For TCS readers arriving from Ed Feser’s rejoinder to my rejoinder, you can find further discussion of political libertarianism here and in the comments, here.
I expect to have a reply to Feser’s latest up later today or tomorrow.
Will Wilkinson
The Sweet Release of Reason
If anyone is interested, see my post on the one narrow, albeit important point that Will didn’t address in his original rejoinder, that Lockean libertarianism, because it invokes “God” necessarily priviledges a “religious social order.”
http://jonrowe.blogspot.com/2004/08/does-lockean-libertarianism-require.html
Will,
I assume your forthcoming reply will focus on decentralization/federalism and Nozick’s “framework for utopia” argument. I’m surprised that Feser would even make his argument after writing a book on Nozick. Surely he is aware of Nozick’s “microsocieties” argument as a solution to incompatible moral views?
On the other hand, I think Feser’s argument, while probably not original, is a very good critique of Rawls, who, to my knowledge, did not encorporate much federalism into his political system.
Re: Micha Ghertner’s comments: I am, of course, aware of Nozick’s “framework for utopia” argument, and at the time of writing my book was more confident of libertarianism’s “neutrality” than I am now. So my discussion of Nozick’s framework in the book does not entirely reflect my current position.
In any case, Nozick’s framework fails truly to be neutral for just the reasons I describe in my TCS articles. The fact that Nozick’s position emphasizes decentralization/federalism doesn’t help, because what needs to be addressed is the extent to which the central or federal authority is going to be able legitimately to intervene in local affairs in order to protect liberty.
Consider the case of slavery in a country where some people consider slavery compatible with a classical liberal/libertarian society (as many in the pre-Civil War South did): if the federal authority doesn’t intervene, the shared commitment to “liberty,” “freedom” (or whatever) that constitutes the “overlapping consensus” between local communities turns out to be vacuous, since it has so little content that it doesn’t even rule out slavery (this is the first horn of the dilemma I pose for Rawls and Wilkinson); if it does intervene, then the understanding of “liberty” etc. is not vacuous, but neither is it genuinely neutral between comprehensive doctrines, as it claims to be (thus grasping the second horn of the dilemma).
In this case, of course, the non-neutrality would be a good thing, because it would end the injustice of slavery; but the point is that it definitely IS non-neutrality, between worldviews that are in the usual (i.e. not the technical Rawlsian sense) “reasonable,” i.e. held by a great many people and associated with a long cultural and intellectual tradition (as slavery was). Of course, Wilkinson could just stipulate that advocates of slavery were unreasonable in the Rawlsian sense, but then his view clearly fails to do what it claimed to do, i.e. provide a way in which a libertarian society can avoid having to settle fierce disputes between competing comprehensive doctrines having many adherents within it.
The right thing to say about the slavery case, in my view, is that the advocates of slavery, including the classical liberal/libertarian ones, were just wrong, and to admit that this is by no means a “neutral” position, but depends essentially on a particular comprehensive doctrine. And I think disputes over abortion and same-sex marriage are in exactly the same boat: there is no way to deal with these issues apart from some comprehensive doctrine, and no way for a “libertarian framework” to be be neutral. Even if a central or federal authority simply tried to avoid these questions by letting local communities decide as they see fit, this would be a fake neutrality, just as the “neutrality” the federal government once took toward slavery was. From the abolitionist point of view, even allowing slavery in some states was simply taking sides with those willing to deprive others of their rights. Similarly, in the case of abortion (for example), a federal government which allows some states to have abortion is simply allowing for the violation of the rights of some citizens –the unborn — from the point of view of pro-life advocates, and thus failing truly to be neutral.
That questions of decentralization, federalism, and “neutrality” are by no means as simple as libertarians often suppose is made evident in Chandran Kukathas’s important article “Two Constructions of Libertarianism,” which I wish I’d thought to cite in my articles (and which is available online at:
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/libertarian.pdf
As Kukathas shows, there are really only two ways to interpret the libertarian idea of “non-aggression,” and either one we choose is going to lead to results that are far less “libertarian” than libertarians usually imagine. (Though I don’t claim, by the way, that Kukathas would endorse everything I’ve been saying in my TCS articles.)
Finally, if you think my critique of Rawls is good, then you should admit that my critique of Wilkinson is good too, since the same points apply to both.
Re: Jon Rowe’s comments on his blog, I have no idea why he thinks my characterization of Locke has anything to do with the agenda of the “religious right,” since there’s nothing in what I wrote to lend support to such an inference. (I’ve noticed that various readers have read all sorts of bizarre things into my article, having less to do with anything I wrote than with their own personal obsessions.) All I was doing was citing Locke’s own view; and to note that Locke believed that natural rights derive from God, and that atheists are not entitled to toleration, is hardly to say anything controversial.
“All I was doing was citing Locke’s own view; and to note that Locke believed that natural rights derive from God, and that atheists are not entitled to toleration, is hardly to say anything controversial.”
No you were doing more than that.
Your article takes Lockean libertarianism, lumps it with Aristotle and Hayek, and then claims that any libertarian operating in such traditions should favor a social or religious conservative worldview:
“That Locke’s version of classical liberalism favors a decidedly religious social order should be obvious.” A “Lockean…sort will, obviously, be a society of a generally conservative character….“Just as the Lockean…version[] of libertarianism entail a social marginalization of those who flout bourgeois moral standards.” “Those whose libertarianism is grounded in Lockean…thinking are far more likely to take a conservative line on the matter.”
You act as though any Lockean must think as though it were the 1600s and mirror Locke’s exact opinions as they existed at that time. Well actually, “Lockeanism” doesn’t refer to one man’s specific opinions at a particular date in history, but rather a tradition of thinking that began with Locke but has, consistent with his core principles, evolved along the way. Your article notes that Locke didn’t extend tolerance to Catholics but also implies that it would only take a small leap of logic, while still being consistent with Locke’s teachings, to extend those same rights to Catholics. That’s the type of evolution we are talking about.
Well America’s most important Lockeans, Jefferson and Madison, took that small leap and wished to extend the full rights of conscience to “the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination.” Indeed to Jefferson, Locke’s theory of the “rights of conscience” fully and properly realized would extend such rights to men who worshipped twenty Gods or no God.
Julian Sanchez notes that most modern Lockeans have scrapped any sort of theological views as grounding natural rights; well some of Locke’s earliest and most important followers—American Founders like Jefferson and Madison—took his theory and got us, at least in theory, not necessarily in practice—public neutrality between the various religions and between belief and non-belief.
That a religiously non-neutral society of some sort would follow from Locke’s premises is, again, obvious from the theological foundation he gives his political philosophy. It doesn’t necessarily follow that it would have to be a specifically Christian society, and I didn’t say or imply that it would, contrary to your talk about the “religious right,” etc.
Since Locke himself certainly saw the existence of God as a necessary precondition for rights, it is hardly obvious that anyone who rejects God’s existence can be a “Lockean” except in a very loose sense. And that Locke’s theological premises are essential to his project is hardly my opinion alone: take a look at Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke, and Equality for a detailed study. (Waldron is hardly a member of the “religious right.”)
None of this is to deny that a Lockean view could evolve, but it doesn’t follow that it could coherently evolve in just any direction. In particular, if theological premises really are as central to Locke’s view as Locke himself seemed to think (and as Waldron thinks) then it is hard to see how a Lockean view could coherently evolve in an atheistic direction.
Personally, I like the direction that Jefferson took Lockean theory: He appealed to an unorthodox God as the guarantor of rights. Jefferson’s “nature’s God,” unlike the God the Bible, (see the First Commandment), grants men the inalienable right to worship no God or twenty Gods.
Edward Feser,
Thanks for the “Two Constructions of Libertarianism.” I greatly enjoyed it.
However, I think Kukathas’s argument cuts against yours. Only under a “Union of Liberty” is a libertarian political system incapable of neutrality. Such a system must decide how to resolve issues like abortion, gay rights, and slavery. In contrast, under a “Federation of Liberty”, neutrality is possible and no single-conception is required. This achieves the stated goal of neutrality – limiting the amount of social conflict between different groups on how to resolve these issues.
This does lead to some difficult conclusions, with which I am not entirely happy, but I don’t see any better alternative.
One minor objection I have to Kukathas’s speech is his overly-rigid conception of federalism. It is possible to believe that a “Federation of Liberty” is the best (or least-bad) institutional structure, while at the same time maintaining the moral right of non-institutional entities to intervene in unjust societies as advocates or agents for the victims.
Pingback: וויסקי קנדיאן
Pingback: מיכלי הדחה
Pingback: Card Games
If anyone is interested, see my post on the one narrow, albeit important point that Will didn’t address in his original rejoinder, that Lockean libertarianism, because it invokes “God” necessarily priviledges a “religious social order.”
http://jonrowe.blogspot.com/2004/08/does-lockean-libertarianism-require.html
Will,
I assume your forthcoming reply will focus on decentralization/federalism and Nozick’s “framework for utopia” argument. I’m surprised that Feser would even make his argument after writing a book on Nozick. Surely he is aware of Nozick’s “microsocieties” argument as a solution to incompatible moral views?
On the other hand, I think Feser’s argument, while probably not original, is a very good critique of Rawls, who, to my knowledge, did not encorporate much federalism into his political system.
Re: Micha Ghertner’s comments: I am, of course, aware of Nozick’s “framework for utopia” argument, and at the time of writing my book was more confident of libertarianism’s “neutrality” than I am now. So my discussion of Nozick’s framework in the book does not entirely reflect my current position.
In any case, Nozick’s framework fails truly to be neutral for just the reasons I describe in my TCS articles. The fact that Nozick’s position emphasizes decentralization/federalism doesn’t help, because what needs to be addressed is the extent to which the central or federal authority is going to be able legitimately to intervene in local affairs in order to protect liberty.
Consider the case of slavery in a country where some people consider slavery compatible with a classical liberal/libertarian society (as many in the pre-Civil War South did): if the federal authority doesn’t intervene, the shared commitment to “liberty,” “freedom” (or whatever) that constitutes the “overlapping consensus” between local communities turns out to be vacuous, since it has so little content that it doesn’t even rule out slavery (this is the first horn of the dilemma I pose for Rawls and Wilkinson); if it does intervene, then the understanding of “liberty” etc. is not vacuous, but neither is it genuinely neutral between comprehensive doctrines, as it claims to be (thus grasping the second horn of the dilemma).
In this case, of course, the non-neutrality would be a good thing, because it would end the injustice of slavery; but the point is that it definitely IS non-neutrality, between worldviews that are in the usual (i.e. not the technical Rawlsian sense) “reasonable,” i.e. held by a great many people and associated with a long cultural and intellectual tradition (as slavery was). Of course, Wilkinson could just stipulate that advocates of slavery were unreasonable in the Rawlsian sense, but then his view clearly fails to do what it claimed to do, i.e. provide a way in which a libertarian society can avoid having to settle fierce disputes between competing comprehensive doctrines having many adherents within it.
The right thing to say about the slavery case, in my view, is that the advocates of slavery, including the classical liberal/libertarian ones, were just wrong, and to admit that this is by no means a “neutral” position, but depends essentially on a particular comprehensive doctrine. And I think disputes over abortion and same-sex marriage are in exactly the same boat: there is no way to deal with these issues apart from some comprehensive doctrine, and no way for a “libertarian framework” to be be neutral. Even if a central or federal authority simply tried to avoid these questions by letting local communities decide as they see fit, this would be a fake neutrality, just as the “neutrality” the federal government once took toward slavery was. From the abolitionist point of view, even allowing slavery in some states was simply taking sides with those willing to deprive others of their rights. Similarly, in the case of abortion (for example), a federal government which allows some states to have abortion is simply allowing for the violation of the rights of some citizens –the unborn — from the point of view of pro-life advocates, and thus failing truly to be neutral.
That questions of decentralization, federalism, and “neutrality” are by no means as simple as libertarians often suppose is made evident in Chandran Kukathas’s important article “Two Constructions of Libertarianism,” which I wish I’d thought to cite in my articles (and which is available online at:
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/libertarian.pdf
As Kukathas shows, there are really only two ways to interpret the libertarian idea of “non-aggression,” and either one we choose is going to lead to results that are far less “libertarian” than libertarians usually imagine. (Though I don’t claim, by the way, that Kukathas would endorse everything I’ve been saying in my TCS articles.)
Finally, if you think my critique of Rawls is good, then you should admit that my critique of Wilkinson is good too, since the same points apply to both.
Re: Jon Rowe’s comments on his blog, I have no idea why he thinks my characterization of Locke has anything to do with the agenda of the “religious right,” since there’s nothing in what I wrote to lend support to such an inference. (I’ve noticed that various readers have read all sorts of bizarre things into my article, having less to do with anything I wrote than with their own personal obsessions.) All I was doing was citing Locke’s own view; and to note that Locke believed that natural rights derive from God, and that atheists are not entitled to toleration, is hardly to say anything controversial.
“All I was doing was citing Locke’s own view; and to note that Locke believed that natural rights derive from God, and that atheists are not entitled to toleration, is hardly to say anything controversial.”
No you were doing more than that.
Your article takes Lockean libertarianism, lumps it with Aristotle and Hayek, and then claims that any libertarian operating in such traditions should favor a social or religious conservative worldview:
“That Locke’s version of classical liberalism favors a decidedly religious social order should be obvious.” A “Lockean…sort will, obviously, be a society of a generally conservative character….“Just as the Lockean…version[] of libertarianism entail a social marginalization of those who flout bourgeois moral standards.” “Those whose libertarianism is grounded in Lockean…thinking are far more likely to take a conservative line on the matter.”
You act as though any Lockean must think as though it were the 1600s and mirror Locke’s exact opinions as they existed at that time. Well actually, “Lockeanism” doesn’t refer to one man’s specific opinions at a particular date in history, but rather a tradition of thinking that began with Locke but has, consistent with his core principles, evolved along the way. Your article notes that Locke didn’t extend tolerance to Catholics but also implies that it would only take a small leap of logic, while still being consistent with Locke’s teachings, to extend those same rights to Catholics. That’s the type of evolution we are talking about.
Well America’s most important Lockeans, Jefferson and Madison, took that small leap and wished to extend the full rights of conscience to “the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination.” Indeed to Jefferson, Locke’s theory of the “rights of conscience” fully and properly realized would extend such rights to men who worshipped twenty Gods or no God.
Julian Sanchez notes that most modern Lockeans have scrapped any sort of theological views as grounding natural rights; well some of Locke’s earliest and most important followers—American Founders like Jefferson and Madison—took his theory and got us, at least in theory, not necessarily in practice—public neutrality between the various religions and between belief and non-belief.
That a religiously non-neutral society of some sort would follow from Locke’s premises is, again, obvious from the theological foundation he gives his political philosophy. It doesn’t necessarily follow that it would have to be a specifically Christian society, and I didn’t say or imply that it would, contrary to your talk about the “religious right,” etc.
Since Locke himself certainly saw the existence of God as a necessary precondition for rights, it is hardly obvious that anyone who rejects God’s existence can be a “Lockean” except in a very loose sense. And that Locke’s theological premises are essential to his project is hardly my opinion alone: take a look at Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke, and Equality for a detailed study. (Waldron is hardly a member of the “religious right.”)
None of this is to deny that a Lockean view could evolve, but it doesn’t follow that it could coherently evolve in just any direction. In particular, if theological premises really are as central to Locke’s view as Locke himself seemed to think (and as Waldron thinks) then it is hard to see how a Lockean view could coherently evolve in an atheistic direction.
Personally, I like the direction that Jefferson took Lockean theory: He appealed to an unorthodox God as the guarantor of rights. Jefferson’s “nature’s God,” unlike the God the Bible, (see the First Commandment), grants men the inalienable right to worship no God or twenty Gods.
Edward Feser,
Thanks for the “Two Constructions of Libertarianism.” I greatly enjoyed it.
However, I think Kukathas’s argument cuts against yours. Only under a “Union of Liberty” is a libertarian political system incapable of neutrality. Such a system must decide how to resolve issues like abortion, gay rights, and slavery. In contrast, under a “Federation of Liberty”, neutrality is possible and no single-conception is required. This achieves the stated goal of neutrality – limiting the amount of social conflict between different groups on how to resolve these issues.
This does lead to some difficult conclusions, with which I am not entirely happy, but I don’t see any better alternative.
One minor objection I have to Kukathas’s speech is his overly-rigid conception of federalism. It is possible to believe that a “Federation of Liberty” is the best (or least-bad) institutional structure, while at the same time maintaining the moral right of non-institutional entities to intervene in unjust societies as advocates or agents for the victims.