I didn’t read your post or Chris’ (who has time to listen when there’s more stuff to be said!?), but I was under the impression that the Condorcet candidate is the one who most closely matches voters’ preferences, not the one who, ex ante, fronts like he’s the most competent or, ex post, empirically is the most competent (or even the guy people end up agreeing with after he starts governing). (Because, of course, the question is ‘competent at what?’) That’s why we can say things like, in a two-way race, the Concorcet candidate always wins, but in a 3-way race, every voting system is subject to gaming, and so the Condorcet candidate may be screwed. No political scientist is saying the best candidate won or lost. They mean that the most *preferred* candidate won or lost.

Empirically and in voting simulations, the plurality system is the worst at awarding the win to the Condorcet candidate because it doesn’t account for second-choice preferences (the spoiler effect). Go Badnarik!

I didn’t read your post or Chris’ (who has time to listen when there’s more stuff to be said!?), but I was under the impression that the Condorcet candidate is the one who most closely matches voters’ preferences, not the one who, ex ante, fronts like he’s the most competent or, ex post, empirically is the most competent (or even the guy people end up agreeing with after he starts governing). (Because, of course, the question is ‘competent at what?’) That’s why we can say things like, in a two-way race, the Concorcet candidate always wins, but in a 3-way race, every voting system is subject to gaming, and so the Condorcet candidate may be screwed. No political scientist is saying the best candidate won or lost. They mean that the most *preferred* candidate won or lost.

Empirically and in voting simulations, the plurality system is the worst at awarding the win to the Condorcet candidate because it doesn’t account for second-choice preferences (the spoiler effect). Go Badnarik!