1. No effective transitional policies. It is always the big bang.

2. They can concieve of no reason for collective action.

i.e. Libertarians are anarchists without the bomb throwing. Having been a Libertarian for 15 years before 9/11 I’d have to agree.

You will not get a Libertarian world if every place but Libertopia settles the alpha male problem the old fashioned way. In fact in such a world Libertopia will be strangled or conquered.

–==–

In fact GWB is the most libertarian president we have had in a long time. Medical Savings Accounts are an excellent transition away from our current socialized medicine mess. The policy is inherently messy and slow. But it has one big advantage – it got enough votes to pass.

Same for privatization of Social Security. It will be ugly. But it is a move in the right direction.

–==–

Politics requires compromise to get results. Something utopians are never comfortable with. And Libertarians are nothing if not utopian.

Matt gave a handily succinct answer to this question above. I’ve tried to say something similar, but ended up waffling.

I think it would be useful here to repeat the example of power projection I gave.

‘The key example I gave above was the current situation in the Ukraine. If, hypothetically, an election which could be proven to be rigged led to a popular uprising which was then suppressed by Russian or Russian supported military power, America would have a clear business responding. The projection of US (military and economic) and European (economic) power is, in fact, a big factor in keeping Russia from intervening more forcefully to protect its perceived sphere of influence.’

Your response:

‘It seems to me that under this doctrine, the U.S. government would have the right, if not the responsibility, to overturn every other government in existance that we do not consider sufficiently democratic and/or sufficiently legitimate.’

Now, your claim is so obviously different from and wider than mine, that the slippery slope was the only thing I could think you might be arguing.

Howevever, apparently I was wrong:

‘But this is not the argument I’ve used. My argument is of the following form: “P is conceptually indistinguishible from Q. If we are not willing to apply the same reasoning to Q as we are to P, we are being inconsistent.” Note that this is not the same as saying that doing P will cause us to do Q; it is merely an argument that we should treat like things alike and reason consistently.’

If you’re genuinely arguing that there is no difference between protecting a current democracy from external or externally funded military aggression, and attacking those stable countries we consider insufficiently democratic, I can only say that you’re wrong. There is a significant difference. The US government is not obliged in either case to intervene, but where US interests are at stake a clear case can be made in the first instance for the right to intervene.

‘There’s nothing wrong with using one’s own judgement.’

Good, we’re agreed.

‘There is something wrong with having no standards/justifications/reasons to explain one’s own positions, and at the same time expect others to agree with your positions.’

There’s something wrong with expecting others to agree regardless of the standards/justifications/reasons provided. I don’t recall doing that over the course of this discussion.

‘If every case is a new case, with no overarching principles or standards for comparison, and each new moral dilemma can only be resolved by consulting one’s private moral intuition, then moral discussion is largely impossible.’

Every case IS a new case. The overarching principles or standards for comparison are useful in educating judgement, but they will never replace it. Likewise, the purpose of moral discussion is to educate and improve individual decision making. I don’t quite understand the idea that it is only useful if some situations are exactly the same as some others.

I’m still not quite sure how any of this renders me akin to a 6 year old, but I’m sure we’ll get to that.

My position is more along the lines of not understanding how libertarians could possibly justify them, not people in general.

I gave a specific instance in the Ukraine in which I consider projection of power would be absolutely justified. You said ‘If this were justified, it seems to me that we’d have the RIGHT, if not the RESPONSIBILITY, to overturn democratic governments elsewhere’.

No, we wouldn’t. One instance is not a series of different instances. I bring the slippery slope issue up in just about every discussion with you, because it’s almost always relevant. Making a judgement call on one particular foreign policy implies nothing about the justification of other hypothetical foreign policies.

This is not a slippery slope argument. A slippery slope argument is of the form “If we do P, which is acceptable, we will inevitably be forced to do Q, and then R, and then S – all of which are unacceptable. Therefore, we must not do P.” And as I mentioned before, even if this was the argument I used, it is a valid form of argument so long as the mechanism is sufficiently explained.

But this is not the argument I’ve used. My argument is of the following form: “P is conceptually indistinguishible from Q. If we are not willing to apply the same reasoning to Q as we are to P, we are being inconsistent.” Note that this is not the same as saying that doing P will cause us to do Q; it is merely an argument that we should treat like things alike and reason consistently.

There are many countries in which political leadership is not democratically chosen to our liking. There is nothing special about the Ukraine (at least nothing you have mentioned) that would make it an exceptional, unique case. If there are no unique characteristics relevant to this discussion, than the Ukraine cannot be conceptually distinguished from other like-countries and we would be inconsistent if we failed to apply our reasoning to all countries in similar circumstances.

If you’re not using your own judgement in this discussion, can you direct me to the person who is telling you which positions to take?

There’s nothing wrong with using one’s own judgement. There is something wrong with having no standards/justifications/reasons to explain one’s own positions, and at the same time expect others to agree with your positions. If every case is a new case, with no overarching principles or standards for comparison, and each new moral dilemma can only be resolved by consulting one’s private moral intuition, then moral discussion is largely impossible. Each person says how they feel and that is the end of it. There can be no common ground.

No, your arguments re: the war in Iraq are mostly sound. I jumped in when you generalised your argument to war in general.

‘And while I’m no expert in just war theory, the belief that international war is justified only in cases of self-defense is certainly not a novel or unpopular one’

Just war theory is similar conceptually to the UN. Lip service has been paid to it since its inception, but whenever leaders perceive the need to act, the tenets are either ignored or fudged.

‘Humanitarian wars for the promotion of “democracy” and “liberty” abroad are a fairly recent invention, and not a very popular one, globally speaking.’

Quite agree, but these are just a small subset of the wars which have been fought over many centuries to protect interests beyond a country’s borders. These wars do happen, and always have happened, with wide public support. Claiming that they shouldn’t is absolutely fine, but if you claim that you can’t understand how people could possibly justify them, then that is a lack of understanding on your part.

With regard to ‘i don’t know what posts you’ve been reading…..’ I’ve been reading yours.

I gave a specific instance in the Ukraine in which I consider projection of power would be absolutely justified. You said ‘If this were justified, it seems to me that we’d have the RIGHT, if not the RESPONSIBILITY, to overturn democratic governments elsewhere’.

No, we wouldn’t. One instance is not a series of different instances. I bring the slippery slope issue up in just about every discussion with you, because it’s almost always relevant. Making a judgement call on one particular foreign policy implies nothing about the justification of other hypothetical foreign policies.

And with regard to:

‘I’m glad we can reach an agreement. You’ve certainly expounded a serious and practical political philosophy – one familiar and extensively used by six-year-olds:

“But mom, I don’t want to go to sleep yet!” “But mom, I want more ice cream!” Color me and mom convinced.’

If you’re not using your own judgement in this discussion, can you direct me to the person who is telling you which positions to take? I might be better off talking to them .

I’ve enjoyed the argument as well.

As for those latest points:
“Always yes” not in an absolute, mathematical sense, more like a default setting that could, in principle, be over-ridden. But, if the question is already a serious topic of national debate, then, almost certainly, the answer should always be: “YES.”

George Orwell said a lot of cool things. I admire that guy. Related quote: “Short words are best and old words, when short, are best of all.” – Churchill. Another man I admire.
(And, yeah, ‘tomfoolery’ is good – sounds kinda Mark Twain-ish to me, since we’re on the topic of dead white guys I look up to.)

As for war being hell; cruelty, ghastly ugliness and tragedy in its DNA, something no-one in their right mind could take lightly: yes.
That’s true. This war, like every other, is like that. Still, it is a just war.
“Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”

Oh, I thought we were talking about the war in Iraq. Silly me. And while I’m no expert in just war theory, the belief that international war is justified only in cases of self-defense is certainly not a novel or unpopular one. Humanitarian wars for the promotion of “democracy” and “liberty” abroad are a fairly recent invention, and not a very popular one, globally speaking.

It’s interesting, on the one hand you rail against anyone who claims that projection of power in the pursuit of strategic interests is sometimes justified, using your favoured slippery slope argument (the, to my mind bizarre ‘if we determine that this instance is justified, how can we claim that that entirely different instance is not?’). On the other hand, you baulk at the idea that your position is ‘never’. You can’t have this one both ways.

I don’t know whose posts you’ve been reading, but they certainly weren’t mine. I never said anything even remotely similar to “if we determine that this instance is justified, how can we claim that that entirely different instance is not?,” since (a) neither you nor I agreed on an instance that is justified and (b) I never compared this nonexistant instance to any other instance. I did ask whether you and McClain would be willing to apply your reasoning elsewhere, which would entail policing the globe and engaging in war against a significant portion of it.

As I noted over at Justin Logan’s blog in response to your similar question, the slippery slope argument is not invalid, so long as its mechanisms are sufficiently explained. Libertarians use the slippery slope argument against socialists all the time; hell, Hayek’s “The Road To Serfdom” is one big slippery slope argument, as indicated by the title.

The fact that I’ve identified Afghanistan as a justified act of war should immediately dispel any notion that my position is “never.”

“war is justified whenever I feel it is justified, and unjustified whenever I don’t.”

You have stated my position in a nutshell, and the only sensible position to have. Judgement on a situation by situation basis is the way political decisions are always made.

I’m glad we can reach an agreement. You’ve certainly expounded a serious and practical political philosophy – one familiar and extensively used by six-year-olds:

“But mom, I don’t want to go to sleep yet!” “But mom, I want more ice cream!” Color me and mom convinced.