OK, fine. Saddam has murdered Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Kurds, and Iranians. He has attempted murder on an ex-US President. He has failed to abide by the terms of the treaty ending the Kuwait war – in essence, his terms of probation. Who are the relevant authorities? The UN? Who, and what treaty, gave the UN that authority?

What if Grover killed his wife, and you called the “relevant authorities”, and they said “She’s his wife, he has the right”? That is essentially what has been said about Hussein killing Iraqis – internal matter for Iraq, not our business. Can I act now, against him? Can the US step in now, to enforce the rights of the Iraqi people, if both the Iraqi government and the UN refuse?

Justice is not the responsibility of the “relevant authorities”, it is everyone’s. Having “relevant authorities” merely systematizes the process of justice, reducing miscarriages. When the authorities in place clearly and systematically fail in that responsibility, the populace, whether in the brotherhood of men, or of nations, must act. That doesn’t mean one has to attempt to bring Grover, Greg, and all other malactors justice no matter the risks, but when one can act, and the system has ceased to function or never did, one should act.

“I am one of those who doesn’t fancy the idea of staring down the point of a chemical warhead before I decide to act. (Even if such warheads turn out to be a chimera today, they won’t likely be tomorrow.) In the nuclear age, when the degree of certainty that you will be attacked is at fifty percent, you are as good as done for in terms of your ability to protect yourself. Thus, preventive action in a world of uncertainty is, unfortunately, the only reasonable course.”

In other words, although there were no weapons, there could have been if we’d waited. Hussein could not be trusted to remain in power at the head of a state with billions of dollars in oil revenue and a scientific and technical base capable of developing nuclear weapons. Why? Because he had attempted to develop them in the past and then lied about and concealed this attempt during the first inspection regime.

Given that Hussein could not be trusted, and given the nature of nuclear weapons (I don’t think, as Max seems to, that chemical weapons are in the same category), waiting until we had proof that Iraq had nukes was not an option. By then it would be too late to defend against them.

This is essentially an argument for lowering the standard for what a threat is. Will argues that Iraq was not a threat today. Max argues that had we not acted, Iraq would have been a threat tomorrow, and by then, it would be too late to defend ourselves.

There are arguments against Max’s point of view, but I don’t think they have been made yet. Will has addressed a different aspect of Max’s article, but I think this issue, about what kinds of threats justify action, is essential.

In any case, since you are a fiery sort, more intelligent than the average blogger and throws excellent parties, I should probably offer a reply:

In a thousand words, I’m afraid I couldn’t help but be remiss in lumping together a preemption doctrine and the iteration of such a doctrine in Iraq (however poorly executed the iteration). But I can understand why you would employ the surgical instruments of the philosophical journal to a TCS article–because it’s too easy.

But maybe not that easy.

First, you see, the Grover allegory is a disanalogy. In such a case, you presuppose a body that exists to “mete out” justice or punishment as a neutral third party (the object of agreement in a social contract). But to whom are the offending parties to answer in the case of terrorism and illegitimate regimes? The UN? The “international community?” Surely, in your libertarian heart-of-hearts you don’t mean that. To what sort of procedural guidelines would you like for a nation to appeal on the international stage (what I’ve called the state-of-nature)?

My answer would be: whatever the elected leaders decide is the most expedient course of action in response to a perceived threat (which may or may not materialize). I can only guess yours would be: either the UN (the pseudo Leviathan) or the ‘magical self-defense principle.’ It seems you’ve conflated the referents in my loose sense of ‘social contract’ with yours; where I meant the US government, you meant something else entirely. (Or maybe Grover did.)

You go on to say:

Bizarrely, Max fails to even ask the contractarian question before accusing his friends and colleagues of being “unreflective.” Would well-informed, rational people who have their own interests in mind choose to empower their state with a doctrine of preemptive warfare?

The question and answer to the latter question is embedded in the rhetoric of the piece. You might have seen this upon some more reflection (just kidding). I think well-informed, rational, self-interested people would empower their state with a preemptive war doctrine on the grounds I stated (being well-informed, rational, etc.):

I am one of those who doesn’t fancy the idea of staring down the point of a chemical warhead before I decide to act. (Even if such warheads turn out to be a chimera today, they won’t likely be tomorrow.) In the nuclear age, when the degree of certainty that you will be attacked is at fifty percent, you are as good as done for in terms of your ability to protect yourself. Thus, preventive action in a world of uncertainty is, unfortunately, the only reasonable course.

And this is the crux of why not just libertarians, but you are wrong on the doctrine of preemption, especially what on what you call “strict standards.” You write:

But surely a libertarian contractarian, understanding the tendency of those with military power to use it to enlarge the domain of their political power (and dimish the scope of our liberties [empirical claim, Will]), will want to implement very strict standards for going to war. Here’s a not very strict standard: the target state (or whatever) that the government wishes to go to war against must be an actual threat to the citizens. If it’s not, then the state is simply wasting the “blood and treasure” of its citizens in violation of the terms of the social contract, becomes criminal, and loses its legitimacy.

It would be nice if there weren’t so many information problems associated with our hypothetical or actual actors making determinations about what is and what is not an acceptable standard for action, much less if there is a threat. You would like for “clear and present danger” to be a standard precisely because these states of affairs are so complex and the degree of uncertainty so high – we could just use it like a template. But I’m afraid that’s not possible due to that very complexity and uncertainty – not to mention the danger.

To my mind, any such social contract would have to stipulate that we arrive at a protective regime that makes the best possible decisions in light of the risks and best available evidence weighed against the gravity of the threat. Notional or not, some situations require action, especially for a whole host of other reasons that figure into the context of the Iraq situation, e.g. 1441, appearance of being a ‘paper tiger,’ as well as the intelligence (that we now know was bad) and the long term neo-con vision of a different, safer, Middle East.
To suppose, however, that “rational actors” would somehow assent to some specific doctrine short of pragmatism on the part of our leaders is a castle in the sky, and certainly not the spirit by which I meant “social contract.” Such standards may be workable internal to the Covenant (i.e. domestically), but in war we have to trust our leaders to make the right bets.

Now, it is an empirical question whether the “bet” long term or short, was successful or failed. On this, Will, you may turn out to be right-i.e. that it was just bad strategery, and that you should’ve been in the war room when they were cooking this up. At that point, I will take back my contra-Hayekian premise that you don’t get (er, I mean, that doesn’t make sense to you).

As far as the criticism about free-ridership, this is more a practical problem than a moral/theoretical problem. If someone plans to attack you and your friend doesn’t help, will you sit there and take your beating in order to make a point to your friend about free-ridership?

In any case, since you’ve decided to wait on the Hayek bit, I will too. Still, I’ll be happy to address it if I have time. It’s a subtle point that may require more attention.

Until then… keep on rockin’ in the free world.

No, it would not have been justfied with a broader coalition. Showing that Iraq is an actual threat is a prior necessary condition.

I do, however, think that broad coalitions that share responsbility and cost in rough proportion to their expected benefit to their citizens can be justified in going to war in cases where no individual state would have been justified.