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	<title>Comments on: More Political Libertarianism</title>
	<atom:link href="http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/</link>
	<description>The Sweet Release of Reason</description>
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		<title>By: IBM</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-712</link>
		<dc:creator>IBM</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Aug 2004 10:23:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-712</guid>
		<description>&quot;Ack, sorry about all the comments. Stupid computers!&quot;

There are no stupid computers, only stupid users, programmers, and writers.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Ack, sorry about all the comments. Stupid computers!&#8221;</p>
<p>There are no stupid computers, only stupid users, programmers, and writers.</p>
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		<title>By: John T. Kennedy</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-711</link>
		<dc:creator>John T. Kennedy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Aug 2004 20:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-711</guid>
		<description>&quot;Then Ayn Rand is right. But the probability that everyone comes to agree with Ayn Rand is, well, zero, give or take.&quot;

Coincidentally, that&#039;s about where libertarianism shows up in the polls...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Then Ayn Rand is right. But the probability that everyone comes to agree with Ayn Rand is, well, zero, give or take.&#8221;</p>
<p>Coincidentally, that&#8217;s about where libertarianism shows up in the polls&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: John T. Kennedy</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-710</link>
		<dc:creator>John T. Kennedy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 17:48:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-710</guid>
		<description>Micha,

Will was taking issue with my assertion that willing compliance was incompatible with any government at all. If he means to say what you and DF are saying, fine. But how is that government?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Micha,</p>
<p>Will was taking issue with my assertion that willing compliance was incompatible with any government at all. If he means to say what you and DF are saying, fine. But how is that government?</p>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-708</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 16:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-708</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will&#039;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#039;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.</p>
<p>This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?</p>
<p>David Friedman presents Will&#8217;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#8217;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.</p>
<p>Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-709</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 16:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-709</guid>
		<description>Ack, sorry about all the comments. Stupid computers!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ack, sorry about all the comments. Stupid computers!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-707</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 14:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-707</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will&#039;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#039;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.</p>
<p>This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?</p>
<p>David Friedman presents Will&#8217;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#8217;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.</p>
<p>Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-706</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 12:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-706</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will&#039;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#039;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.</p>
<p>This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?</p>
<p>David Friedman presents Will&#8217;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#8217;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.</p>
<p>Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-705</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 12:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-705</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will&#039;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#039;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.</p>
<p>This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?</p>
<p>David Friedman presents Will&#8217;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#8217;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.</p>
<p>Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: Micha Ghertner</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-704</link>
		<dc:creator>Micha Ghertner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2004 12:39:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-704</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will&#039;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#039;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &quot;solve&quot; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll tell you right up front that I absolutely will not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. So you can forget about willing compliance.</p>
<p>This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?</p>
<p>David Friedman presents Will&#8217;s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will&#8217;s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.</p>
<p>Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to &#8220;solve&#8221; public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.</p>
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		<title>By: John T. Kennedy</title>
		<link>http://willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2004/07/29/more-political-libertarianism/#comment-703</link>
		<dc:creator>John T. Kennedy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Aug 2004 10:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/?p=398#comment-703</guid>
		<description>&quot;That is, nobody is disposed to unilaterally free-ride.&quot;

I am disposed to unilaterally free-ride, and so are you.

Say the people on my block decide to hire a security patrol. I will definitely benefit from the patrols, my home will be slightly safer. But the benefit does not justify the cost, I&#039;d prefer to spend my money otherwise. So I&#039;m disposed to free-ride if they implement the patrols.

Can you offer an example where you think force is justified to reach voluntary compliance?

&quot;I believe this does, in fact, work fairly well here in the US...&quot;

If restraining government by voluntary donations of virtue works well then why is the effective choice on the ballot between socialism and socialism-lite?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;That is, nobody is disposed to unilaterally free-ride.&#8221;</p>
<p>I am disposed to unilaterally free-ride, and so are you.</p>
<p>Say the people on my block decide to hire a security patrol. I will definitely benefit from the patrols, my home will be slightly safer. But the benefit does not justify the cost, I&#8217;d prefer to spend my money otherwise. So I&#8217;m disposed to free-ride if they implement the patrols.</p>
<p>Can you offer an example where you think force is justified to reach voluntary compliance?</p>
<p>&#8220;I believe this does, in fact, work fairly well here in the US&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>If restraining government by voluntary donations of virtue works well then why is the effective choice on the ballot between socialism and socialism-lite?</p>
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