Max Borders over at TCS attempts to deploy contractarian reasoning in the service of that unlikely composite creature, the libertarian hawk. Max argues the lib-hawk is no impossible monster, like the gryphon. More like the liger, although, sadly, more feracious and no less ferocious.
Insofar as Max is attempting to justify a doctrine of preemeption in general and the Iraq war in particular, he fails, and he fails on contractarian grounds.
Max writes:
The libertarian hawk takes her cues from Hobbes, not Locke, as the spaces mostly untouched by globalization are, in her view, like a state-of-nature. She sees threats that organize themselves in the shadows beyond civilization; operating, no less, in an age of deadly weapons proliferation. She fears the world’s great, but nimble powers coalescing into a slothful and ineffectual global body — where the toughest decisions of life and limb must be made in committee. She understands that freedom does not drop like manna from heaven, but is earned drop-for-drop and coin-for-coin by the sacrifices of blood and treasure.
According to the contractarian, rights are conventions justified by their role in mutual benefit. Your entitlement to protection against the agression of others is conditional on your compliance with the convention. If you fail to heed the convention, then you cannot be expected to gain its benefits.
. . . if you stand outside the covenants of Man, you are presumed “enemy.”
This is all by way of establishing that terrorists lack “moral standing.”
Let’s just say all this is fine. But at this point, we’ve barely even approached a case for preemptive war or for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. If my neighbor, Grover, kills his roommate Getrude in cold blood then he in effect opts out of the social contract and loses moral standing. May I therefore go next door and slay him at will? No, I may not.
Grover may have forfeited his rights, but I am not therefore at liberty to do whatever I like to Grover. Another element of the social contract is the prudent restriction of the power of citizens to bring criminals to justice. We leave it the relevant authorities, who are required to follow strict procedures in order to ensure that coercive sanctions are not abused. That Grover has lost his moral standing does not give just anyone permission to mete out punishment.
Similarly, the fact that there are terrorists, murderers, and illegitimate regimes out there who have forfeited some or all of their moral standing does not begin to imply that the United States of America may swoop in and see that justice is done.
Bizarrely, Max fails to even ask the contractarian question before accusing his friends and colleagues of being “unreflective.” Would well-informed, rational people who have their own interests in mind choose to empower their state with a doctrine of preemptive warfare? Well, it’s certainly not obvious that they would, even if there are bad guys out there who don’t deserve not to be killed. And if they would agree to such a doctrine, it seems likely that they would put such stringent conditions on use of preemptive war that Iraq would unlikely qualify.
If you’re a contractarian libertarian then you think that counterfactually wise parties to an imaginary agreement would wish to restrict the power of the state to the minimum necessary to provide the public goods for which voluntary action is insufficient. Security is surely one of those public goods. But surely a libertarian contractarian, understanding the tendency of those with military power to use it to enlarge the domain of their political power (and dimish the scope of our liberties), will want to implement very strict standards for going to war. Here’s a not very strict standard: the target state (or whatever) that the government wishes to go to war against must be an actual threat to the citizens. If it’s not, then the state is simply wasting the “blood and treasure” of its citizens in violation of the terms of the social contract, becomes criminal, and loses its legitimacy.
The argument whether Iraq was anything more than a notional threat to the US has already been won. It wasn’t. The US government is now wasting our money, and wasting soldiers’ lives. Maybe there are good humanitarian reasons for the war, but they have nothing to do with the contractarianism Max espouses.
There’s more to say here. The US’s near-unilateralism is a problem for reasons a contractarian ought to appreciate. By demonstrating a willingness to bear almost any cost in what we take to be our own defense, we encourage others to free-ride. (Indeed, so many states (hello Canada!) have been free-riding off American defense for so long that American taxpayers don’t even know to be indignant at this incredibly lavish scheme for redistributing wealth outside our borders.) And when others are encouraged to free ride, they do. As an auxilliary benefit to them, they become less visible to the enemy, providing even further motive to free ride. Of course, the ugly flip side of their benefit is our peril; we loom ever larger in the minds of our enemies. The absence of a serious coalition (in terms of leadership and cost-sharing) may in the end make more or less unilateral action against terrorists counterproductive, endangering the lives of US citizens, as attacks escalate agains us, the main antagonist of the bad guys. As anti-American animosity rises, and more and more groups plan attacks, the ability of our stretched-thin intelligence agencies to more or less singlehandedly detect all the chemical warheads that Max “doesn’t fancy staring down the point of” is dangerously diminished.
These considerations, even if not decisive, would certainly be entertained by a community of rational agents deciding what they would like their defense policy be. I don’t believe being persuaded by these considerations reveals any lack of reflection (even among the denizens of those “hashish dens of protest music and anti-Bush priggishness). If it turns out that engaging in wars like the one we’re in, besides wasting money and lives, puts our citizens in even greater peril, then you can bet that rational citizens will be against them, and an ideal social contract will rule them out.
It’s not clear to me that there is anything whatsoever about contractarian reasoning that supports the kind of hawkishness Max likes. Certainly not the kind of contractarian reasoning that leads to libertarian conclusions about the scope and powers of the state. As far as I can see Max simply jumps from the fact that terrorists cannot reasonably expect the protections of civil society (true) to the claim that the Iraq war was justified (false). I can barely even see how the two points are supposed to be related.
Maybe more later about Max’s response to the Hayekian argument against nation-building, which I thought made almost no sense.
[Update: Yglesias fully admirably and unmisguidedly chimes in.]
So Will,
Would you say that the Iraq invasion would have been justified on contractarian grounds if we had a worldwide coalition? If the costs were shared and there was no (or at least not nearly as much) possibility of free-riding?
Will,
In the case of nation-states that have lost their moral credentials through various acts of barbarism, what is the recourse for the nation-states in good standing? Do we shrug or do we act? Can one be a libertarian hawk on humanitarian grounds?
Love your site!
Scott
Surely, though, free-riding is not always morally blameworthy. For instance, I free-ride off of my neighbor’s good temper — she does not throw loud parties or make a mess of the neighborhood, because that is not the sort of thing that she likes. Does this make me a bad person — ought I to compensate her somehow for this benefit from which I free-ride?
No. She does as she likes, and any benefit I see from this, while “free-riding”, is morally neutral. I have no responsibility to, eg, install sound insulation to block the noise of the parties she does not throw, or to compensate her for not being the sort of person who likes to party.
The United States, oddly, likes building a huge military and marching it to-and-fro — it always has. It is hardly blameworthy for our neighbors then to “free-ride” off this unusual but convenient habit, no more than it is blameworthy for me to enjoy my neighbor’s quiet disposition.
Indeed, if a United States exists, it is positively incumbent upon its neighbors to not waste their taxpayers’ money on redundant services. To ride free in such a case is not merely convenient but morally requisite — to pointlessly duplicate American armaments and belligerance would be a silly waste, and a wasteful state is justified neither under utilitarian nor contractarian nor indeed libertarian grounds.
“Free-rider” is not a slur. It is a mark of rational distinction.
Grant. It’s entirely rational for other nations to free-ride off of us. I don’t think Will was claiming that there’s anything blameworthy, per se, from Canada’s decision to do so. His point was that the government of the United States is behaving in a manner inconsistent contractarian considerations in forcing its citizens to subsidize the defense of the rest of the world.
Luka,
No, it would not have been justfied with a broader coalition. Showing that Iraq is an actual threat is a prior necessary condition.
I do, however, think that broad coalitions that share responsbility and cost in rough proportion to their expected benefit to their citizens can be justified in going to war in cases where no individual state would have been justified.
Grant, I agree with Tim.
(Prince once wrote a song describing posts like this one, Will… “Dig if you will the picture…”)
In any case, since you are a fiery sort, more intelligent than the average blogger and throws excellent parties, I should probably offer a reply:
In a thousand words, I’m afraid I couldn’t help but be remiss in lumping together a preemption doctrine and the iteration of such a doctrine in Iraq (however poorly executed the iteration). But I can understand why you would employ the surgical instruments of the philosophical journal to a TCS article–because it’s too easy.
But maybe not that easy.
First, you see, the Grover allegory is a disanalogy. In such a case, you presuppose a body that exists to “mete out” justice or punishment as a neutral third party (the object of agreement in a social contract). But to whom are the offending parties to answer in the case of terrorism and illegitimate regimes? The UN? The “international community?” Surely, in your libertarian heart-of-hearts you don’t mean that. To what sort of procedural guidelines would you like for a nation to appeal on the international stage (what I’ve called the state-of-nature)?
My answer would be: whatever the elected leaders decide is the most expedient course of action in response to a perceived threat (which may or may not materialize). I can only guess yours would be: either the UN (the pseudo Leviathan) or the ‘magical self-defense principle.’ It seems you’ve conflated the referents in my loose sense of ‘social contract’ with yours; where I meant the US government, you meant something else entirely. (Or maybe Grover did.)
You go on to say:
The question and answer to the latter question is embedded in the rhetoric of the piece. You might have seen this upon some more reflection (just kidding). I think well-informed, rational, self-interested people would empower their state with a preemptive war doctrine on the grounds I stated (being well-informed, rational, etc.):
And this is the crux of why not just libertarians, but you are wrong on the doctrine of preemption, especially what on what you call “strict standards.” You write:
It would be nice if there weren’t so many information problems associated with our hypothetical or actual actors making determinations about what is and what is not an acceptable standard for action, much less if there is a threat. You would like for “clear and present danger” to be a standard precisely because these states of affairs are so complex and the degree of uncertainty so high – we could just use it like a template. But I’m afraid that’s not possible due to that very complexity and uncertainty – not to mention the danger.
To my mind, any such social contract would have to stipulate that we arrive at a protective regime that makes the best possible decisions in light of the risks and best available evidence weighed against the gravity of the threat. Notional or not, some situations require action, especially for a whole host of other reasons that figure into the context of the Iraq situation, e.g. 1441, appearance of being a ‘paper tiger,’ as well as the intelligence (that we now know was bad) and the long term neo-con vision of a different, safer, Middle East.
To suppose, however, that “rational actors” would somehow assent to some specific doctrine short of pragmatism on the part of our leaders is a castle in the sky, and certainly not the spirit by which I meant “social contract.” Such standards may be workable internal to the Covenant (i.e. domestically), but in war we have to trust our leaders to make the right bets.
Now, it is an empirical question whether the “bet” long term or short, was successful or failed. On this, Will, you may turn out to be right-i.e. that it was just bad strategery, and that you should’ve been in the war room when they were cooking this up. At that point, I will take back my contra-Hayekian premise that you don’t get (er, I mean, that doesn’t make sense to you).
As far as the criticism about free-ridership, this is more a practical problem than a moral/theoretical problem. If someone plans to attack you and your friend doesn’t help, will you sit there and take your beating in order to make a point to your friend about free-ridership?
In any case, since you’ve decided to wait on the Hayek bit, I will too. Still, I’ll be happy to address it if I have time. It’s a subtle point that may require more attention.
Until then… keep on rockin’ in the free world.
I’ll reply more later, Max. But for a contractarian, moral/theoretical problems just are practical problems. The problem is: what system of constraints and institution does in fact support mutually advantageous civil peace, which is a practical aim.
The weekend is nigh and its almost time to drink. My point about practice is not directly related to contractarianism, rather at your evoking the problem of free-ridership. That would be the point I’d like for you to address… along with the problem of your mysterious international adjudicator, your boilerplate-libertarian geopolitical standards of war, and the various other releases of “sweet reason” you attempted to give at my expense via improper characterizations of social contract theory.
Yglesias, for once, says about all there is to say about Max’s arguments: “The key questions are factual and the reality is that there was no Iraqi threat to American security. That’s all one needs to say as far as that goes.”
Max’s argument about the Iraqi “threat” seems plain and simple. Here are his key words on the subject:
In other words, although there were no weapons, there could have been if we’d waited. Hussein could not be trusted to remain in power at the head of a state with billions of dollars in oil revenue and a scientific and technical base capable of developing nuclear weapons. Why? Because he had attempted to develop them in the past and then lied about and concealed this attempt during the first inspection regime.
Given that Hussein could not be trusted, and given the nature of nuclear weapons (I don’t think, as Max seems to, that chemical weapons are in the same category), waiting until we had proof that Iraq had nukes was not an option. By then it would be too late to defend against them.
This is essentially an argument for lowering the standard for what a threat is. Will argues that Iraq was not a threat today. Max argues that had we not acted, Iraq would have been a threat tomorrow, and by then, it would be too late to defend ourselves.
There are arguments against Max’s point of view, but I don’t think they have been made yet. Will has addressed a different aspect of Max’s article, but I think this issue, about what kinds of threats justify action, is essential.
>Grover may have forfeited his rights, but I am not
>therefore at liberty to do whatever I like to
>Grover. Another element of the social contract is
>the prudent restriction of the power of citizens to
>bring criminals to justice. We leave it the
>relevant authorities, who are required to follow
>strict procedures in order to ensure that >coercive sanctions are not abused. That Grover
>has lost his moral standing does not give just >anyone permission to mete out punishment.
OK, fine. Saddam has murdered Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Kurds, and Iranians. He has attempted murder on an ex-US President. He has failed to abide by the terms of the treaty ending the Kuwait war – in essence, his terms of probation. Who are the relevant authorities? The UN? Who, and what treaty, gave the UN that authority?
What if Grover killed his wife, and you called the “relevant authorities”, and they said “She’s his wife, he has the right”? That is essentially what has been said about Hussein killing Iraqis – internal matter for Iraq, not our business. Can I act now, against him? Can the US step in now, to enforce the rights of the Iraqi people, if both the Iraqi government and the UN refuse?
Justice is not the responsibility of the “relevant authorities”, it is everyone’s. Having “relevant authorities” merely systematizes the process of justice, reducing miscarriages. When the authorities in place clearly and systematically fail in that responsibility, the populace, whether in the brotherhood of men, or of nations, must act. That doesn’t mean one has to attempt to bring Grover, Greg, and all other malactors justice no matter the risks, but when one can act, and the system has ceased to function or never did, one should act.
the problem with jim’s response is that his and max’s arguments are arguments for war against dozens of regimes – perpetual war for perpetual peace – and doesn’t amount at all to a libertarian argument. Since Hussein wasn’t involved in 9/11 and Hussein didn’t have a weapons program to threaten the U.S. or the capability to do so, there’s no conceivable way to paint this as a defensive war. It was less defensive than the German attack on France in 1914.
Pingback: Crescat Sententia
Pingback: JustinLogan.com
So Will,
Would you say that the Iraq invasion would have been justified on contractarian grounds if we had a worldwide coalition? If the costs were shared and there was no (or at least not nearly as much) possibility of free-riding?
Will,
In the case of nation-states that have lost their moral credentials through various acts of barbarism, what is the recourse for the nation-states in good standing? Do we shrug or do we act? Can one be a libertarian hawk on humanitarian grounds?
Love your site!
Scott
Surely, though, free-riding is not always morally blameworthy. For instance, I free-ride off of my neighbor’s good temper — she does not throw loud parties or make a mess of the neighborhood, because that is not the sort of thing that she likes. Does this make me a bad person — ought I to compensate her somehow for this benefit from which I free-ride?
No. She does as she likes, and any benefit I see from this, while “free-riding”, is morally neutral. I have no responsibility to, eg, install sound insulation to block the noise of the parties she does not throw, or to compensate her for not being the sort of person who likes to party.
The United States, oddly, likes building a huge military and marching it to-and-fro — it always has. It is hardly blameworthy for our neighbors then to “free-ride” off this unusual but convenient habit, no more than it is blameworthy for me to enjoy my neighbor’s quiet disposition.
Indeed, if a United States exists, it is positively incumbent upon its neighbors to not waste their taxpayers’ money on redundant services. To ride free in such a case is not merely convenient but morally requisite — to pointlessly duplicate American armaments and belligerance would be a silly waste, and a wasteful state is justified neither under utilitarian nor contractarian nor indeed libertarian grounds.
“Free-rider” is not a slur. It is a mark of rational distinction.
Grant. It’s entirely rational for other nations to free-ride off of us. I don’t think Will was claiming that there’s anything blameworthy, per se, from Canada’s decision to do so. His point was that the government of the United States is behaving in a manner inconsistent contractarian considerations in forcing its citizens to subsidize the defense of the rest of the world.
Luka,
No, it would not have been justfied with a broader coalition. Showing that Iraq is an actual threat is a prior necessary condition.
I do, however, think that broad coalitions that share responsbility and cost in rough proportion to their expected benefit to their citizens can be justified in going to war in cases where no individual state would have been justified.
Grant, I agree with Tim.
(Prince once wrote a song describing posts like this one, Will… “Dig if you will the picture…”)
In any case, since you are a fiery sort, more intelligent than the average blogger and throws excellent parties, I should probably offer a reply:
In a thousand words, I’m afraid I couldn’t help but be remiss in lumping together a preemption doctrine and the iteration of such a doctrine in Iraq (however poorly executed the iteration). But I can understand why you would employ the surgical instruments of the philosophical journal to a TCS article–because it’s too easy.
But maybe not that easy.
First, you see, the Grover allegory is a disanalogy. In such a case, you presuppose a body that exists to “mete out” justice or punishment as a neutral third party (the object of agreement in a social contract). But to whom are the offending parties to answer in the case of terrorism and illegitimate regimes? The UN? The “international community?” Surely, in your libertarian heart-of-hearts you don’t mean that. To what sort of procedural guidelines would you like for a nation to appeal on the international stage (what I’ve called the state-of-nature)?
My answer would be: whatever the elected leaders decide is the most expedient course of action in response to a perceived threat (which may or may not materialize). I can only guess yours would be: either the UN (the pseudo Leviathan) or the ‘magical self-defense principle.’ It seems you’ve conflated the referents in my loose sense of ‘social contract’ with yours; where I meant the US government, you meant something else entirely. (Or maybe Grover did.)
You go on to say:
The question and answer to the latter question is embedded in the rhetoric of the piece. You might have seen this upon some more reflection (just kidding). I think well-informed, rational, self-interested people would empower their state with a preemptive war doctrine on the grounds I stated (being well-informed, rational, etc.):
And this is the crux of why not just libertarians, but you are wrong on the doctrine of preemption, especially what on what you call “strict standards.” You write:
It would be nice if there weren’t so many information problems associated with our hypothetical or actual actors making determinations about what is and what is not an acceptable standard for action, much less if there is a threat. You would like for “clear and present danger” to be a standard precisely because these states of affairs are so complex and the degree of uncertainty so high – we could just use it like a template. But I’m afraid that’s not possible due to that very complexity and uncertainty – not to mention the danger.
To my mind, any such social contract would have to stipulate that we arrive at a protective regime that makes the best possible decisions in light of the risks and best available evidence weighed against the gravity of the threat. Notional or not, some situations require action, especially for a whole host of other reasons that figure into the context of the Iraq situation, e.g. 1441, appearance of being a ‘paper tiger,’ as well as the intelligence (that we now know was bad) and the long term neo-con vision of a different, safer, Middle East.
To suppose, however, that “rational actors” would somehow assent to some specific doctrine short of pragmatism on the part of our leaders is a castle in the sky, and certainly not the spirit by which I meant “social contract.” Such standards may be workable internal to the Covenant (i.e. domestically), but in war we have to trust our leaders to make the right bets.
Now, it is an empirical question whether the “bet” long term or short, was successful or failed. On this, Will, you may turn out to be right-i.e. that it was just bad strategery, and that you should’ve been in the war room when they were cooking this up. At that point, I will take back my contra-Hayekian premise that you don’t get (er, I mean, that doesn’t make sense to you).
As far as the criticism about free-ridership, this is more a practical problem than a moral/theoretical problem. If someone plans to attack you and your friend doesn’t help, will you sit there and take your beating in order to make a point to your friend about free-ridership?
In any case, since you’ve decided to wait on the Hayek bit, I will too. Still, I’ll be happy to address it if I have time. It’s a subtle point that may require more attention.
Until then… keep on rockin’ in the free world.
I’ll reply more later, Max. But for a contractarian, moral/theoretical problems just are practical problems. The problem is: what system of constraints and institution does in fact support mutually advantageous civil peace, which is a practical aim.
The weekend is nigh and its almost time to drink. My point about practice is not directly related to contractarianism, rather at your evoking the problem of free-ridership. That would be the point I’d like for you to address… along with the problem of your mysterious international adjudicator, your boilerplate-libertarian geopolitical standards of war, and the various other releases of “sweet reason” you attempted to give at my expense via improper characterizations of social contract theory.
Yglesias, for once, says about all there is to say about Max’s arguments: “The key questions are factual and the reality is that there was no Iraqi threat to American security. That’s all one needs to say as far as that goes.”
Max’s argument about the Iraqi “threat” seems plain and simple. Here are his key words on the subject:
In other words, although there were no weapons, there could have been if we’d waited. Hussein could not be trusted to remain in power at the head of a state with billions of dollars in oil revenue and a scientific and technical base capable of developing nuclear weapons. Why? Because he had attempted to develop them in the past and then lied about and concealed this attempt during the first inspection regime.
Given that Hussein could not be trusted, and given the nature of nuclear weapons (I don’t think, as Max seems to, that chemical weapons are in the same category), waiting until we had proof that Iraq had nukes was not an option. By then it would be too late to defend against them.
This is essentially an argument for lowering the standard for what a threat is. Will argues that Iraq was not a threat today. Max argues that had we not acted, Iraq would have been a threat tomorrow, and by then, it would be too late to defend ourselves.
There are arguments against Max’s point of view, but I don’t think they have been made yet. Will has addressed a different aspect of Max’s article, but I think this issue, about what kinds of threats justify action, is essential.
>Grover may have forfeited his rights, but I am not
>therefore at liberty to do whatever I like to
>Grover. Another element of the social contract is
>the prudent restriction of the power of citizens to
>bring criminals to justice. We leave it the
>relevant authorities, who are required to follow
>strict procedures in order to ensure that >coercive sanctions are not abused. That Grover
>has lost his moral standing does not give just >anyone permission to mete out punishment.
OK, fine. Saddam has murdered Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Kurds, and Iranians. He has attempted murder on an ex-US President. He has failed to abide by the terms of the treaty ending the Kuwait war – in essence, his terms of probation. Who are the relevant authorities? The UN? Who, and what treaty, gave the UN that authority?
What if Grover killed his wife, and you called the “relevant authorities”, and they said “She’s his wife, he has the right”? That is essentially what has been said about Hussein killing Iraqis – internal matter for Iraq, not our business. Can I act now, against him? Can the US step in now, to enforce the rights of the Iraqi people, if both the Iraqi government and the UN refuse?
Justice is not the responsibility of the “relevant authorities”, it is everyone’s. Having “relevant authorities” merely systematizes the process of justice, reducing miscarriages. When the authorities in place clearly and systematically fail in that responsibility, the populace, whether in the brotherhood of men, or of nations, must act. That doesn’t mean one has to attempt to bring Grover, Greg, and all other malactors justice no matter the risks, but when one can act, and the system has ceased to function or never did, one should act.
the problem with jim’s response is that his and max’s arguments are arguments for war against dozens of regimes – perpetual war for perpetual peace – and doesn’t amount at all to a libertarian argument. Since Hussein wasn’t involved in 9/11 and Hussein didn’t have a weapons program to threaten the U.S. or the capability to do so, there’s no conceivable way to paint this as a defensive war. It was less defensive than the German attack on France in 1914.
Pingback: The Liberty Papers »Blog Archive » A Libertarian for the New York Times Op-ed Page?