It seems Nature can only have a normative significance for our project of finding legitimacy. (Our interest is not describing human behavior in its ferral state, as such a state does not exist.) ‘Natural’ signifies what is intrinsic to the best and most fulfilling life for human beings–that is, for political beings.

The reference to ‘nature’ takes us back inescapably to nurture/culture. It is, to speak with Kant, a regulative (limit-) not a constitutive concept.

So the question might be posed: what is the ideal family structure for the raising of the next generation? In other words, what is ‘natural’ for human beings, given the end in view, namely to raise the best children possible? intelligent, resourceful, empathic, etc. To what nature are we to refer here? What significance is to be ascribed to the findings of researchers (the reality testers who, presumably, investigate that which is/nature)? Specifically, the findings that children raised by homosexuals show no deficits in psycho-sexuality, gender-identities or the human excellences/virtues? Do the indications of reality at any point enter into the informed opinionating of traditionalist, conservative family-protectors? (I’m struggling here to come up with a just description of those who oppose gay families in the name of what is natural for children.)

I remember Rumsfeld saying that you don’t fight a war with the army you want to have, but with the army such as it is. The same could be said about families and the rights of children to heterosexual parents. No one chooses them! but we make do.

It seems Nature can only have a normative significance for our project of finding legitimacy. (Our interest is not describing human behavior in its ferral state, as such a state does not exist.) ‘Natural’ signifies what is intrinsic to the best and most fulfilling life for human beings–that is, for political beings.

The reference to ‘nature’ takes us back inescapably to nurture/culture. It is, to speak with Kant, a regulative (limit-) not a constitutive concept.

So the question might be posed: what is the ideal family structure for the raising of the next generation? In other words, what is ‘natural’ for human beings, given the end in view, namely to raise the best children possible? intelligent, resourceful, empathic, etc. To what nature are we to refer here? What significance is to be ascribed to the findings of researchers (the reality testers who, presumably, investigate that which is/nature)? Specifically, the findings that children raised by homosexuals show no deficits in psycho-sexuality, gender-identities or the human excellences/virtues? Do the indications of reality at any point enter into the informed opinionating of traditionalist, conservative family-protectors? (I’m struggling here to come up with a just description of those who oppose gay families in the name of what is natural for children.)

I remember Rumsfeld saying that you don’t fight a war with the army you want to have, but with the army such as it is. The same could be said about families and the rights of children to heterosexual parents. No one chooses them! but we make do.

If man is homo faber, the tool-user, the inventor and transformer of what is given (nature), then the orderings and hierarchies we create/inherit/cultivate are a part of human nature. We cannot refer to a non-human nature to settle the question of what is ‘against’ or contrary to [our human] nature. History is human nature. Would someone explain how an appeal to Nature aids us in deciding what is acceptable morally–say in terms of human sexual expression? How that is possible in a non-normative way?

If man is homo faber, the tool-user, the inventor and transformer of what is given (nature), then the orderings and hierarchies we create/inherit/cultivate are a part of human nature. We cannot refer to a non-human nature to settle the question of what is ‘against’ or contrary to [our human] nature. History is human nature. Would someone explain how an appeal to Nature aids us in deciding what is acceptable morally–say in terms of human sexual expression? How that is possible in a non-normative way?

“I’m just living the way I live, enjoying my work and my family and my friends, and life seems special and precious to me, and I’m happy and I genuinely look forward to each new day.”

The question is, is this sort of happiness, alone and by itself, even worth having? Assume that it perfectly characterizes the psychological state of say, Pol Pot. Who cares? Isn’t such an opinion of oneself an undesireable thing if they have it in spite of the good? Wouldn’t we try to correct someone who had all the characteristics you describe if they had them in virtue of their deep love of child molestation or spousal abuse?

I claim that living according to one’s own nature is the standard of a happiness that is worth having. This happiness cannot be limited to a mere psychological state, or the opinion of someone about themself, even though I would insist that it this psychological state must be included in any definition of happiness.

Okay, I will. I argue that the tiny percentage of homosexuals who argue against gay marriage because they think that gay marriage will destroy the traditional family are wrong. Gay marriage will not destroy the traditional family. I commend to you Johnathan Rauch’s book on the subject and would suggest to you that his arguments about why gay marriage is actually a good thing are stronger than the arguments on the opposing side–no matter who happens to be articulating them.

The idea that the very few gay people who oppose gay marriage somehow should carry the argument is absurd. Some blacks opposed integration, and a considerable number of women opposed women’s suffrage. The question should not be “who believes what?” but rather, “what is the right thing to believe?”

It became apparent [in the 19th century] that the scientific understanding of the world emerges by way of a radical modification, as distinquished from a perfection, of the natural understanding. Since the natural understanding is the presupposition of the scientific understanding, the analysis of science and of the world of science presupposes the analysis of the natural understanding, the natural world, or the world of common sense. The natural world, the world in which we live and act, is not the object of or the product of a theoretical attitude; it is a world not of mere objects at which we detachedly look but of “things” or “affairs” which we handle. Yet as long as we identify the natural or prescientific world with the world in which we live, we are dealing with an abstraction. The world in which we live is arleady a product of science, or at any rate it is profoundly affected by the existence of science. To say nothing of technology, the world in which we live is free from ghosts, witches, and so on, with which, but for the existence of science, it would abound.

Emphasis in bold mine.

What makes difficult Nietzsche’s return to physis [NATURE] is of course “history,” and it is history which is the starting point and the theme of Heidegger. Heidegger is very deeply indebted to Nietzsche, and he knows this, of course and he does not, it seems to me, conceal it.* That he puts the emphasis on what distinguishes him from Nietzsche is, I think, perfectly defensible since he is naturally concerned with avoiding the pitfalls into which Nietzsche fell. The point which Heidegger learned from Nietzsche and which he could not have learned from any other philosopher is: “There is no Without;” i.e., there cannot be “objectivity” in the last analysis. From this point of view “nature” is no longer possible except as postulated in the critical moment, and eternal returns as Nietzsche understands it primarily is nature qua being through being postulated.

[. . . ]

To repeat, I think that you are right against Heidegger as regards Nietzsche’s intention. But once one raises the question, which I believe one must raise on the very basis of your excellent book on Nietzsche, whether Nietzsche achieved what he intended, and therefore what prevented his achieving what he intended, one is compelled to concentrate on Nietzsche’s radical historicism (which he may have believed to have been aufgehoben ["resolved" -- Hegelian term] in his “phsiology,” but which is not in fact), and then there is no possibility known to me superior to Heidegger’s philosophic doctrine of which his interpretation of Nietzsche forms an integral part.

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* Strauss prefaces this paragraph with the following qualifier:

As for the fact that Heidegger is chiefly concerned with the Nachlass [posthumous writings of Nietzsche], I thought that he justifies this sufficiently by quoting Nietzsche’s statements on the Zarathustra, on the one hand, and post-Zarathustra, on the other (cf. also: “Zarathustra is only an old atheist.”).

That is, some folks might see the gay issue as a subsidiary gender issue in the way that pregnancy is a subsidiary gender issue (and a protected anti-discrimination category).

Relating to the ban on gay marriage, this could clearly be analyzed, instead of under the rubric of “sexual orientation” discrimination, rather under, “gender discrimination,” i.e., the “wrong” gender of the partner instead of the “wrong” race.

Gender is an established “civil rights” category. But as Volokh’s post indicates, it has more exceptions than “race.” We subject laws that use racial classifications to Constitutional “strict scrutiny,” with gender, to “intermediate.” And then there is the BFOQ exception for gender under our anti-discrimination laws that is not recognized for race.

(For a classic example of such an exception, Volokh notes how sex-segregated bathrooms are okay, but racial one’s aren’t).

The point is, when laws make distinctions on the basis of gender, they do and ought to raise suspicion. Perhaps hetero marriage can overcome the suspicion, like a BFOQ or a policy that passes intermediate scrutiny. But there is also a reasonable basis for subjecting gender discriminatory marriages to a heightened level of scrutinty that we would not do for discrimination based on any other of those categories like “number” where is it argued that we will next fall down the slippery slope.