive, large format camera equipment, and suggests it as an alternative to homicidal obsession.
Jay: . . . I’m going to kill the fucker!
Ben: No you’re not.
Jay: Penisfucker!
Ben: Jay, relax.
Jay: Why should I relax? Jiminy Cricket. Anyway, so
you bought a camera, did you. How diverting. . . .
Later:
Ben: But my suggestion is, get yourself
a camera. . . .
Jay: I thought film was dead.
Ben: It’s dying, but it’s not dead. The larger formats
still hold more
detail. Look, my friend, look. Okay, they used napalm. That’s very
bad.
I agree. Shooting the head of state is not a
solution.
Jay is not easily placated, having developed a moral sensitivity to general suffering that would make Peter Singer proud. It is indeed hard to resist Jay’s outrage when he describes the horrific episode from which Checkpoint takes its title. A family in a Land Rover comes to an Army checkpoint, attempting to flee the war zone. Somebody in the car waves, and the soldiers think the wave indicates something it does not and opens fire
on the family.
Jay: . . . and so there was this huge blast of fire, and one of the women in the car, the mother, she said, “I saw the–” Sorry.
Ben: It’s okay.
Jay: She said, “I saw the heads–” Pull myself together.
Ben: It’s all right.
Jay: She said, “I saw the heads of my two little girls come off.” That’s what she fucking said. I’m not kidding you, man. “My two little girls.” That’s what she fucking said. Can you imagine it? You’re just trying to get your family out of a war zone? Your farm’s already been blasted by helicopters, and then a bunch of guys in Kevlar open fire on your kids, and you see that happen? Ho, God.
Ben: That’s bad.
Jay: Liberators. Such bullshit. It’s just one event. The grandfather was killed, too. You know what he had on? He was wearing a pin-striped suit so he would look more American. Ho, man. Ho, man. And that creep, that fucking Texas punk, who can’t even talk, with his drugged-out eyes, he brought us to this point, to this war, and for nothing, for not one red fucking thing.
Obviously Jay’s admirable sympathy is not idle fellow feeling. It works a path through Jay’s implicit theory of just war and just retribution. But he fails to recognize a difference in rational status between the fact of his feeling and the assertion of his judgment. He does not question that that one might not really follow from the other. Jay takes his conclusion to follow from a kind of inexorable machinery of moral-psychological inference.
Jay: So then the desire for justice starts moving through me. It’s like a huge paddlewheel. It churns up all this foam and fury. VENGEANCE.
It is perhaps Ben’s failure to question the transition to “VENGEANCE” that led Tim Noah to complain, strangely, that the conversation between Jay and Ben “isn’t a debate at all,” as if it should be. Ben doesn’t disagree with Jay’s moral logic. Rather, he exhorts Jay to stop fixating on the sorts of thing that set in motion the paddlewheel of justice.
Ben suggests, unhelpfully, copying a book word for word. Mainly, he sticks to the remedy of aesthetic engagement. He notes, for instance, that the Dutch masters were surrounded by cockroaches.
Ben: . . . The painters were doing the things they could do, never mind the pests–the pests were bracketed off. They didn’t impinge. The painters looked at the trees. That’s what you should do.
Looking at the trees in the right sort of way calls up a different kind of emotional logic. Ben walks Jay through the experience of looking at the world through a viewfinder:
Ben: . . . You might see, oh, I don’t know, a nuthatch on a fence. You think, take the picture? No, no. There’s somebody’s cat sniffing a blade of grass. Take the picture? No, no. You move on. A twisted piece of wire on the ground. Yes? No, no. You see what’s happening?
Jay: I’m not sure I do.
Ben: What’s happening is that the weight of the camera in your hand–and remember, it’s a heavy camera–the holding of it is changing the way you look at everything. You look up at the buildings, the stonework up there–ah, and then you see the trees . . .
Ben goes on to describe the sublimity of photographing a catalpa tree and its “incredible explosion of black twigs reaching in every direction.”
Ben: . . . I knew I had that catalpa in the bag. I knew its secrets. Yet there it was still out in the street for everyone to enjoy. So who cares about George W.? He’s irrelevant. He’s irrelevant. You see?
Jay finally relents, settling for an attack with a hammer on a photograph of Bush, an act of minor aggression that may have a similar tonic effect on millions of disaffected Kerry voters.
So Ben’s strategy is a success with Jay. Baker’s novella, however, leaves the reader with an aftertaste of failure. Checkpoint sputters to an end (they smash the picture, press “Stop” on the tape recorder, and, we imagine, just leave) because one senses that Baker has not really satisfied himself that it’s okay to become one with catalpa trees, or to rhapsodize about the geometry of milk cartons, as he does to wonderful effect in The Mezzanine, while our government blows innocent kids to bloody pieces in an unjust war. We can, like the Dutch Masters ignoring the cockroaches, just “bracket” it all off. But once one has tasted sublime moral outrage, this has to seem like woeful retreat.
Baker is, as always, embarrassed about his obsessiveness. He realizes that it is insane to ask that we go forward deranged by our moral horror until the last knot of injustice is undone. And so he saves Jay from his insanity. Yet he is embarrassed, too, by the aesthetic remedy, by the fact that it’s the best he can manage.
But it is the best he can manage, especially given the corner he has painted himself into with the completeness of Jay and Ben’s agreement. However, Baker may be showing us something worth seeing. It is, perhaps, our minimal moral obligation to be at least slightly abashed by our evasion of total moral engagement, although we really must avoid it. Morals, and politics especially, do not reign supreme over life. We may, if we choose, cultivate the beautiful, or devote ourselves to the pleasures of discovery. But we may not do so blithely. Life is a web of awful tradeoffs; there is no escape from regret, or shame.
The lesson, then, for those millions with a visceral antipathy to Bush, and a horror of another four Bush years, is just to set politics aside, to look away, to look to the trees–every once in a while at least, for balance–and accept that even if this is a shameful way to live, it is the best way to live.
Checkpoint is not a great book, but it’s not bad advice.
Zing!
Tim Lee micturates upon Nick Gillespie’s semi-autobiographical work of armchair demography.
What do you think about Reason’s “cultural turn.” Personally, I enjoy reading Nick’s Reason better than Virginia’s, although Virginia’s did seem more like a serious magazine for serious people with serious thoughts, and thus I guess I found her version more intellectually edifying. But what I think may be most interesting is the fact that, oh I don’t know, I guess maybe 70% of the writers are the same. So the actual substantive differences aren’t that great. It’s basically the same magazine with a few fewer pieces on privatizing x, a few more pieces on drugs, rock, and burning things in the desert, a reliably unfunny but fun-to-look-at cartoon, and lots more willfully obscure pop culture references. Overall, I like it. I think the formula’s got maybe two years left before its played.
The DC Nationals
OK. So the baseball team name is a drag. It sounds like the damn airport. But where were the Reagan legacy people? The DC Reagan Nationals would at least inspire passion. How long before the “The Nationals: America’s Team” crap starts?
Bad Theories that Track Robust Regularities
This interesting (as always [that is, I want to have millions of Malcolm Gladwell's babies]) Malcolm Gladwell essay on personality tests comes down hard on the Myers-Briggs. Now, I think he’s right about everything he’s saying about personality. Yet it remains that the Myers-Briggs does tend to track some fairly deep and important regularities. For instance, almost everyone I know is an NT. (Indeed, almost all libertarians are NTs, which is helpful for understanding why we do such a terrible job communicating to non-NTs.) So Gladwell’s right, but I sort of believe Myers-Briggs anyway. What’s going on?
Similarly, I think the mind is pretty modular, if not massively so. Thus, I don’t think there is anything like a general reasoning capacity. There are various cognitive subroutines that are elicited by different environmental cues, and it is possible to reason effectively in one domain while it is possible to make systematic errors in other domains. So, in terms of foundational theory, I shouldn’t believe in G, general intelligence. Yet I’m rather impressed by the data on G, and how it predicts quite a number of things. So what is G tracking if there is no general reasoning capacity? And what is Myers-Briggs capturing if personality is more continuous and labile that the test seems to assume?
(Bonus conjecture: If you have taken the M-B test, put your personality type in the comments. I bet that over 70% of The Fly Bottle readers are NTs of some sort. I am, FYI, an xNTP.)
The Fly Bottle is . . .
Tyler Cowen’s favorite philosophy blog! Wow! Thanks Tyler! That makes my day.
This means something to me, not only because Tyler was sort of my boss at Mercatus, and because I admire his work immensely, but because Tyler is one of those extremely rare economists who is also an outstanding philosopher (putting him in the company of people like Buchanan and Sen). Tyler has published papers in Ethics, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, in Economics and Philosophy, and has co-authored papers with Derek Parfit, an enviable record for just about any philosopher. But that’s just in his spare time.
There Once Was a Man Named John Locke/ Who had an Incredible . . . Sock
You will weep in . . . well, you will weep from something or other when you read this collection of Modern Political Thought Poetry by Beth Cohen.
The Magical Mister McF
I see that my favorite bureaucrat, Lane McFadden, has restarted his blog now that he has finished his clerking duties. Lane promises to post pictures. I’m excited.
So, I’m going to the IHS/Reason blog panel like right now, and there’s a good chance that this is it for the evening. I’ll let you know how it goes.
Objectivism on Legislative Authority
Freeman’s paper lead me to check whether the Objectvist political philosophy reserves any room for legislative bodies or legislative authority. Peikoff in OPAR is equivocal.
On the one hand he says:
The only system of laws that excludes every element of the nonobjective–of the indefensible and the unknowable–is one that confines legislation to the protection of rights.
[OPAR, 365}
This, along with other things Peikoff says, seems to imply that a political body may legitimately legislate "objective" law. Yet, turn the page, and we get this:
This purpose [barring the use of initiatory coercion] entails three and only three governmental functions. In Ayn Rand’s statement, these are: “the police, to protect men from criminals–the armed services, to protect men from foreign invaders–the law courts, to settle disputes among men accoding to objective laws.” Any additional function would have to involve the government initiating force against innocent citizens. Such a government acts not as man’s protector, but as a criminal.
So does the state have a legislative function or not? Where do we get objective law? I know Objectivists like the constitution, and that’s legislation. The common law, maybe? But how are judges nominated and appointed? It would be helpful in assessing the Objectivist political philosophy if they would say something about legislatures and their view of the conditions under which legislative powers are justified. Is there any discussion of this in the O’ist literature, or oral tradition?
Crescat Action
I’ve blogged again on the Are libertarians liberal? question over at Crescat. So, there.
It's Not the Cities, Stupid
I just returned an hour or so ago from the AFF rountable of Bush’s mandate. Interestingly, because it was a highly conservative panel, Bush got absolutely ripped to shreds for his fiscal profligacy and total abandonment of anything resembling a traditional free-market conservative philsophy of governance. (Yet, other than the one Brit, I fear that they all voted for him anyway. Why?)
Anyway, by far the most interesting point of the evening was made by Adrian Wooldridge of the Economist and co-author of Right Nation who reported that areas with high economic growth predominantly voted for Bush and areas with low growth voted predominantly for Kerry. There are, of course, exceptions, but that was the clear trend. Wooldridge said he’s got a piece coming out on this in the next Economist, which I now look forward to.
So, it may not really be a town and country thing, but a low-growth/high-growth thing. Democrats succeed in crowded havens of economic stagnation, like San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia and so forth. While Bush did pretty well in high growth cities — I guess places like Phoenix, Dallas, Charlotte, Atlanta. I have no idea how the causation goes–whether certain cities have low growth because they’re so liberal, or so liberal because they’re stagnating, or some reciprocal thing, or something else. But, either way, it looks to screw up the Stranger’s Big Idea of the liberal Urban Archipelago.
Look for the Economist piece.
The Functions of Fictions
Via Gillespie at Hit n’ Run I found Dennis Dutton’s review of Joseph Carroll’s Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature, and Literature.
I was most interested in Dutton’s take on Carroll’s criticism of Stephen Pinker’s account of the adaptive function of literature. In his LRB review of Pinker’s How the Mind Works, Jerry Fodor, no friend of “psychological Darwinism,” makes hay with Pinker’s view:
And here he is on why we like to read fiction: ‘Fictional narratives supply us with a mental catalogue of the fatal conundrums we might face someday and the outcomes of strategies we could deploy in them. What are the options if I were to suspect that my uncle killed my father, took his position, and married my mother?’ Good question. Or what if it turns out that, having just used the ring that I got by kidnapping a dwarf to pay off the giants who built me my new castle, I should discover that it is the very ring that I need in order to continue to be immortal and rule the world? It’s important to think out the options betimes, because a thing like that could happen to anyone and you can never have too much insurance.
Ho! That Fodor is a pill! Yeah, so Fodor thinks Pinker’s view of fiction is too absurd to require further comment. How many of us will ever be dwarves in need of an immortality ring? I mean, really! Now, Fodor has very general (weirdly motivated reasons, I think) for denying that adaptionist thinking tells us anything whatsoever, so he won’t be much impressed by Carroll’s view either, no matter how good it is. But it would be a nice thing about Carroll’s theory if it makes pretty good sense of what we get of the story of the giant and dwarf.
Dutton reports:
On the first topic, the functional uses of fiction, Carroll, Pinker, and other evolutionary aestheticians agree. There is an enormous potential survival value for a species in being able to hypothesize non-obtaining states of affairs — imagining, contrary to known facts, what it would be for the neighboring tribe to attack the camp when the men are out hunting, or what it would be to travel in an area where water is scarce.
This is the view Fodor mocks. You will never be a dwarf who has accidentally sold of his immortality ring. Of course, you might be a person who sells something you don’t know is incredibly valuable to someone much more powerful than you in order to get something less valuable that you wanted, and then discover you need to get it back. The dwarf story can help us navigate the basic schema, and so even Pinker’s theory can stand up to Fodor’s snark.
So what does Carroll add? Dutton tells us that
Carroll does not deny that literature gives us simulations that can act for models of behavior, game plans in Pinker’s sense. But art goes further: “It helps us to regulate our complex psychological organization, and it helps us cultivate our socially adaptive capacity for entering mentally into the experience of other people.” This is not quite the same thing as imaginatively encountering a dangerous elephant in a story. It is rather a matter of entering empathically into the minds of our fellows. It may come to us as entertainment, but fiction has profound effects on making us what we are.
I find this just fascinating. So the thing about the dwarf is not just that were are exploring the contours of a strategic schema, but practicing seeing and feeling things from somebody else’s perspective — and the dwarf perspective is as good as any for this purpose, because the dwarf psychology really is just human psychology with a tweak here or there. (Gimli is no more exotic than a Kazakh, psychologically.) Dutton further explains Carroll’s view in a very compelling way. He also does a nice job in splitting the difference between Pinker and Carroll’s explanations for the reason we get pleasure from fiction. I encourage you to read the review.
However, I’m left with a question, and I guess I’ll have to read Carroll to search out an answer. Doesn’t the view that fictions train our ability to enter empathically into the minds of others, and to make finer discriminations in judgment about people’s intentions, motives and so forth–and these are, I think we should agree, abilities with adaptive upshot–imply that people who are better at understanding and appreciating literature ought to (1) be better at reading people and (2) ought to therefore do better in life and reproduction? That is to say: Doesn’t Carroll’s theory imply that literature majors (or at any rate, good ought to get laid more? I mean, Nick Gillespie has a Ph.D. in literature. How’s he doing?
I don’t think Carroll’s view really does imply this. But why not? I think Dutton may point the way.
Ack
I’m feeling poorly this evening, so please forgive me if my posts are shorter than usual.
If you haven’t been checking at my guest spot, I posted early today over Crescat on the question, Is Libertarianism Liberal?, inspired by this John Phillips post.
Public Reason. Culture War. Two Great Tastes that Don't Taste Great Together?
Tons of great stuff over at Julian’s today. In this post, he seems to be asking in part (he says a lot more) whether one can be a culture warrior and a good Rawlsian political liberal at the same time. If that’s the question, then I think the answer is: yeah, sort of.
The point of public reason is not that one cannot attempt to change people’s comprehensive conceptions in public. It is that when we are deliberating together about the public principles by which we are all going to be governed, we should ideally appeal to reasons that most people can endorse.
I do think there is a kind of rhetorical problem or tension when one shifts from publicly arguing over comprehensive conceptions (“There is no God! Free will is a lie! You are continuous with the apes!”) to publicly arguing about political principles in Rawls-approved tones. If you’re perceived as an aggressive flack for a particular comprehensive view, people will have a hard time taking you seriously when you attempt to set out an argument designed to appeal even to the very people you’ve just publicly accused of being dangerously blinkered. People will suspect you’re being tricksy, trying to pull a fast one.
So it’s probably tough to be a well-known comprehensive gladiator and a trusted voice of public reason all at the same time.