Comments on: The Evaluative Worthlessness of Happiness http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/ The Sweet Release of Reason Thu, 09 Feb 2012 18:11:50 +0000 hourly 1 By: Michele Loi http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1192 Michele Loi Sat, 10 Jun 2006 18:24:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1192 I never thought one path to wilosophical wisdom in this field could come by merely empirical, or better statistical consideration. As an intuition pump it is just great. Most people who are traditional welfarist have a good time making jokes of the ARistotelian claims on "happiness", as implying the pursue of many "ends" external to the person (many people have even suggested that the word "happiness" cannot be the right translation for what Aristotle meant by eudamonia). Now we know that Aristotle took hapiness (eudamonia) to be quasi a-priori equivalent to "what most people/what it makes sense to/ pursue as a final end for a life taken as a whole". And it seems that, from the studies quoted above, that if indeed there is such a thing as happiness in the Aristotelian sense, it clearly cannot be the sort of thing those studies measure. Now, what are you most inclined to think? That happiness is not the end of reasonable life, or that the sort of thing those studies measure cannot be happiness? Michele I never thought one path to wilosophical wisdom in this field could come by merely empirical, or better statistical consideration. As an intuition pump it is just great. Most people who are traditional welfarist have a good time making jokes of the ARistotelian claims on “happiness”, as implying the pursue of many “ends” external to the person (many people have even suggested that the word “happiness” cannot be the right translation for what Aristotle meant by eudamonia). Now we know that Aristotle took hapiness (eudamonia) to be quasi a-priori equivalent to “what most people/what it makes sense to/ pursue as a final end for a life taken as a whole”. And it seems that, from the studies quoted above, that if indeed there is such a thing as happiness in the Aristotelian sense, it clearly cannot be the sort of thing those studies measure.
Now, what are you most inclined to think? That happiness is not the end of reasonable life, or that the sort of thing those studies measure cannot be happiness?

Michele

]]> By: Michele Loi http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1213 Michele Loi Sat, 10 Jun 2006 18:24:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1213 I never thought one path to wilosophical wisdom in this field could come by merely empirical, or better statistical consideration. As an intuition pump it is just great. Most people who are traditional welfarist have a good time making jokes of the ARistotelian claims on "happiness", as implying the pursue of many "ends" external to the person (many people have even suggested that the word "happiness" cannot be the right translation for what Aristotle meant by eudamonia). Now we know that Aristotle took hapiness (eudamonia) to be quasi a-priori equivalent to "what most people/what it makes sense to/ pursue as a final end for a life taken as a whole". And it seems that, from the studies quoted above, that if indeed there is such a thing as happiness in the Aristotelian sense, it clearly cannot be the sort of thing those studies measure. Now, what are you most inclined to think? That happiness is not the end of reasonable life, or that the sort of thing those studies measure cannot be happiness? Michele I never thought one path to wilosophical wisdom in this field could come by merely empirical, or better statistical consideration. As an intuition pump it is just great. Most people who are traditional welfarist have a good time making jokes of the ARistotelian claims on “happiness”, as implying the pursue of many “ends” external to the person (many people have even suggested that the word “happiness” cannot be the right translation for what Aristotle meant by eudamonia). Now we know that Aristotle took hapiness (eudamonia) to be quasi a-priori equivalent to “what most people/what it makes sense to/ pursue as a final end for a life taken as a whole”. And it seems that, from the studies quoted above, that if indeed there is such a thing as happiness in the Aristotelian sense, it clearly cannot be the sort of thing those studies measure.
Now, what are you most inclined to think? That happiness is not the end of reasonable life, or that the sort of thing those studies measure cannot be happiness?

Michele

]]> By: keshala http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1212 keshala Wed, 10 Nov 2004 01:07:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1212 hey, i was just wondering, amongst all of this, it is said that be having friends one is content, and that you have so to speak a burst of happiness through this new found friendship, but how about all those stories about hermits. could they truly be happy even though they say they are? hey, i was just wondering, amongst all of this, it is said that be having friends one is content, and that you have so to speak a burst of happiness through this new found friendship, but how about all those stories about hermits. could they truly be happy even though they say they are?

]]> By: Patri Friedman http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1211 Patri Friedman Fri, 10 Sep 2004 19:40:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1211 It seems that there is almost nothing one can do to significantly and permanently alter one's natural temperamental disposition to happiness. I don't understand why this statement is meaningful. Its like saying there is nothing one can do to alter one's natural disposition to be a certain height, or have a certain skin tone, or any of the other things which genes have an effect on. But one can choose to get more or less sun, one can be malnourished and short or take HGH and be taller. Of course we can't change our dispositions. That's what a disposition is. But we can change all the other things that go into the formula, along with disposition, to determine the end result. It seems that there is almost nothing one can do to significantly and permanently alter one’s natural temperamental disposition to happiness.

I don’t understand why this statement is meaningful. Its like saying there is nothing one can do to alter one’s natural disposition to be a certain height, or have a certain skin tone, or any of the other things which genes have an effect on. But one can choose to get more or less sun, one can be malnourished and short or take HGH and be taller.

Of course we can’t change our dispositions. That’s what a disposition is. But we can change all the other things that go into the formula, along with disposition, to determine the end result.

]]> By: Josh http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1210 Josh Mon, 06 Sep 2004 03:47:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1210 Will, I noticed you're reading some of the "Positive Psychology" stuff. Paradox of Choice was a great book. From my understanding of that book, and Seligman's stuff, they use the word happiness almost more like a verb than a noun (i.e., happiness is more of an action than a feeling). With this view, happiness is almost more like an undercurrent that runs through a person's life than a surface feeling of joy. Looking at it this way, someone whose life consists solely of entertainment might seem happier on the surface, but since they don't take the actions of happiness, they might not really be as happy as the person who works competently, loves well, etc., even if that person seems uptight or serious on the surface. Will, I noticed you’re reading some of the “Positive Psychology” stuff. Paradox of Choice was a great book. From my understanding of that book, and Seligman’s stuff, they use the word happiness almost more like a verb than a noun (i.e., happiness is more of an action than a feeling).

With this view, happiness is almost more like an undercurrent that runs through a person’s life than a surface feeling of joy. Looking at it this way, someone whose life consists solely of entertainment might seem happier on the surface, but since they don’t take the actions of happiness, they might not really be as happy as the person who works competently, loves well, etc., even if that person seems uptight or serious on the surface.

]]> By: JR http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1209 JR Sun, 05 Sep 2004 12:04:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1209 Will writes: "I do think this pushes me to a more Scanlonian view according to which our reasons for action are not even close to exhausted by considerations of "well-being." If being more free, more healthy, and so forth do not cash out in terms of happiness, then so much the worse for cashing out value in terms of happiness." I agree that the impact of this research, if it's true, is huge. The good thing about happiness is that it seems like happiness-facts can ultimately ground claims about what is right, wrong, virtuous, vicious, etc. But if we have reasons to do things that do not get grounded in facts about happiness - especially if we say we have reasons to be more free, more healthy, etc. - the most unifying explanation of these reasons will probably be some kind of group-subjectivism, e.g., "That's just the way WE feel, after thinking about it. We LIKE freedom, we reflectively endorse it." Isn't this gross? Doesn't it turn all of ethics into a gooey war of rhetoric, just like Dick Rorty says? How else could we account for our attempts to convince outback bushmen and government-worshipping Germans to try out our ways? Will writes: “I do think this pushes me to a more Scanlonian view according to which our reasons for action are not even close to exhausted by considerations of “well-being.” If being more free, more healthy, and so forth do not cash out in terms of happiness, then so much the worse for cashing out value in terms of happiness.”

I agree that the impact of this research, if it’s true, is huge. The good thing about happiness is that it seems like happiness-facts can ultimately ground claims about what is right, wrong, virtuous, vicious, etc. But if we have reasons to do things that do not get grounded in facts about happiness – especially if we say we have reasons to be more free, more healthy, etc. – the most unifying explanation of these reasons will probably be some kind of group-subjectivism, e.g., “That’s just the way WE feel, after thinking about it. We LIKE freedom, we reflectively endorse it.” Isn’t this gross? Doesn’t it turn all of ethics into a gooey war of rhetoric, just like Dick Rorty says? How else could we account for our attempts to convince outback bushmen and government-worshipping Germans to try out our ways?

]]> By: Robert Campbell http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1208 Robert Campbell Fri, 03 Sep 2004 16:37:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1208 Will, See Jerome Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas (Harvard University Press, 1998), particularly the discussion of fear and anxiety, pp. 15-38. Something or other in Kagan's book will rile just about anybody, but he asks good questions. Robert Will,

See Jerome Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas (Harvard University Press, 1998), particularly the discussion of fear and anxiety, pp. 15-38.

Something or other in Kagan’s book will rile just about anybody, but he asks good questions.

Robert

]]> By: Robert Campbell http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1207 Robert Campbell Fri, 03 Sep 2004 16:34:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1207 Will, See Jerome Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas (Harvard University Press, 1998), particularly the discussion of fear and anxiety, pp. 15-38. Something or other in Kagan's book will rile just about anybody, but he asks good questions. Robert Will,

See Jerome Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas (Harvard University Press, 1998), particularly the discussion of fear and anxiety, pp. 15-38.

Something or other in Kagan’s book will rile just about anybody, but he asks good questions.

Robert

]]> By: Will Wilkinson http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1206 Will Wilkinson Fri, 03 Sep 2004 13:15:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1206 Robert, I'm pretty skeptical of self-reports, but what I was reading made it seem not as bad as I thought. But I am perfeclty willing to believe that it is as bad as I thought. Can you point me to the Kagan discussion? Robert,

I’m pretty skeptical of self-reports, but what I was reading made it seem not as bad as I thought. But I am perfeclty willing to believe that it is as bad as I thought. Can you point me to the Kagan discussion?

]]> By: Robert Campbell http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/08/31/the-evaluative-worthlessness-of-happiness/#comment-1205 Robert Campbell Thu, 02 Sep 2004 21:35:00 +0000 http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=435#comment-1205 Will, You refer to Objectivism as having a "subjective-happiness-as-barometer-of-objective-life-success-view." (Hey, isn't it a lot easier to say that kind of thing in German?) But Rand's point of view wasn't strictly consequentialist. Note those qualifiers like "happiness is the purpose, not the standard" and "man's life qua man." These days, the people with the big investment in who is an Objectivist and who isn't seem to be tilting toward a duty ethic, albeit with context-dependent rules. I think they are also tilting toward an a priori mode of argument that pushes to the side empirical evidence about happiness, or any other outcomes in life. In any form of eudaimonism, you're going to encounter arguments of the form "So-and-so claims to be happy, but here is evidence that maybe he isn't." It gets dangerous when the eudaimonist starts resorting to "So-and-so claims to be happy, but he is obviously isn't living by Rand's ethic, or Aristotle's, or the Stoics', or whoever's, *so he can't be happy.* What more do you need to know?" Of course we need to know more. And good social science--the kind that will enable us to know more, social science that manages a balance between theory development and empirical work--is really hard to do. Robert Campbell Will,

You refer to Objectivism as having a “subjective-happiness-as-barometer-of-objective-life-success-view.” (Hey, isn’t it a lot easier to say that kind of thing in German?)

But Rand’s point of view wasn’t strictly consequentialist. Note those qualifiers like “happiness is the purpose, not the standard” and “man’s life qua man.”

These days, the people with the big investment in who is an Objectivist and who isn’t seem to be tilting toward a duty ethic, albeit with context-dependent rules. I think they are also tilting toward an a priori mode of argument that pushes to the side empirical evidence about happiness, or any other outcomes in life.

In any form of eudaimonism, you’re going to encounter arguments of the form “So-and-so claims to be happy, but here is evidence that maybe he isn’t.” It gets dangerous when the eudaimonist starts resorting to “So-and-so claims to be happy, but he is obviously isn’t living by Rand’s ethic, or Aristotle’s, or the Stoics’, or whoever’s, *so he can’t be happy.* What more do you need to know?”

Of course we need to know more. And good social science–the kind that will enable us to know more, social science that manages a balance between theory development and empirical work–is really hard to do.

Robert Campbell

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