Strangely, though, even as a radical libertarian, I’m with DeLong on this one. But I think that a consequentialist structure of incentives exactly tracks a desert-based entitlement theory. In other words, I don’t think you and DeLong are all that far apart; you are just speaking different moral languages.

Since you all have hit on this important subject, I address it in a post of my own at errortheory.blogspot.com: “Time to perform reflective equilibrium on Rawls’ Theory of Justice”

The other thing I wonder is whether all you guys are really talking about the same sort of desert. I was struck by this sentence in the original Yglesias article:

Being born with the inclination and ability to become financially successful is no more morally praiseworthy than being born with the inclination and ability to inherit a large fortune.

Does anyone else see a problem here? Since money and moral praise are two different things, how exercised should we be to discover that the former is not distributed according to how much of the latter people deserve?

Thanks for the anecdote about MY.

I read a lot of arguments and, like every other person disagree with many of them. And I often spend considerable effort trying to understand how people come to a given conclusion. Delong seems preternaturally incapable of wondering whether he might–occasionally, once in a while– be wrong. Truly a world class asshole, Brad DeLong is one of the only people who regularly makes me want to punch my computer screen.

(Still, a very good economist. He should stick with it.)

I read a lot of arguments and, like every other person disagree with many of them. And I often spend considerable effort trying to understand how people come to a given conclusion. Delong seems preternaturally incapable of wondering whether he might–occasionally, once in a while– be wrong. Truly a world class asshole, Brad DeLong is one of the only people who regularly makes me want to punch my computer screen.

(Still, a very good economist. He should stick with it.)

Thanks for the anecdote about MY.

The other thing I wonder is whether all you guys are really talking about the same sort of desert. I was struck by this sentence in the original Yglesias article:

Being born with the inclination and ability to become financially successful is no more morally praiseworthy than being born with the inclination and ability to inherit a large fortune.

Does anyone else see a problem here? Since money and moral praise are two different things, how exercised should we be to discover that the former is not distributed according to how much of the latter people deserve?

Since you all have hit on this important subject, I address it in a post of my own at errortheory.blogspot.com: “Time to perform reflective equilibrium on Rawls’ Theory of Justice”

Strangely, though, even as a radical libertarian, I’m with DeLong on this one. But I think that a consequentialist structure of incentives exactly tracks a desert-based entitlement theory. In other words, I don’t think you and DeLong are all that far apart; you are just speaking different moral languages.

In his reply to Chris B’s response to his article on desert Will Wilkinson expresses dismay that no-one has taken up a point he made in his original piece, viz, Material inequality is one kind of inequality among many. Political…