Here’s a possible difference between undetermined will and free will. If some has undetermined will, then their choices were not determined at the time of the Big Bang.

If someone has a free will (on the compatibilist reading) they are able to make choices based on their desires and what they take to be their reasons for action (or something like that).

Notice that, in this sense, a free will does not have to be undetermined. It might be or it might not be. What makes the will free, in this sense of “free”, is that it is free to choose based upon its desires or perceived reasons for action (or whatever).

Now, you might not think that this is an interesting sense of “free will”. Or you might think that this is not a relevant sense of “free will”. Or you might think that it isn’t a sense of “free will” at all.

Which is it for you, if any?

I wholeheartedly agree that Mr. Wilkinson is trying to say that the human will is free, and everything might be determined. I would futher grant that this conflict might be resolved by a delicate parsing of terms, and I will also grant that Mr. Wilkinson has the authority of certain modern philosophers behind him.

What I don’t grant is that Mr. Wilkinson has proved his case, either by citing the arguments of his contemporaries or by giving a proof of his own. Certainly we shouldn’t give the benefit of the doubt to someone who claims what Mr. Wilkinson claims, because in common experience if you tell someone “everything might be determined” they will quite reasonably assume that “the will might be determined” and it might therefore not be free. If this is merely a dispute about terms, isn’t it imparative to distinguish terms? And even after we have distinguished our terms, if we still hold what Mr. Wilkenson claims, we will a least have to grant one sense in which the will is not free.

The responses given to my post are not definitive, but conditional on an account being given. This is fine as a first response, and I deeply value the responses, but I am reasonably confident that Mr. Wilkinson’s claim should not get the benefit of the doubt, and should not be accepted in the absence of an explanation. What is the precise difference beteween “an undetermined will” and “a free will”? I see no relevant distinction, and have never heard anyone who could give one. I therefore wholly stand by my first comment, and I wait for a plausible answer.

I’m surprised you don’t tackle the Objectivist idea that the choice to think — to focus one’s mind or not — is in some way the essence of free will. Somewhat mysteriously, acts of pushing pieces of paper across a table are not, on the Objectivist position as I understand it, paradigmatic cases of free will (if anything, the volitional character of such acts is supposed to depend in some way on the choice to think or not). Yet the Objectivist view is not that voluntary acts of thought make sophisticated knowledge and hence *autonomy* possible and that being autonomous is the root of voluntary actions which are free in the kind of sense that attaches to moral responsibility (a sort of Harry-Frankfurt-meet-Ayn-Rand position that I am inclined toward). As a young Objectivist, I did not ask hard questions about seating free will in the choice to focus one’s mind or not. How could the locus of free will or choice be in some particular choice? This does not make sense and cries out for hard questions, further interpretation, etc.

I’m interested in what you have to say to “little Will” at a more personal level. If “little Will” is like “little Michael,” the important personal question is what *nonepistemic* reasons he had for believing lots of questionable things. Was he angry and alienated from others as Rand often came across as in her writings? Why? Was he escaping into an set of ideas that conveniently tells him that these feelings are justified because he is just fine and *everyone else* is a schmuck and the *whole world* is corrupt? I expect you have some kind, big-brotherly words along these lines for “little Will” coming up…

(I know, I know. Get my own blog.)

Actually, my impression is that precisely that is the dominant position among philosophers working on this right now.

I believe that Will IS saying that the human will is free but everything might be determined. His point (or one of his points) is that freedom doesn’t require indeterminism. There’s nothing about our notion of free will that requires indeterminsm.

I think that a big part of the argument here is going to be sort of superficial (but not unimportant). What do we mean by “free will”? What do we mean by “free choice”? Will seems to want to argue that what we mean by these things is consistent with determinism.

If you disagree with his general position, then you probably disagree with him about the semantics of the relevant terms.

One way out of this is to make a distiction between “a undetermined will” and “a free will”. Nobody can believe there is any such distinction.

Another way to get out of this is to claim that even if there is something determining the will, we are ignorant of what it is, and so we must assume, by default, the common opinion that the will is free. This is mere mysticism. It is like saying that because are ignorant of what causes the corn to grow, we can assume, by default, that it is a god (or, optionally, we can assume there is no reason). Either way is the death of science.

So again, you’re saying “the human will is free, but everything might be determined”?

1.) The freedom of the will is not axiomatic, but rather proved from the indetermination of univerals, and

2.) If “detrminism” is taken to mean that a person is determined to something more particular than the good as such, it confuses sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge.

the rough proof is at my blog:

http://www.waitingforelijah.blogspot.com

p.s. I agree that “the first hand experience proof” gets one nowhere with refuting determinism.

I’m going to bet that you and Will can agree on a definition of “determinism” but not on one for “free will”. His definitions of both terms are going to be consistent with eachoter. Yours are not. I’m guessing.

The most important issue here, in my opinion, is whether or not we need an Objectivist or libertarian type of free will in order for us to make choices or be responsible for our choices. Will seems to think that we don’t.

Another important issue here is whether or not the Objectivist argument against determinism is sound. Now, I don’t think that it matters which sense of “free will” you plug into the Objectivist argument. It doesn’t defeat determinism.

You said:

I don’t think the experience of being able to choose otherwise is at all illusory if one is operating on the right notion of ‘able’.

My reply:

Ahh, but how do you pick the right notion of “able,” without getting into metaphysics?

Robert

Now, I’m not assuming determinism. I’ve said I don’t know whether or not it is true, but that I don’t think it has much to do with free will.

What you actually present, and object to, is an argument against determinism. However, presenting it as a syllogism makes it sound like a deduction, when really it is an evidentiary argument: we have particular introspective experiences, and this is evidence that our actions are not deterministic. It is all well and good if you want to question the strength of this type of evidence. But questioning the reliability of introspection does not serve to establish any sort of positive argument for determinism. What is the positive evidence or argument for determinism? If the choice is between a belief with no evidence in its favor vs. a belief with some evidence in its favor, then the latter is preferable.

Before anyone responds, let me note in advance that I do not find any of the following to be very convincing methods of arguing for determinism: 1) assuming determinism; 2) assuming reductionism; 3) the argument from repeated assertion; or 4) claiming that modern science is based on determinism. I mention this because I see these a lot when this issue is dicussed.

You said

“But our experience of choice contains nothing but the experience that our deliberation can lead to our choices, our choices can lead to our actions, our actions make things happen, and that we could have chosen otherwise…”

I’m assuming you meant to include “we could have chosen otherwise,” and that you didn’t mean to claim that this aspect of our experience is illustory.

If so, do you think that every philosopher who claims to be a compatibilist actually meets your requirements for compatibilism? Or are some of them just incompatibilist deniers of free will pretending to be something else?

I’m thinking of well known figures like Dennett and Flanagan here.

Robert